The development of secure multi-agent systems by Janicke, Helge
ýoo<3f'401; G9 c-/o 
DMU 0587271 01 2 
llHI HH Hill iHI IHII 
The Development of Secure 
Multi-Agent Systems 
PhD Thesis 
Helge T. Janicke 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy, awarded by De Montfort University. 
February 2007 
2 
Abstract 
Security requirements must be addressed early and throughout the development of the 
system. They cannot be left to a late stage in the development process, as otherwise func- 
tional design-decisions may undermine security requirements. Honouring this principle we 
developed the SANTA framework which integrates the specification of security, functional 
and temporal requirements of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) within a unifying and formal 
framework. 
The specification and implementation of MAS is supported by the SANTA Wide- 
Spectrum Language (SANTA-WSL). SANTA-WSL allows for the expression of specifi- 
cations and their implementations within the same language. The specification-oriented 
semantics of SANTA-WSL is given in Interval Temporal Logic (ITL), that is the formal 
foundation of all components in the framework. A formal foundation is key to the cer- 
tification of MAS deployed in security critical environments where a breach in security 
may result in serious harm to people, equipment or missions. A SANTA-WSL specifica- 
tion comprises agents, objects, policies and enforcement mechanisms. Agents are active 
entities in the system; objects represent passive resources; policies express security require- 
ments; and enforcement mechanisms define the effect of a policy on the execution. Policies 
can change dynamically according to time or events and can express history-dependent 
constraints. They are compositional, that is policies can be composed out of small, easier 
to comprehend components Tong a temporal and structural axis. 
We show the advantages of policy composition for the specification and enforcement 
of policies. Compositionality is also important for verification, as properties of the overall 
policy can be inferred from the properties of its components. We show how abstract policy 
and enforcement specifications can be refined into concrete and implementable enforcement 
code that guarantees the compliance with original specification. On one hand policies 
depend on the history of the system's execution, on the other hand the execution of the 
system depend on the outcome of policy decisions. By addressing security, functional and 
temporal requirements in a unifying framework we are able to formalise and study their 
interactions. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Motivation 
With the growth of the World Wide Web (WWW) more and more information becomes 
available, in form of scientific articles, results of experiments, news and other on-line 
services. But it is not only the part of the internet that we can access through web-pages 
that grows at such an enormous rate, increasingly businesses and governmental institutions 
use the internet, or similar networks, to communicate and share (confidential) information 
in order to be competitive or to provide better services. 
The amount of information does lead to an information overload, viz. the problem of 
determining which information is relevant and which is not. This is not only a difficulty 
for private users, but especially for global businesses and governmental institutions that 
use and share information with their partners. Sharing information efficiently and securely 
is especially important in the military domain, where increased situational awareness and 
shorter Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) cycles are critical success factors. Ded- 
icated decision support systems are devised to aid in the analysis of information and pro- 
vide support for human decision making under severe time constraints whilst maintaining 
a high level of assurance in the security of the system. 
We identified in [19] requirements and problems that information and decision support 
systems face in the military domain, that - by its nature - is characterised by uncertainty 
and disruption. Based on the identified needs we concluded that Agents and Multi Agent 
System technologies are one of the best candidates to provide these systems. However, with 
the increased level of awareness and the higher availability of mission critical information, 
security becomes a major concern. 
23 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Problem Statement 
Security cannot be bolt on. It must be addressed together with the functional and tem- 
poral requirements early and throughout the system's development life-cycle. If security 
requirements are not addressed in the early stages of the development process, the system 
design is likely to prevent their implementation - leading either to insecure implementa- 
tions or to a complete (and expensive) redesign of the affected components. 
Especially for security critical applications, viz. applications in which the violation 
of the system's security requirements can cause actual bodily harm or loss of life, it is 
paramount that mechanisms that ensure the compliance with the security requirements 
are in place and can be certified. By certification we mean that a high level of assurance 
can be provided that the implementation of the security mechanisms ensure that none of 
the security requirements can possibly be violated. 
The key advantage of Multi Agent Systems for information and decision support sys- 
tems is the unsupervised collaboration of autonomous agents to achieve an adopted goal. 
Collaboration, however, requires the exchange of potentially security critical information. 
To guarantee that security requirements are not violated it is important to limit the au- 
tonomy of the agents in the Multi Agent System and their access to system resources. 
In the context of Multi Agent Systems the employed mechanisms must be flexible, viz. 
the enforced security requirements can change dynamically on time or events, and modular, 
viz. the mechanisms should be loosely coupled with the agent design and should not limit 
the architecture that is used for the implementation of individual agents. If the security 
mechanisms are too static and impose too many constraints on the implementation of 
system components, they destroy the very advantages that Agent and Multi Agent System 
technology has to offer for applications used in uncertain and disruptive environments. 
Approach to Solution 
To be able to provide such a high level of assurance, we integrate the specification of 
security, functional and temporal requirements within a unifying and formal framework. 
This allows for the analysis of the effect that the enforcement of security requirements has 
on the behaviour of the Multi Agent System, which is the main goal of any certification 
process. 
The use of formal methods, viz. the creation of a mathematical model of the system 
that accurately describes its functioning, is a key factor, as it allows for the unambiguous 
specification of the requirements and their verification using mathematical machinery that 
has been developed and improved upon over years. The use of mathematical formulations 
to express security requirements, such as access control or integrity constraints, has been 
24 
identified as a corner stone for the certification of military information systems in e. g. [85]. 
Today, policy languages are used to formulate security requirements at a level that 
is more accessible to administrators who will inevitably maintain the systems. They 
provide an abstraction from the concrete models that are encoded in the system. The 
idea is to separate the policies from their implementations and to introduce management 
components in the system that interpret and enforce these policies [126]. The advantage of 
this modular approach is that it permits the timely adaptation to changes in the system 
and allows to react quickly to formerly undiscovered vulnerabilities. This flexibility is 
essential in military and business environments. 
Although many policy languages have been proposed (e. g. [72,108,134,118,46,20]) 
their ability to express dynamic change of policies based on time or the occurrence of 
events is limited. Dynamically changing policies have been recently addressed in [124] 
by policy composition at the specification level. We believe that dynamically changing 
policies play an important role for the specification of security requirements for Multi 
Agent Systems in the before mentioned domains, as they allow for the dynamic adoption 
of a different security policy based on the current situation. 
We use the model proposed in [124] as the foundation of our work as it also provides 
a compositional approach to policy specification and verification. We feel that the com- 
positionality of the model improves the scalability of the formal approach. Using this 
model, policies can be specified as individual components, for example policies that apply 
in different situations are specified individually, and are then combined to form the over- 
all policy of the system. Similarly, the compositionality of the model does allow for the 
compositional verification of policies, viz. properties of the system policy can be inferred 
from properties of its components. 
Another important aspect of the policy model is that it allows for the specification of 
history-based policies [3]. For example the requirement "if a user at some point in the 
past read a file that is secret then the same user cannot write to a file that is unclassified" 
can be expressed naturally in the model. This allows for the expression of a large class of 
security requirements, including complex policies such as the Chinese Wall Policy [35]. 
By providing a unifying and formal framework, named SANTA, we are able to integrate 
the functional specification of the system with its security and temporal requirements. This 
allows us to study the effect that the enforcement of dynamically changing security policies 
has on the behaviour of the Multi Agent System. Through the use of Interval Temporal 
Logic (ITL), we are able to study the timeliness of the policy enforcement and show that 
the system-implementation satisfies the functional, security and temporal requirements. 
Figure 1.1 outlines the proposed framework. 
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Figure l. l: Outline of the Proposed Framework 
The SAN'T'A framework is organised along a theoretical to - applied axis. The 
fouudat iou is a foruºal couiputatioual ºnodel and a compatible security model. To aid 
ill t he specification and dcsigu of the systeiu we provide linguistic support, in form of 
t lie SAN'T'A Wide-Spect ruuº Language (SANTA-WSL), for the specification of a Secure 
Multi Agent System (S NIAS). 'I'he language is agent-based and provides constructs for the 
Specification of react ivc agents, objects that represent shared resources, security policies 
and their cnforcciucut ux'chanisºns. SANTA-WSL is a wide-spectrum language, viz. the 
language allows for specification constructs and concrete implementations to coexist within 
t he saºue prograuº. 'T'he specification oriented semantics of SANTA-WSL is given in ITL 
t lint is t he underlying logical foundation of the SANTA framework. 
'T'he dcvelopnicnt of Secure Nlulti Agent Systems using SANTA-WSL is based on the 
uotiou of refinement, tlºat is the stepwise transformation of a specification into a con- 
crete and iuºpleºueut; ºhle program through the application of sound, semantic preserving 
refineuºent, rules. Policies are defined at a higher level of abstraction than the system 
inºplenºent at iou itself. For example an authorisation policy defines the conditions under 
which it user can access a specific resource in a declarative manner - without detailing 
how this constraint is actually implemented. Enforcement mechanisms are also defined at 
a high abstractiou level. 'They state properties that the systein must satisfy to comply with 
it specific policy. During the development process policies and enforcement mechanisms 
are refined into concrete and deterministic enforcement code. 
I3y refining t he policy and their enforcement mechanisms into concrete, provably cor- 
rect cuforceºueººt code, we are able to provide high assurance iii the system's security 
uºeclumisºus. 'Phis is important for the certification of Secure Multi Agent Systems de- 
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veloped using the SANTA framework, that would otherwise have to rely on review and 
validation techniques. 
The concrete SANTA programs should be readily implementable (or even compilable) 
in agent-frameworks such as JADE [129], although this is not the main focus of the thesis. 
Part of the SANTA framework forms also the tool-support for analysis, where we especially 
focus on the early prototyping of policies, their animation and analysis using the Security 
Policy Analysis Tool (SPAT). 
Outline 
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 we critically review related work in 
the areas of Multi Agent Systems and policy specification/enforcement. In Chapter 3 
we provide an introduction to the SANTA framework and SANTA-WSL that serves as 
an overview for the formalisation in the subsequent chapters. For completeness of the 
presented work, we introduce in Chapter 4 the syntax and semantics of ITL. Readers who 
are already familiar with ITL may wish to skip this chapter. 
To make the formalisation of the framework more accessible, we gradually extend 
SANTA-WSL from Chapter 5 to 8. In Chapter 5 we concern ourselves with the formal 
specification of agents. We refer to the subset that is introduced in this chapter as SMAS1, 
viz. a SMAS1 is a SMAS that contains only agent specifications. We extend the specifi- 
cation of a SMAS1 by introducing objects in Chapter 6 and formalise the communication 
between agents and objects. We- refer to this subset as SMAS2i viz. a SMAS2 is a SMAS 
that contains only agents and objects. 
In Chapter 7 we present the policy model presented in [124] and extensions for the 
specification of obligation and integrity requirements as well as scoping and structural 
composition [74]. We also provide examples of well-known policies such as Bell LaPadula 
[21] and Chinese Wall [35]. In Chapter 8 we then define (de-)centralised enforcement 
mechanisms that link policies with agents and objects. We refer to a SMAS as a SMAS3 
to explicitly state that the SMAS contains agents, objects, policies and enforcement mech- 
anisms. 
In Chapter 9 we define formally what we mean by refinement and provide refinement 
rules that are used subsequently to show how agents in a SMAS can be developed. We 
also apply the refinement rules to show how enforcement mechanisms and policies can be 
refined into concrete enforcement code. 
Chapter 10 describes the design of SPAT that has been implemented as a prototype. 
The tool is used for the early prototyping and validation of dynamically changing policies. 
It is intended to be used by policy designers to validate that a policy specification does yield 
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the desired effect before the policy is deployed. We summarise the thesis in Chapter 11 
where we emphasise the contributions of this work, and review them critically. The chapter 
also outlines future work to improve the SANTA framework. 
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Related Work 
In this chapter we introduce the concept of Software Agents and Multi- 
Agent Systems and review related work in the area of policy languages 
that can be enforced to control their execution. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part, Section 2.2, provides an introduc- 
tion to agent-based systems. We survey the different view-points on this topic that have 
influenced research in this area over the years. The aiin is to provide an overview of what 
agent-based systems are and the properties that are commonly associated with agents. 
We then point out the key properties of agents that are addressed in this thesis. 
The second part, Section 2.3, critically reviews related work in the area of security with 
the emphasis on policy-based languages and control mechanisms for distributed systems in 
general and for Multi Agent Systems in particular. Following the review on policy models 
and languages, we discuss the enforcement of policies. The chapter concludes with a short 
summary in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Agent and Multi-Agent Systems 
The idea of agents is old - mankind has always dreamed of creating artificial intelligence 
and artificial life-forms, that would help in our (lay to day business. The idea of agents is 
indeed about learning and assisting human users. According to Allan Kay [81] the idea of 
software agents attributes to John McCarthy and Oliver G. Selfridge during their work in 
the 1950s at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Kay describes their vision as 
follows: 
They had in view a system that, when given a goal could carry out the details 
of the appropriate computer operations and could ask back for and receive 
advice, offered in human terms, when it was stuck. An agent would be a soft 
robot living and doing its business within the computer world. [81] (cited by 
1331) 
An agent that could deduce execution plans from a given goal to carry out appropriate 
computer operations itself and that accepts instructions offered in human terms immedi- 
ately leads to the research field of Artificial Intelligence (Al), which had anti still has the 
main influence on todays research on agents. Jennings et. al. [77) state that Al is all about 
creating intelligent artifacts and that if these artifacts can sense and act in some environ- 
ment they can be considered to be agents, indeed. Some specialised groups within the 
Al community are more closely related to agents. Namely these are Artificial Intelligence 
Planning (AIP) and Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI). Research in these areas was 
categorised by Nwana [107) as being the first strand in the history of agent development. 
Artificial Intelligence Planning is usually associated with the Stanford Research Insti- 
tute Problem Solver (STRIPS) [55) planning system which uses symbolic representations 
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of the agent's environment, its capabilities and goals to describe the system. The planning 
algorithm employs symbolic reasoning techniques to create a plan that can be executed 
by the agent in order to achieve its goal. In the 1980s it became clear that although the 
planning algorithms in STRIPS and its descendants provide reasonable performance they 
do not scale well when applied to more realistic, real world examples. Rodney Brooks has 
been one of the front runners in questioning the applicability of symbolic reasoning to real 
world examples in Al. Based on his experience he proposed an alternative to symbolic 
AI, variously known as behavioural AT, reactive AI or situated AI [37]. We discuss the 
resulting subsumption architecture [36] later in section 2.2.2. 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence itself can be divided into two separate sub-domains 
1. ) Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) and 2. ) Multi Agent System (MAS). The for- 
mer concentrates on how knowledge can be distributed between different modules that in 
turn cooperatively solve the problem. In Distributed Problem Solving systems the com- 
munication and interaction strategies are usually predefined and form an integral part of 
the system. On the contrary the agents in Multi Agent System are autonomous problem 
solvers, which are loosely coupled and aimed to solve problems that would otherwise be 
beyond the capability of each single agent. Although Multi Agent System originated from 
Artificial Intelligence the word is today often used in a different sense: to denote systems 
that can be seen as they are constituted out of several agents [77]. 
The second strand of agent development, that has been identified by Nwana [107] 
started in the 1990s with the diversification in the types of agents. This was the time 
when the term agent has been picked up by researchers from a variety of different fields 
such as robotics, artificial life, distributed object computing, human-computer interaction 
- to enumerate only a few. Since then the already not well defined notion of what an 
agent is has become more vague and the categorisation of agent types even more complex. 
Having in view the now much broader area of agent research Nwana sees the Actor model 
proposed by Agha and Hewitt as one of the first models to describe Multi Agent Systems. 
In this model an actor is a self contained, interactive and continuously executing object. As 
discussed in further detail in the subsequent section the necessity of these three properties 
of agenthood, is widely accepted. 
An actor is a computational agent which has an email address and a behaviour. 
Actors communicate by message passing and carry out their actions concur- 
rently. [107] 
Undeniable other fields of research such as Object Oriented Programming (OOP), con- 
current object-based systems as well as human-computer interface design, did contribute 
significantly to current agents research. Zambonelli et. al. state in [142] that for researchers 
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coming from the field of Object Oriented Programming agents are often seen as being (spe- 
cialised) objects. Although it is true that most of the todays agent based applications are 
written in an Object Oriented Programming environment, agents are to be seen as a more 
abstract way of describing complex, highly interactive, distributed systems. One approach 
to develop Multi Agent System - the GAIA Methodology - is presented in [142]. It is 
based on the identification of organisations and roles, which later in the development are 
assigned to concrete agents. 
The idea of using agents as an abstraction and directly create Multi Agent System by 
programming agents and their relationships was proposed by Shoham in the 1990s. His 
ideas were manifested in the Agent Orientated Programming (AOP) paradigm, that like 
Object Oriented Programming abstracts from the concrete implementation and describes 
entities (agents), their relationships and interaction. His work resulted in one of the first 
agent languages called AGENTO in which an agent is essentially described in terms of 
capabilities, initial beliefs and commitments and so called commitment rules which are 
responsible for the actual action the agent does take. Since then other researchers invented 
agent-languages to describe Multi Agent System (e. g. [143,58,50,92]). 
Jennings et. al. [77] critically compare both paradigms and highlight the sometimes 
not obvious differences between agent oriented programming and object oriented program- 
ming. One of the most notable differences is the level of abstraction and compositionality 
that agents provide. Unlike an object, that encapsulates methods and attributes which 
can be accessed from other objects, an agent additionally encapsulates the control over 
its actions and state. This allows the pro-active behaviour that is often associated with 
agents [142]. 
Research in agents today can be seen as a joint venture of all kinds of different areas, 
not limited to Computer Science only. For example Philosophy and Psychology had and 
will have an important influence on todays agents. The philosopher Dennett coined the 
term intentional systems, by which he denotes systems in which the behaviour of entities 
can be predicted by the method of attributing belief, desires and rational acumen. A 
short list of attitudes emerging from this intentional stance is given in [140]. Out of 
these attitudes three form the basis of Rao & Georgeffs Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI) 
architecture [115], which is probably one of the best known architectures to characterise 
the mental state of agents. 
The psychological aspect of agents is more obvious when expert assistants come into 
picture. In these systems a proactive user interface learns and assists the user in his 
work. Software Agents that assist the user of a (computer) system in her day to day tasks 
are becoming more and more important the more complex todays systems get. Nicholas 
Negroponte describes his view of agents in [106] as follows: 
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The best metaphor [ ... 
] for a human-computer interface is that of a well-trained 
English butler. The "agent" answers the phone recognizes the callers, disturbs 
you when appropriate, and may even tell a white lie on your behalf. [106] 
To be able to assist in a helpful, productive way the agent must possess knowledge about 
the user. Since this knowledge cannot be statically expressed for a specific program (as it is 
traditionally done), but needs to adapt to the changes of users experience and preferences, 
learning becomes of utmost importance for agents in the role of expert assistants. Pattie 
Maes emphasises that the agent 
(... ] does not act as an interface or layer between the user and the application. 
It rather behaves as a personal assistant which cooperates with the user on the 
task. The user is able to bypass the agent. [91] 
These cooperation and learning issues again draw the attention to the field of Artificial 
Intelligence. Natural language processing, speech recognition [15] and learning by demon- 
stration [127] play an important role in the development of personal assistants. 
Another important issue that is to be mentioned arises with the openness of Multi 
Agent System. Traditionally, Multi Agent System for Distributed Problem Solving were 
closed systems, in which all agents in the Multi Agent System are known and cooperate. 
With the second strand of agent development, and especially with the invention of mobile 
agents [42] that migrate from server to server through the internet, in order to accomplish 
tasks, cooperation of agents cannot be assumed. Beside standardisation [56] and commu- 
nication issues [57], that are needed to be addressed in this heterogeneous environment, 
the question of how to deal with competitive agents and how to protect agents from being 
tempered or spoofed did arise. Despite the obvious need, security concerns have only fairly 
recently been addressed by the agent community (eg. [32,132,110,34]). 
This short review of the history of agent development should give the reader an idea, 
of how complex and multifaceted agents are. To summarise: The idea of agents started 
in the field of Artificial Intelligence and was picked up by various other disciplines in the 
early 1990s. Where Al traditionally addressed the learning, planning and collaboration 
aspect of agents various other aspects like mobility, fault tolerance and user interaction 
etc. came into picture. In the next section we discuss the different notions of what agent 
is and identify properties that are strongly associated with agenthood. 
2.2.1 Agents 
Unfortunately the field of agent research is vast and most of the definitions that are given 
to agent seem to originate from a specific application the author had in mind. Nwana 
states that there is 
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[.. ) as much chance of agreeing on a consensus clrfinition for the word 'agent' 
as Al researchers have of arriving at one for 'artificial intelligence' itself --- nil 
[107] 
Facing this, it seems to be obligatory for publications in the area of agents to start with 
a definition what the author exactly means by agent. This section firstly reviews some 
definitions of agents that were given by different authors and then descril, e:; the properties 
most commonly associated with agents. 
Although Nwana deems a consensus definition of agency as infeasible and prefers to 
view the term agent as an umbrella tern, she gives the following description of agency: 
[An agent is) a component of software or hardware which is capable of acting 
exactly in order to accomplish tasks on behalf of its user. (107) 
This notion of agents is probably one of the broadest and seems to be very much 
oriented on the definition of the word agent, that is given in dicticntaries. According to 
the Webster 1913 Dictionary [137[ the word is derived from tile. Crcrk word agcre, to act. 
It defines agent as 
1. One who exerts power, or has the power to act; an actor. 
2. One who acts for, or in the place of, another, by authority from him; one 
intrusted with the business of another; a substitute; a deputy; it factor. 
3. An active power or cause; that which has the power to produce an eitert; 
as, a physical, chemical, or medicinal agent; as, heat is a powerful agent. 
The ability to act is the central property, that is associated with agents. In the above 
definitions, acting is still very general. Shoham gives a definition that is accepted in the 
AI community and according to Bradshaw (33) is also acceptable for a wider community. 
This definition is more concrete in describing the agent's ability to act. 
Most often, when people in Al use the term 'agent, ' they refer to an entity 
that functions continuously and autonomously in an environment in which 
other processes take place and other agents exist. (12,3) 
It emphasises on the continuity and autonomy of an agent and explicitly denotes the 
importance of the environment in which the agent is executing. Even stronger is the 
impact of the environment on the definition given by Franklin fi; Craesser: 
An autonomous agent is a system situated within and a part of rut environ- 
ment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its 
own agenda and so as to effect what it senses in the future. 
[CO] 
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Here the emphasis lies on the autonomy and the relationship between the agent and 
its environment. Since this relationship is a crucial part of their definition, Franklin & 
Graesser state that systems are agents or not with respect to some environment [60]. This 
does reflect that, if the environment of the agent is changed, the agent might loose its 
status of being an agent w. r. t its environment. A similar definition is given by Wooldridge 
& Jennings. 
An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that 
is capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design 
objectives [139] 
This definition does also focus on the situatedness of an agent in its environment, its 
autonomy and goal-orientation. The list of definitions could be continued further, but the 
one mentioned should be sufficient to relate to the following properties that agents can 
exhibit. The following list of properties is adapted from Bradshaw: 
Reactivity The ability to selectively sense and act. 
Autonomy Goal-directedness, proactive and self-starting behaviour. 
Collaborative behaviour Can work in concert with other agents to achieve a common 
goal. 
"Knowledge Level" Communication ability The ability to communicate with persons 
and other agents with language more resembling humanlike "speech acts" than typical 
symbol-level program-to-program protocols. 
Inferential capability Can act on abstract task specification using prior knowledge of gen- 
eral goals and preferred methods to achieve flexibility; goes beyond the information 
given, and may have explicit models of self, user, situation, and/or agents. 
Temporal continuity Persistence of identity and state over a long period of time. 
Personality The capability of manifesting the attributes of a believable character such as 
emotion. 
Adaptivity Being able to learn and improve with experience. 
Mobility Being able to migrate in a self directed way from one host platform to another. 
[33] 
These properties have also been identified by Franklin & Graesser and are reflected 
in their definition. For them the properties reactivity, autonomy, goal-orientation and 
temporal continuity are essential to agents, whereas the others are used to categorise 
different classes of agents. Table 2.1 shows the properties they have identified by reviewing 
several definitions of agents. 
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pro-active, purposeful 
Meaning 
responds in a timely fashion to changes in the en- 
vironment 
exercises control over its own actions 
does not simply act in response to the environment 
is a continuously running process 
Properties used for further classification 
Other Names Meaning 
socially able communicates with other agents, perhaps including 
adaptive 
people 
changes its behaviour based on its previous experi- 
ence 
able to transport itself from one machine to another 
actions are not scripted 
believable "personality" and emotional state 
Table 2.1: Properties of agents, adopted from [60] 
In most of the literature the definition of an agent is given by a enumeration of prop- 
ert ics t hat t he agent does exhibit. According to these properties classifications of different 
agent types have been proposed [107, (i0]. It is remarkable to see how many different 
not ions of what an agent is can be found in the literature, but even more fascinating is the 
divergence in the interpretation of these properties themselves. One example is autonomy. 
Although this property is the inain constituent of most of the definitions it is not really 
clear what various researchers understand when using this term (Compare Table 2.1 and 
Bradshaw's list). 
Agents º goat-oriented º pro-active autonomous 
I 
T 
º reactive -94 
temporal 
continuous 
T 
A 
Processes 
º situated responsive -º flexible 
º social 
º learning ý 
cooperative 
It 
communicative 
VVV 
mobile adaptive collaborative high-level 
Figure 2.1: Reliit ioiis between Properties 
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We will not try to find a solution for this problem, since this must be solved by the 
community as a whole, but show some relations between properties that might not be 
obvious. Figure 2.1 shows the main dependencies of the properties that were identified. 
The properties are ordered in a directed graph. The arrow from situated to reactive for 
example denotes, that being situated is a prerequisite for an agent to be reactive. The 
following describes the properties and critically compares the different notions that were 
found in the literature. An informal definition of the use of the term in this work is given 
and the relation to other properties is explained. 
Autonomy 
The property that is probably mostly associated with agents is autonomy. Shoham men- 
tions that the term itself is not precise, but describes it as [ ... 
] the agents' activities do not 
require constant human guidance or intervention [123]. Other authors give a stricter inter- 
pretation to autonomy. For example Wooldridge describes autonomy in his PhD-Thesis 
as [.. ] the agent operates without direct human (or other) intervention or guidance [141]. 
Although both definitions describe the agents independence of the human user the second 
is probably not acceptable for agents in the sense of expert assistants, since these have to 
cooperate with the user. It is difficult to think of a productive cooperation without the 
possibility to intervene. 
Jennings shares the definition given by Wooldridge and adds that it [the system] should 
have control over its own actions and internal state [77] - this is the notion that has been 
adopted by Franklin & Graesser, which base their agent-taxonomy on an autonomous agent 
(see section 2.2.2). That an agent has control over its own actions leads to the question 
how the agent controls its actions. One possibility is that an agent takes an action or not 
dependent whether it deems this action to be beneficial to its goal. This would explain 
why Bradshaw describes the term autonomy as being goal-oriented, although this would 
lead to the view that goal-oriented behaviour is a prerequisite for autonomy. We will come 
back to this point later. 
Situatedness 
Central to all definitions is the ability of an agent to take actions. These actions have an 
effect on the agents environment, which includes other agents and resources. The relation 
between the agent and the environment is referred to as situatedness. For Jennings et-al. 
situatedness means: 
that the agent receives sensory input from its environment and that it can 
perform actions which change the environment in some way. [77] 
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Situatedness is to be seen as a basic property of agency, since almost all other properties 
rely on the ability of an agent to sense and act in its environment. Another view of situated 
agents is given by Nwana in her description of reactive agents. For her agents are situated 
when: 
They do not plan ahead or revise any world models, and their actions depend 
on what happens at the preset moment. [107] 
According to the notion given by Jennings et. al. and the previously cited definitions, 
we view situatedness of an agent as follows. An agent is situated in an environment if: 
1. The agent senses the environment. 
2. The agent acts on the environment. 
3. The agent actions have an effect on the environment. 
4. The agent itself is part of the environment. 
The last point leaves room to discussion. Is the agent part of its environment or 
not? The literature here is again not clear and the different interpretations seem to lead 
to rather philosophical questions. Franklin states explicitly that the agent is part of its 
environment. Similar is the definition given by Shoham. In this work we see an agent 
and its state as being part of the environment, since it can be influenced directly (through 
communication) or indirectly (through changes in the environment) by other agents, which 
does affect its behaviour. 
Notably Franklin & Graessers definition provides a stricter view of the third point than 
that mentioned above. For them the agents actions must have an effect on what it senses. 
Temporal Continuity 
Another basic property of agency is temporal continuity. A concrete definition of this 
property is again difficult. According to Franklin & Graesser, temporal continuity is the 
property that does mainly distinguish agents from subroutines and "ordinary" programs. 
A program usually is invoked to perform a specific task and terminates, when this task is 
accomplished. On the contrary an agent runs, once instantiated, forever, unless it itself 
decides not to do [60]. To speak in anthropomorphisms: after an agent is born it lives 
until it dies naturally or under force. This continuity might be compared with modern 
operating systems running on a PC that is never turned off, but suspended. Here the 
system is always available and continuously responding to the user (although it might 
take some time to wake up). 
Bradshaw describes this property as persistence of identity and state over long periods 
of time. As a footnote he mentions that this property ideally includes some sort of episodic 
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memory. We identified temporal continuity as a prerequisite for being reactive, pro-active 
and learning. We also want to see persistence of identity and episodic memory as one 
of the main pre-requisites to enable agents to build up a network of trust. Trust is an 
important issue, when modelling secure systems. 
Reactiveness and Responsiveness 
Temporal continuous agents are involved in a constant cycle of sensing their environment 
and acting. Agents take their actions according to changes in the environment, where a 
commonly made request is that the action is taken in a timely fashion. The ability of an 
agent to respond in a timely fashion is described by Jennings as responsiveness: 
Agents should perceive their environment and respond in a timely fashion to 
changes that occur. [77] 
To respond in a timely fashion is the problem that most agents face that utilise traditional 
Al approaches (i. e. symbolic reasoning). Brooks tried to overcome this problem with purely 
reactive agents, that do not posses any reasoning abilities. Nowadays hybrid approaches, 
that combine the benefits of both approaches gain more and more popularity [90]. 
Communicative and Social 
Being communicative is the main requirement for agents to be able to cooperate. For 
Franklin & Graesser an agent is communicative if it 
communicates with other agents, perhaps including people. [60] 
Although the communication in purely reactive agent systems is simple and performed 
through changes in the shared environment, the communication between deliberative 
agents, i. e. agents that employ symbolic reasoning in their decision making, is more com- 
plex and is usually defined at a higher level. 
For Jennings et. al. the ability to communicate with other agents, in some form of 
Agent Communication Language, is an essential part of their definition of agency. Nwana 
states that the exchange of high-level messages mainly differentiate agent-based systems 
from other distributed systems. 
For Franklin & Graesser social ability and being able to communicate are synonyms. 
Although a subtile difference can be seen in the fact, that socially able is stronger and 
does impose that the agents do 
interact in appropiate situations in order to complete their own problem solving 
and to help others with their activities. [77] 
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This definition differenciates between the capability of an agent to communicate and set- 
ting social behaviour in corelation with benevolence. 
Cooperative and Collaborative 
According to Nwana [107], the main properties collaborative agents emphasise on are au- 
tonomy and cooperation. They work in concert with other agents to achieve tasks on their 
owners behalf. Typically they are additionally socially able, responsive and proactive. Ex- 
hibiting these properties, they are able to operate in open, tine-constrained environments. 
We distinguish between cooperation and collaboration slightly in a sense that collabo- 
ration with other agents is stronger than cooperation. Cooperation can be seen as pa. ssiVT'ly 
assisting the other agents in their persuit to reach their goals, where collaboration does 
express that the involved agents share a common goal and are therefore pro-actively taking 
actions. 
The motivation of collaborative agents is that a Multi Agent System of collaborative 
agents does essemble functionality that is beyond the capability of the individual agent 
involved in the collaboration. 
Strongly related to agent collaboration are the following topics: 
" Agent Communication Language 
" Agreements 
" Multi Agent Planning 
Goal-Orientation 
Agents are usually serving a special purpose, which means they try to bring about a 
specific state of the environment - the goal state. Intentional Agents, that do use artificial 
planning technics, choose their course of action in such a way that they achieve this goal- 
state. While some researchers take the opinion, that the goal that an agent tries to achieve 
must be flexible and specified at a high-level [77], others sec an agent being goal-oriented 
when it serves a special purpose to the system [52]. 
For intentional agents the goal can be specified at runtime, and is specified as a de- 
scription of the goal-state the agent tries to bring about. For reactive agents the goal is 
hard-coded in the agents reaction-system. Intentional agents are therefore able to adopt 
goals dynamically, as a result of collaboration with other agents in the system. In a sys- 
tem of reactive agents the overall behaviour emerges at runtime. The specification of a 
system-wide goal is therefore a difficult task. 
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Pro-Activeness 
Pro-activeness is one of the properties that is mainly associated with intentional agents. 
A goal-oriented agent is pro-active, if it takes the initiative and performs actively to reach 
its goal, by either performing the appropriate actions itself, or by cooperation with other 
agents. 
A prerequisite for an agent to be pro-active is therefore goal-orientation. In the case 
of intentional agents, the assumption made is that the agents' goals are expressed symbol- 
ically and the agent has a model of its environment. If we take view that goal-orientation 
means that the agent serves a specific purpose, then pro-activeness can be seen in a much 
more wider sense. Here the minimum requirement for an agent to be pro-active is that 
the agent is a temporal continuous process, that executes actions in pursuit of its (pre-) 
defined goals. 
This is the view that we take in the development of SANTA agents, where each agent 
is representing a process, the agent does pro-actively execute actions on observations on 
its environment (the agents perceptions are reflected in the agents local state). The goal 
for SANTA agents is defined at a high-level, in the sense, that the actions represent a 
refinement of possible ways in that the over-all goal (given in the specification) can be 
achieved. 
Flexible 
Jennings et. al. [77] see flexibility as one of four aspects that define agent-hood. By flexibil- 
ity they mean that the agent is responsive, pro-active and social. As we analysed before 
this requires the agent to exhibit a number of other properties, that are not explicitly 
stated. 
The requirement that a program in order to be an agent needs to be flexible is therefore 
strong. Especially, since they take the view that agents are problem-solvers and therefore 
have a symbolic model of their environment the amount of systems that are Multi Agent 
System based on this definition are few. 
As depicted in Figure 2.1 on page 36, the property flexible is a high-level requirement 
that assumes that a flexible agent exhibits most of the other properties. 
Learning 
Agents that are learning must be at least temporal continuous and situated. This becomes 
obvious when we see learning as the process of gaining experience and derive new knowl- 
edge out of experience. To gain experience, the agent must be situated in its environment, 
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i. e. sense and act on it. By observing the effect that the execution of a particular action 
has, the agent is then able to employ Al techniques to modify its model of the environment. 
learning means that the agent dianges its behaviour bnsmi on its previous 
experience. [60] 
Mostly the ability to learn is coupled with a symbolic representation of the agents 
environment, and often reasoning is based on a formalism that supports the notion of 
knowledge and belief. Although there is some well founded theory [116,123], it is not 
clear how an agent does actually execute utilising these abstract concepts. But it is 
conceived, that learning can be achieved without an explicit symbolic representation, for 
example by using neural networks. 
The other major factor that is important to enable an agent to learn is temporal 
continuity, i. e. the agents state must be persistent over some period of time. The emphasis 
here is that the agent maintains some form of episodical memory. 
Collaborating agents offer a wider perspective to learning than the mentioned above. 
When agents are able to communicate about their past experience and the conclusions 
that they have drawn from it, an agent is able to learn not only from its own experience, 
but also from the experience of others. This is mainly investigated in intelligent, especially 
Belief, Desire, Intention agents, where an agent updates its belief database. For example 
an agent A sends agent Ba message stating that D knows that X= true, then agent A 
could conclude that B wants A to believe that B knows that ,Y= true. Any decision that 
is then based on whether X is true or not, highly depends oil the trust, that agent A has 
in agent D. 
This example shows the security implications that come with learning agents. On the 
other hand, a basic form of learning comes into the picture when we try to address trust 
and changing policies. If security policies adapt to changes in the environment, the agents 
behaviour does so, too. This is a consequence of seeing the set of possible behaviour of 
an agent restricted by security policies. Dust then inevitably relates back to previous 
experience. 
Adaptive 
Franklin and Graesser [60) see adaptive as a synonym to learning. We mentioned in the 
previous section some of the implications that come with learning agents. Viewing the 
complexity that comes when an agent learns from past experience, or other agents then 
we could view adaptable as a further step defining how the agents behaviour changes 
according to newly learned information. 
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Bradshaw [33] sees in Adaptivity one of the main advantages, that the Agent oriented 
approach to system development has over more traditional approaches: 
Adaptivity: Agents can use learning algorithms to continually improve their 
behaviour by noticing recurrent patterns of actions and events. [33] 
Relating this again to security would mean that once a network of trust is established, 
how does it affect the agents security policies. More concretely how can the agent deter- 
mine whether to grants access to system resources controlled by it to other individuals. 
Mobile 
Mobile agents are usually cooperative agents, that are capable of migrating through the 
network and thus change their execution environment. The advantages of mobile agents 
are mainly on a non-functional side: they can help to reduce communication costs. An 
often used example is the flight booking agent. In this scenario, the agent does visit several 
airline-company servers and looks for a cheap flight. Depending on the requirements for 
the flight-search, the agent is filters the information directly on the server, and helps 
reducing network traffic. Other advantages of mobile agents are: 
" Operating on platforms with limited resources (such as Palmtops) 
" Asynchronous computation, while the agent roams the network to accomplish tasks 
on the users behalf, the user can go offline. 
" Dynamically changing configurations, where new agents are made available and offer 
additional services. 
High-Level 
We take the attribute of an agent being high-level a bit out of the context of the other 
attributes. This requirement defines that the agent has a symbolic model of its environ- 
ment and employs symbolic planning techniques. We feel that this requirement, although 
valid, is vague and not applicable to the wide-spectrum of agents. The main effect of this 
property is that it limits the different interpretations for the previously discussed proper- 
ties to those parts that explicitly require the agent to employ a symbolic representation 
of its environment. Shoham [123] describes high-level as follows: 
The high level is manifested in symbolic representation and/or some cognitive- 
like functions: agents may be "informable", may contain symbolic plans in 
addition to stimulus-response rules; and may even posses natural language 
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capabilities. This sense is not assumed uniformly in Artificial Intelligence ... 
[123] 
With this overview of the different properties that agents can exhibit, we will go on 
and describe different interpretations and classifications of the agents environment. 
To summarise: We have shown that, although there is no common definition of what 
exactly makes a program an agent, several properties are commonly accepted requirements 
for agent-hood. These are mainly autonomy and temporal continuity. Beside this common 
ground, one of the key-problems is the different understanding of these properties. Many 
authors do fear that the lack of a common understanding, what exactly an agent is, poses 
a threat to the research area as a whole; but a general consensus is, that like in Artificial 
Intelligence, major advances can be made without a clear and concise definition [52]. 
2.2.2 Categorisation of Agents 
Different attempts have been made to categorise agents. Franklin & Graesser [60] outlined 
two different approaches to build an agent-taxonomy. Firstly they identify an classification 
tree that is inspired by biological models (e. g. kingdom, phylum, class, order, family, 
subfamily, genus, species). Figure 2.2 depicts this taxonomy. 
Autonomous Agents 
Biological Agents Robotic Agents Computational Agents 
1Software Agents Artificial Life Agents 
Figure 2.2: Agent-Taxonomy given by Franklin & Graesser 
The second approach is to build a n-dimensional matrix of all properties, in which 
each cell corresponds to a collection of features, and provides one possible category for 
the classification. As Franklin & Graesser point out for this approach definitions of the 
properties must be given. The difficulties of this has been discussed in the previous section. 
Nwanas shares the view that a typology of agents forms a multi-dimensional space. 
For a more accessible representation she "collapsed" this space into a list. Obviously this 
44 
2.2. MI TH 
trades off accuracy against "c. faritv of uiuferstruufing'. Nw"atia uses five criteria to classify 
, iý; cýnts: 
1. ºuol>ilc vs. static 
2. clclilxeraitivc vs. reaac"tivc 
; 3.1>riº»>ºrY a>. t. irilnºtcw (aººtoiunººY. Icau"Iaitºg aºaul c"(olwraºtiota) 
f. uºaajor roIcw (c. ". iufinnºaºtiuu }; aatlu riut; ) 
5. hybrid vs. lictcn)genewis 
Intcrcstiug is tlºc partial vicw on tl>c aº(; c'aºt-tu1>cclcºp" that is derived frouº tIu" 1>riui, u"Y 
aºttrilnltcs. licre Nwauaaº describes that lin" an agent it is ncc"otitiaºrY, to cxlºil>it it lenst two 
of "t I>e 1>ria>aau"Y attributes. This is cle1>ic"tccl in Figrºre 2.: 3. 
Smart Agents Collaborative 
VAI: ýý 
COoPCr°atc learn 
Learning Agcnts 
Collaborative /ý/\ Interface Agents 
Agents autonomous 
I not agent 
Fihtu"c 2.3: A Part View of aua Agent 'fOjºuk)gy from Nwanaa) 
Derived from the five criteria Nwauºa presents a list ()f eight nt; vnt tYIx: s. 'I'hc clas- 
sification has been viewed raatlucr controversial and clocs only claim to highlight Ow key 
contexts ill which the word apvats is used in the tio/'tat"au"c litcniturc [1071. The following 
t}'lxes of agents have been described IaY Nwauºn: 
" ('<illahcratit"e Agents 
" Intcrfacc Agents 
" NIobilc At; ciit, 
" InfOunnaticýii Agents 
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" Reactive Agents 
" Hybrid Agents 
" Heterogeneous Agent Systems 
" Smart Agents 
In the following we shortly summarise the main aspects of the eight agent types that 
have been identified by Nwana. The information provided is mainly an extract of her 
paper [1071. Please notice that, although this categorisation has had a wide influence, it 
is not universally accepted by the agent-community. 
Collaborative Agents 
Relating back to the analysis of agent properties we have claimed that one of the main 
aspects for an agent to be collaborative is be cooperative and social. Coordination is one 
of the key points that need to be addressed in a Multi Agent System of collaborative 
agents. Without clearly defined agent coordination the system is at risk to enter deadlock 
situations, starvation or unbalanced behaviour (e. g. in a producer-consumer example all 
resources are given to one particular consumer agent. Potential other consumers are 
starved). 
Another aspect is the benevolence assumption, which is often made by deliberative 
agents that employ symbolic reasoning. But how does a network of collaborative agents 
behave if one malicious agents is not benevolent? Does agent coordination allow to identify 
self-interested agents, and how should the system react? Game theory and work on agent 
negotiation tries to provide some answers, how a pareto optimal solution, viz. a solution 
for which no agent can improve its benefits without decreasing the benefit of another, can 
be guaranteed by a selecting a specific strategy. One of the commonly known examples is 
the Prisoners Dillema. A brief introduction to this topic is given In e. g. Wooldridge [139] 
in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Wooldridge also addresses in his book agent coordination by partial global planning, 
by commitments and conventions and norms and social laws. Bcrgenti et. al. [251 discusses 
three different approaches to agent coordination: i) tuple centres, ii) interaction protocols 
(like contract-net) and iii) semantics of Agent Communication Language and highlights 
their potential benefits and commonly made critics. Omicini ct. al. discuss the notion of an 
Agent Coordination Context in [109) as a model for the agent environment, by describing 
the environment, where the agent can interact and enable and rule the interactions between 
agent and the environment, by defining the space of admissible agent interactions. They 
later extended their work and relate coordination to security [110]. 
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The emphasis is here on the learning aspect of the agent, which trice to build a model 
of the human user and assists in the operation of increasingly complex applications. 
" Observing and imitating the user 
" receiving user-feedback 
" explicit instructions 
" asking for advice. 
Related to Interface-Agents are the fields of speech-recognition, natural language pro- 
cessing and learning by demonstration. Another important aspect for the acceptance of 
Interface-Agents is psychology, since the human user needs to understand the actions taken 
by the assisting agent, in order to build a trust-relationship to their personal assistant. 
Mobile Agents 
One often publicised advantage of the agent approach to software engineering is that 
autonomous agents can migrate from the originating host machine to other host in the 
network and then perform tasks there locally. The emphasis on mobility lend to the public 
perception, that all agents must be mobile agents. When we refer to the analysis of agent 
properties, this is clearly not the case, rather mobility is to be seen as an independent 
property that some agent have and others not. 
Mobile agents are commonly described as Mobile agents are processes which can au- 
tonomously migrate to new hosts (541 or as agents that are capable of suspending execution 
on one platform and moving to another, where they resume execution [76]. 
We depict a network of agents in figure 2.5. In this scenario, the agents are executed 
on different agent-platforms. A agent-platform defines the local runtime environment 
of an agent and provides basic infrastructure services, such as Name, Service lookup, 
inter-platform communication and migration between platforms. In the example agent- 
platforms reside on different types of hardware: PDAs and a powerful server. Mobile 
Agents are able to migrate between different platforms and thus utilising the available 
resources, that are specific to the individual platform. 
The benefits and risks of this new approach to distributed computing has been high- 
lighted by Chess et. al. [421. The main advantages of mobile agents they note are: 
" High bandwidth remote interaction. 
. Support for disconnected operation. 
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Information Agents 
As mentioned in the introduction, the sheer amount of data, that is becoming available is 
overwhelming and difficult to filter and analyse. Unlike most of the other agent-categories, 
that define themselves by what they are, described in terms of attributes that they exhibit, 
Information Agents are defined by what they do. According to Nwana, Information agents 
perform the role of managing, manipulating or collating information from many distributed 
resources. 
Information agents can often be classified into different categories. For example an 
Information agent can be a collaborative agents, i. e. they interact with other agents to 
gather and filter information. Information agents can be mobile agents, e. g. Web-Spiders, 
that traverse the net to gather useful information. They can be Interface agents, and learn 
by demonstration, how their owner filters information on the net. They can be intelligent, 
learning agents, that derive new information from data that is available to them. 
An area that is of specific interest for Information Agents is the Semantic Web. While 
our normal world wide web is meant to be read by humans, the semantic web is marked up, 
to be read by programs such as Information Agents. The information in the semantic web 
is structured and a meaning is given to each structure, using the concept of ontologics. 
Ontologies also play a key role for agent communication in open systems, when agents 
need to understand what other agents mean by sending a specific message. 
Reactive Agents 
Agents that have a symbolic representation of their environment and that reason about 
their environment to derive plans for future action have one major disadvantage. Symbolic 
reasoning techniques do not scale well with increasing complexity of the description. This 
makes it unattractive for research areas, where real-time decision making is required, i. e. 
robotics. 
Robots must be able to react to certain environmental event in real-time. One ex- 
ample would be the robo-cup event, where robots play football. Imagine an agent that 
employs rudimentary planning techniques and analyses all possible effects that his action 
will have on the game. How beneficial planning is depends on the rate in which the agents 
environment changes. Most planning algorithms assume a static environment, i. e. the 
environment is only influenced by the agents action. A symbolic reasoning agent in a 
dynamic environment faces difficulties. Assuming the planning process starts at time t 
with the environment being in state of and the result of the planning process is available 
at time t', then its usefulness depends entirely on the dynamicity of the system (i. e. How 
different is the environment in state ai from the state at). Wooldridge and Jennings in 
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[140] describe this as the representation/reasoning problem. 
These problems where encountered when agents (robots) where operating in highly 
dynamic environments, such as the real world. Breaking away from traditional (symbolic) 
approaches to Artificial Intelligence, some researchers came up with the idea of behavioural 
AI, or situated Al. The idea is that intelligent behaviour of a system is not founded on 
a symbolic representation, but by the interaction of the systems components. Rodney 
Brooks was one of the front-runners in the promotion of this new approach, and his 
subsumption architecture is one of the best-known architectures for reactive agents. 
Reactive agents do not have a symbolic representation of their environment. They 
are situated and embodied in their environment. Brooks [36] describes situatedness and 
embodiment as: 
Situatedness The robots are situated in the world - they do not deal with 
abstract descriptions, but with the "here" and "now" of the environment 
which directly influences the behaviour of the system. 
Embodiment The robots have bodies and experience the world directly - 
their actions are part of a dynamic with the world, and the action have 
immediate feedback on the robots' own sensations. 
Brooks subsumption architecture decomposes the system vertically into different tasks. 
In the resulting layered architecture each layer has its own level of competence. In general 
the lowest layer implements the most basic functionality, while higher level control layers 
represent more complex behavioural patterns. All levels compete to control the agent, 
where higher levels, representing more elaborate goals, can override decisions made by 
lower level layers. Each level can be seen as a behaviour defined by an augmented final 
state machine, that is meant to achieve a particular goal. The lowest level in the example 
below would be "locomote", causing the agent to wander around without any specific goal. 
This is subsumed by the first layer "avoid hitting objects", etc. Figure 2.6(a) depicts the 
traditional task decomposition used for intelligent control systems, Figure 2.6(b) depicts 
the behavioural approach. 
In the subsumption architecture each layer is unaware of the layers above, but higher 
levels can utilise data provided by lower layers. Although this approach lead to astonish- 
ingly good results, the identification of different layers is ad hoc, and the analysis of the 
systems behaviour is difficult. Luck states that: 
Systems built on the subsumption architecture are quite complex and idiosyn- 
cratic, and it is almost impossible for any formal investigation of the properties 
of such systems. This makes it difficult to predict or explain such an agent's 
behaviour in a given environmental scenario. [90] 
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Figure 2.6: Comparison between both approaches, adopted from Brooks [36] 
Most books on agents describe Brooks subsumption architecture as an example of 
reactive agents. Brooks collection of papers [37] gives an overview of the history of the 
"new Al". 
Alt hough the subsumption architecture defines behaviours at different levels, it does 
not impose that the agent has any symbolic model of its environment. Hybrid Agents 
combine botlh, the deliberative and the reactive approach and thus combine their advan- 
t ages. 
Hybrid Agents 
Hybrid agents try to optimise the benefits by combining the different approaches for dif- 
ferent agent types. A typical example is the combination of deliberative agents (reasoning 
agents, that contain a symbolic model of their environment and plan how a specific goal 
can be achieved) and reactive agents (that are more robust, have a faster response time, 
and adapt more quickly to changes in the environment). The typical examples that can be 
found in almost all text-books (e. g. [90] or [139]) are IN'r'I RRAP and TouringMachines. 
TotiriugMachiues In Tourin-Alachines, the decision process from sensors to actuators 
is controlled by a three-layered control-subsystem. Each of the three activity producing 
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Myers. These represent it tuoclel of fit(' c'nviruiºuuvtit nt the level of abstraction thilt is 
appropriate for this level. Auothc1r difference is that whilst in 'I'ourilIgNlnchines couflict- 
ing siiggestious are resolved by tit(' control-system, in IN lIIUHAP couflic"ts au"e resolved 
Irv cotltlnºutic"ation between layers. Sensory input is Iºroc"Pssecl at flit, first layer which is 
c"c, tººfx'tctit, and otherwise passed ()It to it higher layer. 't'his is called In0luni-111º netivntion. 
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architecture of IN'I'I; lili'I'. Figure 2.8 shows the au"c"hitec"tlire. 
Although, hybrid agent architectures c"onthine acivarttages of" Iºotli deliberative and re- 
ac-. five approaches for agents, it is still not clear how these systems caul he autalysed. This 
is partly Iwc"anse of the react ivc layer ill t he architect are. part I. N. heeaºtse of t he adclit ionaal 
interaction hetweetu the laver, that make the overall behaviour of the agcut more conilºIex. 
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give material 1,01- discussion. At which level arc security 1nclic"ies clelirueclY If at ºt higher 
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level. then how su"e they enforced, since it is unacceptable that the behavioural layer 
exec"ntes actions t hilt sine insecure with resI)e(t to to the security policy. Consequently 
the entiºrecuºeººt should be at the lowest level. This is the attempt that we chose using 
the computational model described in Chapter 3. 'l'1ºe enforcement nºechaiiisms of our 
security policies represent an additional layer that the suggested action must pass before 
it is performed by the actuators. The specification of the policies themselves is at a lligher 
level (see Chapter 7), requiring to map between the high-level of the policy abstraction 
mud their enforcement (see Chapter K). 
2.2.: 3 Agents in the Context of this Work 
III the context of* this work, we are focusing on reactive agents and their interaction in a 
shared environment. A1'e assume that agents are situated in an environment, that they can 
cunfill nouslq observe and atfeet. Agents react to stimuli from their environment; since we 
use ,º teuºporaºl logic to describe the execution of agents in our model we can also discuss 
t he t iºueliness of an agent's react ions and t lnºs address the issue of responsiveness. Higher- 
level properties such as goal-orientation, social behaviour, learning, etc. are not addressed 
in our frauuework. However the modularity of our approach means that most agent- 
arclºitectnres call be encoded as part of an agent's deliheratioin phase (see Chapter 3.2.3 
for uºore details). 
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2.3 Security 
In this section we firstly introduce the terminology that is used in relation with the policy 
and security aspects described in this work. Secondly we survey some of the well known 
policy models (Section 2.3.1 and discuss critically some of the formal and informal policy 
languages that have been proposed in this context (Section 2.3.2). Lastly we discuss 
architectures for the enforcement of policies and formal models that are used to determine 
the classes of policies that are enforceable. 
Security in the context of Multi Agent Systems encompasses a whole set of various 
problems that need to be addressed to guarantee that a system is secure. Due to the 
openness of a MAS the first difficulty is the correct authentication of agents in the system. 
This is typically addressed using Public-Private Key-based authentication mechanisms 
that rely on the existence of a trusted third party e. g. [105,83,53,26]. In the context 
of this work we assume that all entities in the system can be authenticated and uniquely 
identified. 
Another important issue is the protection of the integrity and confidentiality of mes- 
sages, that are exchanged between entities in the system. This is typically addressed 
using encryption techniques by the middle-ware on top of which the MAS is implemented 
[80,133,87,22]. In this work we also assume, that the confidentiality and integrity of 
messages that are exchanged between entities in the system is given and focus on the spec- 
ification and enforcement of authorisation, obligation, delegation and integrity constraints 
on interactions. 
Authorisation Authorisation policies define the conditions under which an authenticated 
subject (a user, or agent acting on behalf of a user) is allowed to execute a specific 
action on an object (also called target). 
Obligation Obligation policies define the conditions or events (sometimes also called 
triggers) under which a subject has to perform a specific action on an object. 
Delegation Delegation policies define the conditions under which a subject can delegate 
a specific access right (i. e. the right to perform an action on an object) to another 
subject. 
Integrity Integrity policies define constraints on the execution of an action on an object 
by a specific subject. 
Whilst a system in general provides functionality to a subject, security is concerned 
with the restriction of the functionality based on the subject's identity. A subject is an 
entity that participates in the execution of the system, e. g. a user, an agent running on 
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behalf of a user, groups, compounds of subjects or rok. A group is a set of subjects, 
the access-control decision is dependent on the membership of the subject in the group- 
A compound of subjects expresses that two or more subjects act jointly. Examples are 
procedures to open a bank safe, or activating nuclear weapons, where. N out of Al subjects 
must perform an activity jointly, e. g. turning a key, entering a code, etc. 
When is a System Secure? We use an axiomatic definition of security. This means a 
system is defined to be secure if it does not violate its security policy. The security policy 
defines constraints on the system state (and transitions between two stater). Under the 
enforcement of security policies we understand the implementation of security mechanisms 
that guarantee that the system will never be in a state that is not secure. 
The enforcement mechanisms can be seen as the link between security l)olicy, viz. the 
specification of security requirements, and the functional requirements of the system. A 
concrete framework to formally express security requirements is called a security model .A 
security model allows to express certain types of security policies and - if based on a formal 
language - allows to reason about the policy. Whilst models still describe an abstraction of 
the system, security mechanisms describe how the security policy is enforced, i. e how the 
access to resources is controlled. Security mechanisms manifest themselves in structural 
design decision and algorithms that determine if a concrete request is processed by the 
system. 
2.3.1 Access Control Models 
In this section we overview different approaches to the specification of security Policies, 
where the main focus is on access-control. Anderson [8] describes access control as follows: 
The function of access-control is to control which principals [subjects] have 
access to which resources [objects] in the system - which files they can read, 
which programs they can execute, how they share data with other principals, 
and so on. [8] 
Based on this definition we view access control as the mechanisms that enforre authorisa- 
tion and delegation policies. Access Control Models can be broadly divided into Mandatory 
Access Control and Discretionary Access Control. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) In mandatory access control the system's secu- 
rity policy is under the control of a dedicated administrator. Typically this form of 
access control model is used for military policies (also called governmental policies). 
To access a MAC-protected resource the requesting principal must have sufficient 
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security clearance for the resource's security label. The enforcement of these policies 
essentially matches the principal's security clearance against the security label of the 
resource. Examples of MAC policies are Bell-LaPadula [86,21] or the Chinese Wall 
Policy [35]. 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Whilst for MAC the control of the system's 
security policy is under the control of the administrator with DAC the control is 
under the discretion of individuals, e. g. the owner of the resource. DAC is typically 
present in the protection of data in a (UNIX) file-system, where the owner of the file 
can change the policy controlling the access to it. This makes DAC unsuitable for 
military policies, where the confidentiality of information should not be at the user's 
discretion. To increase the security and prevent (accidental) information leakage 
most UNIX systems now provide support for MAC (e. g. SELinux [10]). 
Non-Discretionary Access Control (NDAC) In [16], Bandara mentions NDAC as 
situations in which "authority is vested in some users, but there are explicit controls 
on delegation and propagation of authority. " In this context administrative policies, 
that control who is authorised to modify access rights are of importance. 
In the following we will summarise some of the well known models for access control 
and emphasise aspects that influenced the policy model that is used in this work. The 
discussion is based on the original publications, surveys [85,64,119,48,16], books [31,8, 
24] and comparison papers [130,4,102]. 
Access Control Matrix 
A good way of representing access-control specifications is in the form of an access-control 
matrix. This generalisation of access-control was pioneered by Lampson [84] and later 
extended by Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman (HRU model) (introductions are provided in 
[31,24]). The HRU extension addresses the issue of subject/object creation and deletion, 
as well as the dynamic addition and removal of rights. The matrix defines which subjects 
are allowed to perform which actions on which objects in the system (at a particular point 
in time). 
A reference monitor for example can then directly base the access-control decision 
on the corresponding entry in the matrix, whilst other enforcement mechanisms need to 
satisfy this specification by other means. Often the access-control matrix is distributed 
over the system, to avoid bottle-necks and single points of failure. The most common form 
is to distribute the matrix to each protected object. Figure 2.9 shows the organisation of 
the access-control matrix and the distribution to objects. The latter is commonly known 
as access-control list. 
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Figure 2.9: Access-Control Matrix and Access-Control List 
ßeferriug to Figure 2.9 in a<"cess-control matrix stores the actions, that a principal 
(subject) can perforua on a resource (object). For example in UNIX principals are the 
users, actions are read, write, execute and objects are files in the system. 
The access-control matrix represents a central storage of the access-rights. The central 
storage does unfortunately not, scale well. Irr a system that contains 1000 user and 10000 
files that need protection, the access-control matrix would have 30 * 106 entries. This is 
dilli<"ult to manage and control and might constitute a bottleneck. 
A cumuuauly used technique to distribute access-control specifications is in form of 
access-control lists. Au . access-control list Carr be seen as a column of the access-control 
mat rix, t hat is stored per resource as meta-information. With respect to the UNIX exam- 
ple. t the access-cant rol list would be stored on a per file basis. This is particular interesting 
wheu access-control is discretionary, i. e. the owner of the files defines the access-rights at 
his own discretion. 
Other options would be to distribute the access-control matrix on a subject basis (rows 
ill the access-tout rol matrix), that describe the capabilities of each subject. This is then 
often enforced Irv issuing certificates for subjects that use encryption techniques to describe 
the subjects capabilities. Another alternative to distribute access-control information is 
to categorise resources in types, and assign principals to groups or roles. In a similar 
fa. slriou actions could be categorised, which is for example done with access-modifiers (e. g. 
private, protected. public) in object-oriented programming languages. 
Multilevel Security: Bell-LaPadula 
the 13e11-1 al'mduln seciuity Windel %v; ts developed by David Ball and Len LaPadnla 1861 
in I973, and targeted the security of time-sharing mainframe systems. Time model is also 
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known as Multilevel Security. 
In the model information is tagged with a label, indicating the sensitivity of the infor- 
mation. Traditionally the military classification scheme contains the levels Unclassified, 
Confidential, Secret and Top Secret, but changes to this classification occurred over time 
and often lead to incompatibilities between different systems. Anderson describes briefly 
how the classification does change when a unclassified document is transferred from the 
US to the UK and back again in [81. 
Principals hold a specific security Clearance corresponding to the classification. An 
individual is only allowed to access documents that he is cleared for, or documents that 
require a lower clearance level. The main two principles underlying the model is that: 
1. no process may read data at a higher level. This is the simple security principle or 
also known as no read up. 
2. no process may write data to a lower level. This is the so-called *-property or no 
write down. 
Following the principle of least privilege a process can start with an initial low label 
and increase its security level when it needs to access data at a higher level (high water 
mark principle). According to the *-property it is then impossible to create files with a 
lower clearance level. This obviously has severe implications on the functioning of the 
system. 
LaPadula mentions an alternative to the *-property. Instead of denying the write- 
down the classification of the file that is written to could be changed. Although this path 
is followed in the information flow analysis of programs, it is regarded as being counter- 
intuitive for a security policy model. Some commercial applications exist that follow the 
approach of floating labels Anderson [8] describes them as products that provide separation 
more than information sharing. 
Inspired by the Bell-LaPadula model is the Biba model [30] (surveyed by e. g. [85,119, 
24,31]), that is concerned with the data-integrity of the system. It is often referred to 
as the Bell-LaPadula model upside down, since it exhibits the properties no write up and 
no read down. The intuition is that high integrity data cannot be contaminated with low 
integrity (unreliable) data. 
Anderson [8] reviews commonly recognised problems with multilevel security. One of 
the main problems are covert channels. A covert channel is a mechanism that, although 
not designed for communication, can nonetheless be abused to allow information to be 
communicated down from a high classification, to a low one. Covert channels are not only 
a problem in multilevel security, but pose one of its main difficulties. 
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Beside liiiiuan issues with the classification and administration of security labels and 
clearances. Aiidcrson iiientions further the necessity of downgrading information in real- 
applicatious. Here information must be sanitised, it must be ensured, that it does not 
coin ain bidden information (e. g. in form of steganography). Another point is that there will 
always he coiiiponents, that need to access information at all clearance levels, for example 
a nueiuory/file management system, or middle-ware in form of Database Management 
5ysteuis. This can significantly increase the size of the trusted computing base (TCB), 
iucrea. sing the anioulit of security testing and thus possibly decreasing the trustworthiness 
of the system. 
Multilateral Security and Chinese Wall 
M lilt ilateral security, or conºpartºnental security, is not concerned with vertical infornia- 
t ion flow bnt with horizontal flow. One approach is to extend the Bell-LaPadula model to 
it lattice-uuulel [51]. The categorisation of the Bell-LaPadula model remains, but addition- 
ally all objects belong to a compartment. The classification together with the compartment 
fornºs a lattice as depicted in Figure 2.10. The idea is that there should be no information 
flow betweeºº compartments (incomparable nodes in the lattice). 
(Top Secre(, (Dessert Storm, Liberia)) 
Clop Srrrel, l 11 
(Unclassified, ()) 
Figure 2.10: Lattice of security labels and compartments 
The Chinese Wall Policy introduces dynamic compartments to capture the concept of 
scpa d ion of d ut,, v. It comes from the financial background, where service firms have in- 
I cm iil idles t hat preveitt, conflicting interests. The informal example given by [35] explains 
the ('liiuc tie Wall recgciireuieiit. 
It call be most, easily visualised as the code of practice that must be followed by 
a uºarket analyst working for a financial institution providing corporate busi- 
n(`ss scrvi(. (, S. Smelt an analyst iiuist uphold the confidentiality of information 
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provided to him by his firm's clients; this means he cannot advise corporations 
where he has insider knowledge of the plans, status or standing of a competitor. 
However the analyst is free to advise corporations which are not in competition 
with each other, and also draw on general market information. [351 
This example cannot be expressed using the Bell-LaPadula model. The key-difference 
to other models is that the Chinese Wall Policy leaves a subject initially the free choice, 
which information to access, but restricts further access to compartments, that are different 
to the previous one. This is addressed in the simple security property. The Chinese Wall 
model is in this way a primitive history-based (or audit-based) access-control model [3] 
and as such requires more sophisticated enforcement mechanisms than Bell-LaPadula. 
The simple security property Access is only granted if the object requested: 
1. is in the same company dataset as an object already accessed by that subject, 
i. e. within the Wall, or 
2. belongs to an entirely different conflict of interest class. 
*-property Write access is only permitted if: 
1. access is permitted by the simple security property and 
2. no object can be read which is in a different company dataset to the one for 
which write access is requested and contains unsanitized information. 
Take-Grant Model 
Another fundamental policy model that should be mentioned is the Take-Grant (TG) 
Model by Lipton and Snyder [89]. In this model the access from a subject to an object is 
modelled in form of a directed graph. Subjects and objects are represented by nodes. A 
directed edge from a subject to an object denotes that the subject has access to the object. 
The access is associated with a weight, that denotes the set of access rights. Fundamental 
to the model are two access rights [31]: 
Take Subject s that has the right to entity e underscores the fact that s can assume any 
right that e has to other entities such as protected entities. 
Grant Subject s that has grant right to entity e can transfer any right it has for other 
entities to e. 
The dynamics of the system is captured by rewriting rules for the graph that can introduce 
new entities or establish new edges according to the take and grant rights. The analysis 
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is then based on checking properties of the resulting graphs. [241 provides an example of 
a safety check for the TG-Alodel by establishing whether a subject can possibly obtain 
access to a resource using the graph-transfonnat ion rules. 
Role-based Access Control 
The key to Role-based access control is to abstract away from the individual user and 
define access-control on the basis of roles in that all individual can act. Whilst group 
member-ship is static and not bound to change, roles reflect a more dynamic nature. The 
same individual can be assigned to a specific role temporarily, but whether he is actively 
acting in the role is a discretionary decision. An example is "a navy officer on night shift". 
The rationale for role-based access-control is that roles more naturally express organ- 
isation hierarchies and allow the specification of complex security policies with less effort. 
Whilst the first point is often argued, the second is generally accepted to be valid. This 
can be shown using a simple example. Imagine, the administrator of the University wide 
computer network has to define the access-rights for every student Separately, instead of 
assigning just every particular student to the role "student". Of course often group and 
group hierarchies can handle situations like this, but roles provide more flexibility as we 
will show in the following. 
f-ºautho(u, r, activate) f-+autho(r, o, a) 
Role assignment Authorisation assignment 
Figure 2.11: Abstraction from user to roles 
The abstraction user - role - permission is depicted in Figure 2.11. It is one of the 
main advantages, since it allows to reduce the management effort. For a principal to act in 
a specific role, two different steps are needed. First the role-assignment, i. e. the principal 
must be assigned to the role, and second the role-activation, i. e. the principal chooses to 
act in the role. Where one obvious requirement is that a principal can only activate a role, 
it is assigned to. The meaning of role-assignment and activation can be constrained, or 
implicit due to inheritance relations in a role-hierarchy. Both concepts will be explained 
shortly. 
Sandhu et-al. [121] defined four different levels of role-based access-control models, 
which we briefly summarise below. Starting from a primitive level (0) reaching to the 
highest, most complex model (3), the four models build the lattice of ILIAC model clas- 
sification. 
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RBACO At this level users, roles, permissions and sessions are defined. In conformance 
with our previous notation, a permission can be seen as a tuple (object, action). 
The idea of session is, that a user can act simultaneously in different sessions. The 
activation of roles and further restrictions, are scoped to the particular session. It is 
for example possible for a user to activate only the minimal required role for the pur- 
suit of a given task, whilst in an other session requiring a different (possibly higher) 
role activation. The minimal role activation is often referred to as principle of least 
privilege and can be introduced as a constraint in RBAC2 models. Permissions are 
assigned to roles, and user are assigned to roles. In this two step assignment lies one 
of the main advantages of role-based access-control, since it makes the specification 
of security policies easier. 
RBACI Includes RBACo and introduces the notion of role hierarchies. A role-hierarchy 
essentially forms a lattice, that specifies the inheritance of roles. A senior role 
inherits all permissions from the junior role. This further simplifies the specification, 
but is often a point for critics. For example it is not intuitive, that a manager 
performs activities (or is even allowed to do so) of an security administrator. The 
notion of seniority relates more to the object-oriented concepts of generalisation and 
specialisation and does sometimes fail to capture our intuitive notion, that the role 
"manager" is senior to the role "security administrator". Figure 2.12 depicts a simple 
role-hierarchy. 
R. BAC2 Includes RBACO but allows to define constraints on the role-assignment, as well 
as on the role activation. Constraints define application dependent conditions, and 
thus allow the security policy to relate to some extend to the state of the system. 
Separation of duty (c. f. Chinese Wall Policy) can be expressed using constraints. 
RBAC3 Finally combines the RBAC1 and RBAC2 models. 
Role-based access-control models have been now in the focus of research for some 
time, but still provide challenges. Extensions to cater for the relationships between roles 
have lead to the notion of Team-based Access Control [128] and extensions to allow for the 
specification of temporal constraints on role assignment and activation have been proposed 
with the Temporal Role-based Access Control by Bertino et. al. [27,28]. Both RBAC and 
TRBAC have been modelled by [17] using Constraint Logic Programming. With the goal 
to express dynamic separations of duty in RBAC, [97] extended the traditional set-oriented 
specification of RBAC with a version that is based on first order temporal logic. RBAC 
has also been standardised by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [9]. 
RBAC3 models can be expressed using Siewe's [124] basic authorisation framework, 
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Figure 2.12: Role-Hierarchies 
I)V iutn)(Inciug slxecialiseel actions for role-assignment and (de-) activation. together with 
Iat a-st ruct. nres that represent, the current role-assignments and activations. 
2.3.2 Policy Languages 
Ilaving reviewed the foundations of security models and policies, we will now review the 
state of the art in policy specification languages. A policy language is expected to be 
(according to [2(1]): 
Expressive The expressiveness of a policy language is judged on the informal require- 
ºuents that can he expressed in the language. Often this does also include the ease of 
use. viz. how complicated are the statements made in the policy language to express 
is specific requirement. 
Clear and Readable The syntax of the language should be readable by humans. [20] 
argººe that for example XMIL-based languages are too verbose and that most logic 
based languages are too hard to learn. 
Intuitive and Unambiguous Semantics The statements written in the policy lan- 
guagc iiuist have a concise meaning. This is typically problematic with languages 
that do not have a formal foundation, as natural language descriptions will almost 
certainly contain anil>ignities. 
Effective Decision Procedure How efficient is the evaluation of the policy to make a 
(lecisiou 1) -((I oil a (fuery. 
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Extensibility Does the language define extension points to include additional function- 
ality 
Except for extensibility these have also been identified by e. g. [67]. Closer to the original 
foundations we begin with the more theoretical and formal approaches, where the focus 
is on the unambiguous meaning and then review the more industrial, application-oriented 
languages that focus on expressiveness and extensibility. 
Authorisation Specification Language (ASL) 
Let us now review the Authorisation Specification Language developed by Jajodia et. al. 
[73,72]. They identified, that most policy languages allow only the specification of a 
specific type of policy. These are namely: 
Open Policies Everybody is allowed access, unless denied. A blacklist is a typical ex- 
ample. 
Closed Policies Everybody is denied access, unless explicitly allowed. This is for exam- 
ple the case for Java policy files. 
In their work, they proposed the use of positive and negative authorisations rules 
and show how conflicts are resolved by decision rules. They introduce rule-based Flex- 
ible Authorisation Manager (FAM) authorisation language. Here positive and negative 
authorisations for a subject (or group) to perform an action on a specific object can be 
expressed. The example below shows a positive and a negative authorisation rule: 
cando(file, s, Tread) E- in(s, Employee) 
This rule defines that if subject s is a member of the group Employee, then it can read 
the file. Negative authorisation would be denoted by a- sign in front of the read action. 
FAM allows also to express authorisations based on previous access using so-called done 
rules. These are essentially facts, that are created by the system (FART) during runtime 
and reflect the access executed by a user. This allows for example to express the Chinese 
Wall Policy. The final decision, whether to grant access or deny a request is then resolved 
by a so-called decision rules. For example the following: 
do(file, s, +a) F-- dercando(file, s, +a)&-idercando(f ile, s, -a) 
This rule specifies that if it can be derived that s is allowed to perform action a on 
file, and it cannot be derived that s is denied to perform action a on file, then s is 
effectively allowed to perform a on file. 
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Siewe's authorisation model (124] has been inspired by these rule:, but he extends the 
language to allow temporal dependency of authorisations and caters for the composition- 
ality of security policies. One of the major points for criticism is that it is not possible to 
express obligation policies in ASL. Further it is difficult quantify events, since the done 
rule merely represents the fact, that such an event has occurred in the past - there is 
also no notion of time or temporal dependency between the events. 
[72] extends the original framework to the Flexible Authorisation Framework (FAF), 
that includes support for RBAC and discusses propagation rules (for example the propa- 
gation of access rights from groups to group-members). They additionally emphasise on 
integrity rules. However the integrity rules in their model cannot take into account the 
result of the execution, as integrity constraints are checked prior the decision whether the 
access is granted or denied - they are mainly concerned with the integrity of the access 
control policy specification itself. The expression of history-based access control require- 
ments is supported. The history is modelled as a table where each row represents a single 
access. A row is structured as (Object, User, Role, Action, Time). The history is 
represented formally by the predicate done with a matching list of parameters. It is not 
clear how the history table is actually updated. The explicit representation of time makes 
also temporal relations difficult to express. 
SecPAL 
SecPAL [20] is a very recent authorisation policy language for distributed systems. They 
claim to balance with their language expressiveness and usability to facilitate widespread 
adoption. The usability stems from the use of a syntax, that is close to natural lan- 
guage and seems to have been inspired by BAN (Burrows-Abadi-Needham) Logic [38) and 
subsequent work on access control [2]. An example of a DAC policy in SecPAL is: 
Example 1 
Admin says user can say,, x can access resource If user can access resource. 
says here represents an assertion, that is essentially a conjunction of facts. call say00 
is a delegation of indefinite depth and can is a predicate. 
The example represents a policy that allows users to delegate their rights to other users 
at their own discretion. They claim that languages without recursion (such as XACML) 
cannot express this simple requirement. The language to express assertions is negation 
free, to avoid higher computational complexity and undecidability. 
SecPAL seems to focus on the delegation of access rights between users, viz. Discre- 
tionary Access Control. It is not clear how policies can be composed and how true the 
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authors claim over simplicity is when large policies are being expressed. In [20] the au- 
thors claim that temporal and periodicity constraints can be expressed. however this is 
not natural to the language. Time is accessible as built-in function CurrentTime and 
constraints are expressed in these terms the expression of time constraints or temporal 
dependencies is not a first class citizen. 
Becker [20] also notes that most languages that did not start with a formal model 
as the underlying foundation are prone to semantic ambiguities. The advantageous role 
that strong logical foundations played in access control has also been emphasised by [1]. 
However, we would like to emphasise Becker's view, that the logical foundation should 
not hinder the understandability of the model and the language through its complexity. 
For example the algebra for policy composition presented in [138]. whilst addressing an 
important subject. appears to introduce a level of complexity that is not justifiable. 
After reviewing some of the logic based approaches to the specification of access-control 
policies. we now have a look at a more informal specification language that is based on a 
graphical representation of the policy. 
LaSCO 
The Language for Security Constraints on Objects (LaSCO) [68] expresses authorisa- 
tion policies as annotated directed graphs. These describe the state of the system and 
specifies access-constraints. Figure 2.13 shows how the simple security condition of the 
Bell-LaPadula model is expressed in LaSCO. 
type="user" && type="file" && 
clearance=$UL sec level=$FL 
name='vad 
ON- 
Figure 2.13: Bell-Lapadula's simple security condition in LaSCO 
This graph denotes, that an object of type `user" has the clearance level $UL (a so- 
called policy-variable) and can perform the action "read" on an object of type "file" with 
the security-level $FL under the constraint, that $UL > $FL. An example of the Chinese 
Wall policy and other more complex examples are given in [68]. 
Damianou [48] states some of the disadvantages of LaSCO. First it cannot express any 
form of obligation (which is also the case for ASL), secondly it is not compositional and 
thirdly there is not textual representation of LaSCO graphs. as it is found for other graph- 
oriented languages. The main advantage of LaSCO is that a graphical representation 
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is more accessible to the human user and aids in the specification of security policies. 
We also believe that the representation of access rights in form of a graph is intuitive 
for the analysis of permissible information flow in policies. The TG-style notation for 
access rights features in our Security Policy Analysis Tool analysis tool, that is part of the 
SANTA workbench. 
Ponder 
Ponder is a object-oriented, declarative language to express security and management 
policies. Ponder policies have been implemented using security mechanisms for firewalls, 
operating systems, databases and Java [47]. Unlike the previously discussed policy models, 
it supports obligation. In Ponder, objects can be grouped in domains and roles and groups 
give structure to the systems subjects. 
An Authorisation Policy in Ponder defines which subject (group or role) can perform 
what actions (activities) on a domain of objects. Security Policies are reusable, since they 
can be parameterised. Thus several instances of the same policy can be created with 
different parameters. This is one of the strength of Ponder. The example of a simple 
authorisation policy is taken from Damianou [481: 
Example 2 
type auth+ PolicyOpsT (subject s, target <PolicyT> t) { 
action load O, remove(), enable(), disable() ;} 
inst auth+ svitchPolicyOpsuPolicy0ps? (/NetxorkAdmine, Nregion/evitchee); 
inst auth+ routersPolicyOpsOPolicy0ps? (/QoSAdmina. Nregion/routere); 
The above example shows two instances of the policy PolicyOpsT that allow members 
of /NetworkAdmins and /QoSAdmins to load, remove, enable or disable objects of type 
PolicyT within the Nregion/switches and Nregion/routers domain respectively. 
Ponder is a flexible and rich language, that allows to define and structure complex 
security and management policies. The support for roles and groups maker it suitable even 
for large system policies. Especially the existing tool-support, that allows to graphically 
view and define the domains and the Ponder compiler, that translates high-level Ponder 
specifications in low level policy languages, such as the Windows 2000 security templates, 
or policies for the Java security model, make Ponder an attractive policy specification 
language. 
The three policy languages, ACL, LaSCO and Ponder are used and discussed in the 
comparative study [4] undertaken by Aljarch and Rossiter. They critically compare the 
expressiveness of the BMA security model for Electronic Patient Records system devel- 
oped by Anderson [7,6]. In their findings they conclude that although, most of the nine 
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principles can be expressed in LaSCO, Ponder gives the most flexibility to do so. This is 
partly because Ponder allows the specification of obligation policies. 
The Ponder project in the described form is discontinued. However, a successor (re- 
designed and re-implemented but strongly influenced by the original ideas) is available at 
http: //ponder2. net. 
SPL 
SPL [118] is a policy language to express access control and a specific form of obligation 
policies. The main interest of the language is that it addresses policy composition in 
the sense that many policies can coexists to form the overall policy of the organisation. 
The composition of multiple policies follows the same lines as discussed in [73,72]. The 
advantage of the model is that it discusses the applicability of policies using domain rules, 
that decide whether a policy applies or not. Policy decisions that are made by SPL can be 
either authorise, deny, or notapply. Resulting in a tri-valued logic for policy composition. 
A similar approach, allowing the evaluation of a policy to produce a non-boolean value 
has also been taken in [18]. 
SPL provides support for history-based policies [3] and provides a tool that can opti- 
mise the history that is stored based on the policy specification. The policy is enforced by 
a security monitor. The authors show in a separate paper [117] how a restricted form of 
obligations (requiring the obliged actions to be atomic) can also be enforced using security 
monitors. This is similar to the approach that is taken in this work. The advantage is 
that the history that must be kept for the enforcement is kept to a minimum. Other 
work [61] has also identified the problem of growing history logs and proposed the use of 
meta-policies that define when events can be purged. This is however dangerous, as the 
deletion of events can mean that the enforcement mechanisms are not able to enforce the 
policy correctly. Since their model also lacks a formal foundation, it is difficult to show 
that the meta-policy only deletes events that are not required. 
The authors of SPL state as the main drawback of their enforcement approach that 
history-based policies cannot decide on events prior to their activation, i. e. the system 
only records events for each history-based policy after the policy exists. [118]. A similar 
problem with respect to the semantics has also been noted by [43]. Our model has the same 
"drawback", however it is truthful to the semantics of our policy model which explicitly 
states that the history that is referenced by policy rules is finite, back to the point in time 
at which the policy started to be enforced. 
SPL was not developed based on a formal model and is in this sense comparable 
with Ponder. It provides many useful constructs for the specification of policies, such as 
composition, inheritance and instantiations of policies. It also provides the automated 
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generation of enforcement code. However the lack of a formal semantics of the language 
makes it unsuitable for security-critical applications. 
Usage Control (UCON) 
Over the recent years Park and Sandhu developed a model for usage control. The aim of 
UCON is to provide finer grained control over the usage of digital objects and to unify the 
access-control, trust-management and digital rights management in one more expressive 
framework. The initial paper [112] outlines the concepts behind UCON and discusses the 
different forms of usage in terms of rights combinations. They discuss the accessibility of 
objects and assert that: ... since a subject cannot modify an object without viewing it, 
... 
leads to a reduced number of combinations in their categorisation of accessibility. We 
feel that this is an overly strong assertion, as it may be the case that a user is allowed 
to append information to a file without being able to view the files contents. A good 
example of this is the security requirements for Electronic Patient Records (EPR) [6], 
where a clinician is allowed to append a new entry to a patient's EPR, without reading 
or modifying the existing entries. 
The model is further detailed in [120] where the UCONABC core models are introduced. 
The focus is here on the notion of mutable and immutable attributes that are associated 
with objects or subjects. Mutable attributes can change during the execution of the sys- 
tem, whereas immutable attributes can only change by administrative action. Furthermore 
the model is extended to capture different phases, before usage, ongoing usage and post 
usage. The novelty here is that the usage of a resource can be denied whilst the resource 
is already in use. They also address pre-, ongoing- and post-update functions to comply 
with obligations and maintain mutable attributes. The definitions that are given in the 
paper are mostly informal and are not suited for the analysis of UCON policies. Especially 
reasoning about the interaction of the system behaviour and the policy enforcement seems 
to be hard, if possible. 
This has been rectified to some extend in later work by Zhang [144,145] who formalised 
the different UCONABC models using Lamport's temporal logic of action (TLA) [82]. 
They mainly focus on the system-controlled mutability of attributes, that is updates are 
made as side-effects of subjects' actions on objects [145]. The major advancement of 
this work is that it provides a formal definition of the UCONABC core models and their 
functioning. However it is not clear how policies can actually be enforced. The following 
is the specification of the Chinese Wall Policy in UCON: 
Example 3 
The first UCON policy states that a subject s is permitted to read from an object o if s 
did once (at some time in the past) tried to read from the same object and that object 
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has been at the same point in time in the list of previously accessed objects s. ao. 
permitaccess(s, o, read) -+ 4 (tryaccess(s, o, read) A (o E s. ao)) 
permitaccess(s, o, read) -+ f(tryaccess(s, o, read) A (o ý s. ao)A 
(o. class ý s. ac)) A *preupdate(s. ac)n 
+preupdate(s. ao) 
preupdate(s. ac) : s. ac' = s. ac u {o. class} 
preupdate(s. ao) : s. ao' = s. ao U {o. class} 
The second policy states that if an access request has once been made and the object at 
that point in time has not been in the list of previously accessed objects and the object 
has not been in a class that conflicts with s's interests and the actions preupdate have 
been successfully executed, then the access is granted. 
The presented formalisation does only formalise exactly one access. It is not clear 
how the model could support several sequential usages by the same subject on the same 
resource (object). Semantically this would mean that once an access has been granted in 
the past it will always be granted in the future. The reason for this is that the f references 
some past state for which the subsequent formula is truer. The authors say informally 
that: "By a UCON policy, we refer to a set of logical formulas for [a] single usage process 
(s, o, r) all through this paper" [145]. If this means that the policy formalises only one 
usage (from request to termination), then it would solve the above problem. However it 
then seems to be impractical (at least) to reason about the effect the policy has on the 
execution of the system as a whole because the usage processes are independent. In this 
sense the formalisation using a temporal logic would also not be justified, as the simple 
state transition diagram (used for illustration in [145]) would capture the sequencing of 
the usage actions adequately. 
Whilst attribute mutability [113] is important and is not often addressed by other 
access control models it is not clear how one can reason about the interaction between 
concurrent usage requests, or how these requests are being processed. Especially since 
concurrency is a feature in UCON, which has been seldom investigated in access control 
models [145]. UCON does also not deal with the composition of policies. 
The use of temporal logic specifications to describe access control and other security 
requirements has been critically reviewed by Calo et. al. [39]. They discuss whether tem- 
poral logic is a good policy specification language. They do not provide a definite answer, 
'If all conditions to grant an access have been met in the past, and we want to check at a later point 
in time whether permitaccess can be true then it is still true that once the condition was met. 
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but emphasise that: 
Policies that are said to be implemented by system ays must be expressed in 
a language from which (at least theoretically) it is computationally possible to 
implement a monitor that detects when sys violates the policy. [39] 
They view temporal logic specification as being opposed to basic rule-languages. We feel 
that Siewe's approach [124] and the approach of encoding rules in temporal logic that can 
be refined to enforceable code provides a beneficial compromise that inherits advantages 
from both schools of thought. 
eXtended Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) 
XACML [108] is developed as a research project by SUN Microsystems. It is a stan- 
dard language (XACML 2.0 has been accepted by the Organisation for the Advancement 
of Structured Information Standards (OASIS)) for expressing access control and privacy 
policies in the context of a particular XML document. The language itself is based on eX- 
tensible Markup Language (XML). It claims to support role based access control. Bandara 
[16] argues that the notion of role in XACML is actually the same as a group. 
XACML is a rule-based language, where rules define the conditions under which an 
access to a specific resource is allowed or denied. XACML policies deal with conflict 
detection and resolution between composed (XACML calls it nested) policies, supports 
the nesting and inclusion of sub-policies by reference. Anderson [5] compares the expres- 
siveness of XACML with the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL) [69]. 
She concludes that in terms of expressiveness EPAL is subsumed in almost all aspects by 
XACML. 
The main critique on XACML is that the underlying XML representation is too large 
and blown up for humans to use directly. The advantage however is that tool support for 
processing the XML is readily available. XACML comes with an open source reference 
implementation of a Policy Decision Point (PDP) that can decide whether a specific access 
control request is authorised or not. Whilst this reference implementation is available, 
there is no formal semantics for the language itself - which makes policy analysis difficult. 
KAoS 
KAoS (e. g. [134,130,94]) policies have been developed under DARPA and NASA sponsor- 
ship, as a collection of componentised agent services that can be used to limit the autonomy 
in software agent applications. It is compatible with several popular agent frameworks, 
e. g. Cougaar [44]. Policies are represented using semantic web languages; originally they 
were represented in DAAML [49] and are now expressed in OWL [135]. The original goal 
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of KAoS is to constrain the behaviour of (semi-) autonomous entities through the use of 
enforcement mechanisms. 
The use of semantic web technology, viz. using the description logic based ontologies 
as a representation of system, environment and policies allows to exploit the tool-support 
that is available. For the conflict detection and harmonisation (the resolution of detected 
conflicts) between policies the Java Theorem Prover (JTP) [59] ontology inference engine 
has been integrated in the KAoS framework. To make the framework usable and hide 
the complexity of the policy specification using OWL, the policy development process is 
supported by the KPAT tool. 
Again temporal aspects are only captured in the language using explicit time stamps 
and are therefore not natural to the model. The dynamic change of policies has been 
identified as a core issue for the application in MAS. Change here means the dynamic 
update by an administrator as opposed the dynamic change on events as addressed in 
our model. It is not clear how one can reason about such changes using the ontological 
representation. The automated dynamic change of policies has been recognised by the 
authors of KAoS recently and has been addressed in the KAA framework [34] that ex- 
tends the KAoS framework with components that automatically change the policies in the 
MAS, i. e. adjusting their autonomy dynamically. Bandara [16] notes that while the KAoS 
framework provides support for the conflict-detection and harmonisation of policies, as 
well as the possibility to perform queries (e. g. "which entities have read/write access to 
the examination marks database") it cannot take into account the changing state of the 
system. This is a drawback, especially when the policy depends on the current state of 
the system. KAoS has been compared by the authors to Rei and Ponder in [130] and more 
recently in [102]. 
The motivation to adjust the autonomy of agents in the system originates from the 
desire to keep the human operator in the loop, whilst the system is acting autonomously 
in a supporting role. The ability to adjust the autonomy provides the human user the 
assurance that he is in control. The idea of adjustable autonomy has also been addressed 
in S-Assess [136]. Here the decision-making of an agent is influenced by a constraint-model 
that is represented as an AND-OR Tree augmented with temporal dependencies between 
siblings. It is not clear how temporal conflicts are detected or resolved in this framework. 
However, the main advantage that we see in this work is that the agent's initial decision 
can be overruled by a policy at run-time. This influenced our model of obligation rules 
for vigilant agents (see Chapter 7). 
We identified the ability to control the behaviour of an (intelligent) autonomous agent 
in [19] as one of the key issues for the success of agent systems in military applications. 
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2.3.3 Enforcement 
The enforcement of policies means to provide mechanisms in the system, that can ensure 
that the policy specification is not violated by the system's execution. The standard model 
for policy enforcement that is used in more industrial approaches to policy enforcement is 
defined in the ISO standard (ISO/IEC 10181-3: 1996) [71]. This model is used for example 
by XACML and EPAL and has been depicted in Figure 2.14 (adopted from [5]). 
Application 
I 
I. Request for access to 
resource 
IF 2. Request 
tI\ %1(`I`PCQ I 
2. Request for authorization 
to access resource 
Policies 
3. Retrieve 
applicable policies 
Policy Enforcement Policy Decision 
Point Point 
i 
5. Authorization decision 
6. Grant access to 
resource if permitted 
Resource 
4. Retrieve 
needed attributes 
Attributes 
Figure 2.14: Policy Enforcement Model 
Iii this nulcl. au application requests access to a resource. This access is controlled by 
a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The PEP queries a Policy Decision Point (PDP) that 
interprets the applicable policies and takes the required attributes (e. g. role activations, 
labels etc. ) into account. The authorisation decision is then reported to the PEP that does 
cit her grant t lie requested access or denies it. Obligations in this model are obligations 
of the PEP to for example make an appropriate entry in an access log file - it does not 
describe obligations of the accessing application or its user. A similar notion of obligation 
cane be found in [126], where obligations denote what a manager must and must not do. 
'1'1ºe logical separation of PEP and PDP is beneficial as the implementation of the PEP 
is usually application- or platform-specific, as it is usually built into the application or the 
phitform oil which the application is built [5]. However, the introduction of PEPs into 
existing applications his been addressed in for example [111] and [18], where Java classes 
are edited at the byte: code level during class-loading. The benefit is, that the enforcement 
code does not have to be manually included, and can even be added to existing programms. 
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In [18] the performance of this approach has been tested using the Java standard library. 
Most policy models and languages focus their discussion on the enforceability on the 
PDP. They show that the answer to an access control request is decidable and tractable. 
This is typically achieved by restricting the language/model to constrained Datalog pro- 
grams (e. g. [29,72]) that allow to evaluate requests in polynomial time (with respect to 
data-complexity). Barker et. al. [17] use constraint logic programming to define RBAC and 
(extended) TRBAC models and for the evaluation of access control decisions. They report 
results on the efficacy of their approach in [17], however do not provide a comparison to 
the other approaches. 
Schneider [122] discusses the practicality of security languages based on their enforce- 
ability and the cost of enforcement using a class of enforcement mechanisms that is called 
Execution Monitoring (EM). Schneider's approach is based on the notion of security au- 
tomata (a class of Büchi automata). The security automata reads a sequence of input 
symbols, that represent system states, atomic actions, higher-level actions (e. g. method 
calls) etc. Each input symbol triggers a transition in the security automaton. If the au- 
tomaton does not accept an input sequence it terminates the request. A simple example 
of such an automaton is given in Figure 2.15 (adapted from [122]). 
Not FileRead Not Send 
FileRead 
Figure 2.15: No Send after Read 
Schneider notes that the termination of a target2 that is about to violate a security 
policy may seem draconian. However, he argues that the notification of the target about 
the failure would restrict the set of security policies that can be enforced using EM without 
apparent gain. This is true from the enforcement point of view, however if we view 
enforcement as part of an overall software system it is important to notify the target to 
allow for recovery. Schneider also mentions the possibility of byte-code editing and briefly 
outlines the concepts of proof-carrying code, that allow to automatically verify that a piece 
of code satisfies the safety-properties that are stated in a policy [103,104]. 
2Target in the context of the paper denotes the monitored system and not the target of an access control 
request. 
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The security automata approach has been extended by Ligatti et. al. in (88) in form 
of edit automata. They view program monitors as transformers that edit the stream of 
actions produced by an untrusted application. This leads to a hierarchy of enforcement 
mechanisms. Truncation automata can halt the target's execution and are similar to 
Schneider's security automata. Additionally they define suppression automata that can 
suppress unauthorised actions without terminating the target; insertion automata that 
can insert actions into the target's action stream (for example to enforce obligations); and 
edit automata that combine the powers of suppression and insertion automata. This view 
of program monitors widens the set of enforceable policies. 
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter we firstly reviewed the notions of Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, em- 
phasising on the different properties that agents can exhibit. This is not meant to be 
a universally acceptable classification scheme for Software Agents. The intention is to 
provide a structured and schematic introduction into the subject. In this work we do 
not address the higher-level properties of agents, such as learning or collaboration but 
focus on situated, reactive agents. The agent architecture that is subsequently described 
in Chapters 3 and 5 is flexible enough to accommodate many of the reactive and hybrid 
architectures that have been reviewed. 
The second part of the review was concerned with security in the context of dis- 
tributed software applications, emphasising on the concerns that the autonomy of agents 
introduces. Since the focus of the thesis is the specification and enforcement of access 
control, obligation and integrity constraints we focussed on policy models and languages 
for the specification of these requirements. Many languages to define security policies have 
been proposed. The more formal, logic-based approaches (e. g. ASL) in general lack the 
flexibility and scalability of more informal specifications (e. g. Ponder, XACML), but have 
the advantage, that properties of the specification can be proved. The advantage of the 
informal models is typically the increased scalability, due to concepts like inheritance or 
instantiation of policy classes as well as the generally better developed tool-support. 
We concluded the discussion of related work with the enforcement of policies. The 
enforcement mechanisms that we emphasised on were those based on a reference monitor 
model as it can be typically found in operating systems, fircwalls and data-bases. 
Another important aspect in the field of security, that was not especially reviewed in 
this chapter, is the impact of more security centric software development proccwses. The 
aim to design security into the system is most notably addressed in UML-Sec. [79,781 and 
the threat analysis in form of (mis-) use-cases [125,451. 
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Computational Model 
A Secure Multi Agent System (SMAS) is comprised of Agents, Ob- 
jects, Policies and Enforcement Mechanisms. This chapter informally 
describes these components and the interactions between them. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The computational model describes the behaviour of a system and provides the basis 
to reason about properties of the individual system component's behaviour and their 
interactions. This chapter introduces the computational model together with the SANTA- 
WSL design-language. The design-language is used for the specification of a Secure Multi- 
Agent System (SMAS). The aim is to provide a formal and compositional framework in 
which Multi-Agent Systems can be expressed together with their temporal and security 
requirements at different levels of abstraction. 
Secure in this context means that the system provides adequate mechanisms to enforce 
dynamically changing security policies that define constraints on the system's behaviour. 
Constraints are for example access control restrictions or integrity constraints. 
A secure Multi-Agent System is a distributed system in which the overall system 
behaviour results from the behaviour of individual agents and their interactions with their 
shared environment. The system specification is comprised of agents, objects, policies and 
enforcement mechanisms. The following list provides a brief description of each of these 
components: 
Agents are the actors in the system. Each agent represents a single sequential process. 
Agents encapsulate a set of variables, that can only be modified by the agent through 
local computation (local actions) or communication with objects (remote actions). 
Objects constitute the part of the environment that is shared and accessible by all agents. 
Objects encapsulate a set of variables, that can only be modified through the object's 
interfaces. Agents invoke these interfaces in remote actions to execute the associated 
code. Objects themselves are passive and cannot initiate any form of computation 
or communication. Access to objects is mutually exclusive. 
Policies constrain the computation and communication in the SAMAS. They define the 
possible behaviour of Enforcement Aechanisms. Policies can change dynamically 
during the system execution, triggered by time and events. Policies are categorised 
in authorisation, delegation, obligation and integrity policies. They are distributed 
to the enforcement mechanisms. 
Enforcement Mechanisms interpret policies and influence the behaviour of the sys- 
tem by enforcing access control, compliance with obligations and integrity policies. 
Mechanisms that are encapsulated within another component (viz. within an agent 
or object) are referred to as vigilant mechanisms and those that protect a collection 
of components are referred to as security enforcer. 
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the Security Enforcer. ' 
The distribution of enforcement mechanisms in the SMAS and the conception and 
development of appropriate security policies are an essential part of the system design. 
Both must be addressed early and throughout the development of the system and cannot 
be left as an add-on. The computational model presenntevl in this work addresses these 
issues by providing the semantics of the interaction between enforcement mechanisms and 
the system components. 
Initial work on the integration of functional, temporal and security requirements -vas 
presented by F. Siewe in his PhD-Thesis [123. Siewe's approach is a conservative extension 
to Back's Action System 1121 and describes the interaction of authorisation policies and 
a distributed system in form of a secure action system (SAS). The computational model 
presented here significantly extends this approach, allowing for the specification of agent- 
based systems and the enforcement of much wider classes of policies such as authorisation, 
delegation, obligation and integrity policies at different levels of abstraction in the system. 
Additionally the issue of encapsulation and openness of a Multi-Agent System is addressed 
in this work by defining clear interfaces that control the flow of information between 
communicating agents. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the role 
of agents in the SMAS, the variables that are part of an agent's state, and the execution 
model of a single agent. Section 3.3 introduces objects as passive entities that represent 
the agents shared environment. Section 3.4 describes the different types of policies that 
are used to specify constraints on the behaviour of the SNIAS. In Section 3.5 the role of 
the different enforcement mechanisms in the SMAS is explained. 
3.2 Agents 
Agents are the actors in the system. They pro-actively act in pursuit of their adopted 
goals and interact with other agents through their shared environment. Each agent in the 
system has a unique name by which it can be identified. Authentication mechanisms that 
verify the identity of an agent are assumed to be in place and the unique name of an agent 
is used to represent its identity. 
An agent encapsulates a set of agent variables and a Set of actions - the agent's 
capabilities. Agents are autonomous, viz. they arc in control of the actions they execute. 
'A Security Enforcer mechanism cannot protect agents. An autonomous agent is in control of the actions 
it is executing. If a policy would be enforced on it by a different system component, the execution would 
be effectively controlled by that component, violating the autonomy property of the agent. Technically 
the security enforcer can be seen as a proxy object, that is guarding the interfaces of all objects under its 
protection. 
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This distinguishes them from passive objects. Consequently, the encapsulated actions can 
only be executed by the agent itself and not be invoked externally. The encapsulated 
variables are local to the agent and can only be modified by the agent's actions. 
The execution of an agent is staged in phases. After the initialisation the agent enters 
its Deliberation-Enforcement-Execution (DEE) cycle. In the deliberation phase the agent 
prioritises actions for execution; the enforcement phase enforces a policy on the agent's 
decision and the execution phase finally denotes the actual execution of the action. To 
terminate the agent ends the iteration of the DEE cycle and enters the termination phase, 
in which it remains idle until the distributed termination of the MAS. 
3.2.1 Agent State 
Agent variables are the variables that are declared in the agent. They represent the part 
of the state that is modified by the execution of action statements. Control variables are 
defined at the semantic level to control the execution. They cannot be directly modified 
by the agent. Control variables are also not observable by the agent, with the exception 
of the boolean variables donea, x and faileda x that provide feedback to the agent a on the 
success or failure of the action x and the integer variables IIa, x that capture the result 
of the agent's deliberation phase (see Section 3.2.3). Special constructs to access these 
variables are provided in the design-language (See Section 5.2.3). 
Additionally auxiliary variables for the agent deliberation and the vigilant enforce- 
ment mechanisms are also part of the agent state. These are local to the deliberation, 
respectively enforcement phase and cannot be accessed in agent actions. The set of agent, 
control and auxiliary variables of an agent are referred to as the agent's state variables. 
The agent state is the mapping from the agent state variables to their values. A 
behaviour of an agent is a, possibly infinite, sequence of agent states. The set of possible 
behaviours of an agent is defined by the semantics of the agent in terms of its actions. 
The semantics guarantees that the agent variables are only modified by one of the agent's 
actions at a time. An agent represents a single, sequential process in the system. 
3.2.2 Agent Capabilities 
The capabilities of an agent are divided into local and remote actions. All actions are 
named uniquely within one agent and define a precondition and a statement. An action 
can only be executed if its precondition evaluates to true. However, the precondition does 
not imply that the action is executed. The choice of action is also dependent on the 
2 This is a necessary condition for the action to be executed, not a sufficient condition. 
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deliberation phase and the enforcement phase. Only declared agent variables can be used 
in the precondition and the statement of an action. 
Any action can succeed or fail. The effect of a successful action execution on the agent 
variables is determined by the semantics of the action. In case of failure the agent variables 
remain unchanged. 
Local Actions 
Define the local computation on the agent's variables. I'lse statement of a local action 
defines the effect of the action, viz. how the agent variables are changed if the execution 
succeeds. A local action can only fail as a result of the violation of an integrity policy that 
is enforced by a vigilant enforcement mechanism3. 
Remote Actions 
Define the synchronous communication with objects. The execution of a remote action 
is additionally constrained by the availability of the invoked object. An object may not 
be available if another agent is currently invoking one of its interfaces, or if the object's 
security enforcer is mediating the access to another object under its protection. The access 
to objects is mutually exclusive. 
Exactly one object interface is invoked by a remote action and no local computation 
is performed. The strict separation between computation and communication is made to 
simplify the computational model and maintain the focus on the integration of security and 
functional requirements. It is assumed that the order of action executions is determined 
by the agent's deliberation (and possibly restricted in the enforcement phase). As a 
consequence transactions must be explicitly encoded in the agent's deliberation. This is 
not a fundamental restriction to the model and we envision to supply more convenient 
notations for the specification of transactions in our future work. 
Remote actions exchange information between the agent and the object by parame- 
ters. The meaning of input and output parameters is defined by an object interface. All 
parameters are passed by value. The effect of a remote action is only partially under the 
control of the agent. The agent exercises control by defining the input and output param- 
eters of the invocation and can place additional constraints by defining integrity policies. 
However, the agent does not have control over the actual computation and its effect on 
the object. A remote action can fail either due to a violation of the agent's integrity policy 
3A11 other classes of policies, such as authorization and obligation, Influence the choice of action that is 
executed, viz. in case of policy violation the action is not executed In the first place and can therefore not 
fail. Due to the encapsulation and the agent's autonomy, other enforcement mechanisms cannot influence 
the execution of local actions. 
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or because of an enforcement mechanism protecting the object. The latter is detailed in 
Section 3.3.2. 
Remote actions define only the communication between agents and objects. Asyn- 
chronous inter-agent communication is modelled using these synchronous mechanism. 
3.2.3 Single Agent Execution Model 
The execution model of a single agent is the continuous iteration of three phases. These 
are depicted in Figure 3.2. 
Initialisation Deliberation 
Enforcement 
Execution Termination 
Figure 3.2: Phases in the Single Agent Execution Model 
Initially the agent enters the deliberation phase. In this phase the agent decides which 
action it prefers to execute next. It then enters the enforcement phase, which maintains 
the agent's control variables and implements vigilant enforcement mechanisms. Dependent 
on the outcome of these two phases the agent either enters the execution phase, or remains 
idle. It then re-enters the deliberation phase. Alternatively to entering the execution phase 
or staying idle the agent may also terminate, to allow for the distributed termination of 
the SMAS system. 
Deliberation Phase 
The deliberation phase serves as an abstraction from the typically complex reasoning 
and decision making process that is found in most agent architectures. To avoid these 
complexities and keep the model generic, it is assumed that the deliberation phase can 
be encoded as an action selection function that assigns a priority to each of the agent's 
actions. The intuition is that the action with the highest priority is the one that the agent 
assessed to be most beneficial to the fulfilment of its current goals. 
This approach is more flexible than the selection of exactly one action by the action 
selection function and allows for the anticipation of failure caused by vigilant enforcement 
mechanisms. It also allows for the definition of alternative remote actions for the case that 
an object is currently unavailable. 
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Non-determinism between a set of actions can be expressed by assigning the same 
priority to each of them. During the execution this means that one of them is chosen at 
random, provided that its execution is not prevented by any vigilant enforcement mecha- 
nism in the agent or synchronisation requirements in the case of external actions. 
Enforcement Phase 
At a high abstraction level the enforcement of security requirements is described in terms 
of policies and enforcement mechanisms. The enforcement phase in the agent's execution 
model represents a placeholder for concrete enforcement code that is derived from policies 
and enforcement mechanisms during the development of the system. 
In the enforcement phase the agent's vigilant enforcement mechanisms are imple- 
mented. They maintain enforcement auxiliary variables that are required for the in- 
terpretation of policies. A policy is enforced by reassigning the priorities that have been 
previously assigned in the deliberation phase in such a way that compliance with the policy 
is ensured. This allows for the enforcement of authorisation and obligation policies. 
Integrity policies are not enforced in this phase, as they typically depend on the result 
of the action execution. Their enforcement is part of the action execution. The enforce- 
ment phase does not modify any agent variables or deliberation auxiliary variables. The 
semantics of the enforcement phase does, however, set control variables to indicate that 
the agent is ready to enter the execution phase. 
Execution Phase 
In the execution phase one of the agent's actions is chosen for execution. The action has 
the highest priority of all those actions for which the precondition is fulfilled. For external 
actions the choice is additionally constrained by the availability of the invoked object. 
Actions that meet these constraints are referred to as enabled actions. 
If more than one action is enabled, then the choice is made non-deterministically 
between these actions. The system ensures the fairness of the action selection and also the 
mutual exclusion of interface invocations. Fairness here means that if an action is enabled 
infinitely often, it is also executed infinitely often. 
The execution ensures that if the action fails, the agent variables and deliberation 
auxiliary variables remain unchanged. The control variables and the enforcement auxiliary 
variables can however be modified by the execution of an action. The former are reflecting 
that the agent re-enters the deliberation phase and indicate the success or failure of the 
action; the latter are used to maintain information that is required for the interpretation 
of policies. 
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Termination Phase 
If the termination of the agent was requested in either the deliberation, enforcement or 
execution phase using the statement terminate, then the agent will leave the deliberation- 
enforcement-execution cycle and enter the termination phase. Termination means that 
the state of the agent is maintained until the distributed termination of the system. The 
agent cannot perform any actions and is not accessible. 
3.2.4 Agents in SANTA 
The SANTA design language provides linguistic support for the specification and im- 
plementation of SMAS. The complete syntax together with the informal and formal 
specification-oriented semantics is described in the subsequent chapters. The listings pro- 
vided here are not intended to give a full and accurate picture of the constructs, but rather 
to provide a flavour of how the described components are specified. 
Listing 3.1: Agent Definition in SANTA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
agent aid 
var, 
vary =0 
when precond, do action, : statement 
when precond2 do action object. interface (var,, var2) 
deliberation : external 
end 
Listing 3.1 depicts the general structure of an agent. The agent with the name aid 
defines two agent variables (varl and var2); a local action with the name action, and an 
remote action with the name actions. The deliberation is in this example not explicitly 
defined and assumed to be defined externally. This means that the priority values are 
being assigned any non-negative integer value from 0 to MAXINT" 
3.3 Objects 
The shared environment is constituted by a set of objects. Objects are passive entities 
that cannot initiate any computation by themselves. Each object in the system has a 
unique name by which it can be identified. An object encapsulates a set of variables and 
a set of parameterised interfaces that agents can invoke. By invoking an interface in a 
remote action an agent exchanges information with the object. 
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3.3.1 Object State 
Object variables are the variables that are declared in the object. They represent the part 
of the state that is modified by the execution of interfaces. Control %7uiables are defined at 
the semantic level to control the invocation of interfaces. These are not accessible in inter- 
face definitions. Additionally auxiliary variables for the vigilant enforcement mechanisms 
are a part of the object state. They are local to the mechanism and cannot be accessed 
in object interfaces. The set of object, control and auxiliary variables of an object are 
referred to as the object's state variables. 
The object state is a mapping from the object's state variables to their values. A 
behaviour of the object is a, possibly infinite, sequence of object states. The set of possible 
object behaviours is defined by its semantics in terms of its interfaces. The semantics 
guarantees that the object variables are only modified by the execution of the object's 
interfaces. 
3.3.2 Interfaces 
Interfaces define the operations that can be performed on objects. They can be invoked 
by agents and allow for the exchange of information between the invoking agent and 
the invoked object. The exchanged information is described by the input and output 
parameters of the interface. All parameters are passed by value. 
The access to the object is mutually exclusive, viz. at most one of the interfaces can 
be executed at any point in time. The invocation of an interface can fail due to the 
enforcement mechanisms that protect the object. In the case of failure all object variables 
remain unchanged. A failure in the interface execution is also indicated to the invoking 
agent, resulting in the failure of the corresponding remote action (s(c Section 3.2.2). 
For the analysis of explicit information flow, the invocations are categorised. Explicit 
information flow denotes the information flow that is explicitly defined in the interfaces. 
It does not address covered channels. An example of a covered channel is the fact that 
the object obtains the information that its interface has been invoked. This is sufficient 
to transmit a boolean value to the object, without using any of the parameters. We 
distinguish three different classes of invocations and their combinations for information 
flow analysis: 
Read is an interface invocation that only specifics output parameters. The information 
flow is is unidirectional from the object to the agent. 
Write is an interface invocation that only specifics input parameters. The information 
flow is unidirectional from the agent to the object. 
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Query is a Read that does not modify any of the object's variables. It is side-effect free. 
Policies can be used to control the invocation of actions and therefore restrict the 
explicit information flow in the system. Given the definition of the interfaces and policies 
the permissible information flow can be analysed. Permissible information flow is the flow 
that is possible under the enforcement of a given policy. The explicit flow of information 
is always a subset of the permissible flow. This is detailed in Chapter 10. 
Policies that depend on the state or history of execution introduce covered channels in 
the system through the enforcement mechanisms. The introduction of covered channels is 
mostly not addressed by the literature on state and history dependent policies. 
3.3.3 Objects in SANTA 
Objects in the SANTA design-language are defined similarly to agents. However, instead 
of action definitions they define parameterised interfaces. As they are passive, they do not 
define a deliberation phase, either. Listing 3.2 shows an example of an object definition. 
Listing 3.2: Object Definition in SANTA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
object oid : 
vari =0 
interface, ( in 
statement 
end 
} 
Pi. out P2 ) { 
Listing 3.2 depicts the general structure of an object definition. The object with the 
name oid defines one object variable (varl) and one interface (interfaces) that has one 
input parameter (pi) and one output parameter (p2). This interface does belong to the 
classes Read (it has output parameter) and Write (it has input parameter). It potentially 
establishes bidirectional information flow. To be able to fully categorise the interface and 
decide whether it represents a Query, knowledge of the statement is required to decide 
whether the object variables are modified by the invocation. 
3.4 Policies 
Policies constrain the behaviour of agents and objects in the system. They are enforced by 
the enforcement mechanisms. Policies are defined by policy rules and their compositions. 
Rules typically express a single security requirement and form the basic building blocks 
of a policy. 
87 
CHAPTER 3. CO\IPU1ATIONAL MODEL 
Rules consists of a premise and a cons quence. The premise. describes a set of system 
behaviours, that when observed lead to the conscequence. 'T'ile consequence of a rule 
determines whether it is an authorisation, delegation, obligation or integrity rule. Rules 
are composed into policies. The composition operators allow for the dynamic change of 
policies on time or events and for the scoping and parallel composition of policies. The 
policy model is detailed in Chapter 7. 
3.4.1 Authorisation 
Authorisation defines the access to resources in the system and decide whether the execu- 
tion of an action or the invocation of an interface are periniysible. An authorisation rule 
defines the condition under which a subject is allowed to perform an action on an object. 
The terms subject, object and action are used in the context of Security policies to 
refer to the different system entities. The term subject denotes the actor that initiates a 
request. In our computational model a subject can only be an agent. The term object 
with respect to policies denotes the target of a request. In our computational model this 
can be an object or an agent (as local actions can also be controlled). The term action 
with respect to policies denotes the mode of access to the object. In our computational 
model actions can be an agent's local and remote actions, or interfaces of objects. 
Examples of authorisation requirements arc: 
. Agent aid is allowed to invoke interface interface, (pl, p2) on object oid provided 
that pl is less than 10. 
. Agent aid is denied to execute the action actions if it previously executed actions. 
The first example is a policy rule that protects the access to the interface of an object, 
whereas the latter is a rule that controls the access of an agent to its capabilities. Both rules 
require fundamentally different mechanisms for their enforcement. Authorisation rules 
can define positive authorisations (allowances) and negative authorisations (denials). To 
resolve conflicts between positive and negative authorisations in the specification, decision 
rules are used. They determine the outcome of the access control decision. 
3.4.2 Delegation 
Delegation defines which subject can delegate a certain access right to another subject. 
The delegating subject is referred to as the delegntor and the subject in receipt of the 
access right is referred to as the delegntee. An example of such a delegation rule is: 
" Agent aid is allowed to delegate the right to invoke interface interface, (p,, p, e) on 
object oid to agent aid,. 
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Delegation rules are expressed in the model using authorisations on specialised interfaces of 
a Security Enforcer. Delegation rules restrict the possible delegation of rights, however, the 
actual delegation must be actively made by the grantor in form of an interface invocation. 
Delegation is a powerful concept, which allows subjects to temporarily transfer access 
rights to other subjects. Delegation policies are important to limit the ability of subjects to 
do so. Delegation as it is discussed in this work, means only the delegation of rights. The 
delegation of duties (obligations) is not addressed and would require further investigation. 
3.4.3 Obligation 
Obligation defines under which conditions a subject has the obligation to perform an 
action on an object. For example: 
. Agent aid must execute the action actions if it previously executed actions. 
This work takes the view, that obligations must be met by the obliged subject itself. This 
limits the possibilities to enforce obligations to vigilant enforcement mechanisms. The 
enforcement of obligation rules and the implementation of the corresponding enforcement 
phase of a vigilant agent is discussed in Section 8.5. 
Other views on the enforcement of obligations are that the system itself does interfere 
in the execution and performs the obligation on behalf of the obliged subject. Although 
this form of enforcement can be expressed in the SMAS computational model, this form 
of obligation enforcement is closely tied with the delegation of duties and not addressed 
here. 
3.4.4 Integrity 
Integrity defines constraints on the effect that the execution of actions and interfaces has. 
They represent assertions on the execution of actions and interfaces. For example: 
" The execution of interface add (in pl , in p2 , out p3) must result in a value 
for 
p3 that is greater than pl and p2. 
The execution of interface time (out t) must return a time stamp that is greater or 
equal to the last returned time stamp. 
Integrity rules allow for the specification of constraints on execution of an action or inter- 
face. If the constraint is violated, the result of that execution is discarded. If all integrity 
constraints are met, the result of the execution takes effect and is reflected in the agent-, 
respectively object variables. 
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The rationale of including integrity l)olicicw in the policy framework is that they allow 
to express expectations on the result of an interface invocation. Unlike assertions these 
expectations can also be dependent on the history of the execution and thus express a 
basic notion of trust. If the results of a specific invocation c11(1 not match the expectations 
of the invoking agent, then this failure is indicated to the agent that can update its trust 
levels. 
3.4.5 Policies in SANTA 
Policies in SANTA are expressed as a separate construct. 
Listing 3.3: Policy Definition in SANTA 
I policy pid : 
2 
3 allow (aid, oid, interface, (pl, p2)) when 0: (pi < 10) 
4 
a decide(S, O, A) when 0: allow(S, O, A) 
6 end 
The policy pid represents the first authorisation example that was given in Sec- 
tion 3.4.1. It contains a positive authorisation rule, that grants the agent aid the right 
to execute the interface interfaces (pl, pQ) of object oid provided that the parameter pl is 
now less than 10. The operator ": " is used to define the length of the observed interval; 
a value of 0 means now. The second rule resolves potential conflicts and states that if a 
positive authorisation can now be derived then the access is granted by the mechanism 
enforcing this policy. 
3.5 Enforcement Mechanisms 
Each enforcement mechanism that is deployed in the system can only enforce policies with 
a certain scope. The scope limits the application of the policy and also restricts the access 
to the observable variables. For example a vigilant enforcement rruerlianisrn in an agent 
can only enforce policies on that particular agent. The set of variables that can be used in 
the policy are also restricted to those that are observable by the enforcement mechanism. 
Consequently the choice of enforcement mechanisms and the specification of policies must 
go hand in hand as not all policies are enforceable with all mechanisms. Additionally the 
specification of behaviours (sequences of states) in the policy is dependent on the chosen 
enforcement mechanisms as it defines the granularity of time over which the policy is 
interpreted (see Chapter 8). 
90 
3.5. ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
3.5.1 Vigilant Agents 
Vigilant agents can enforce authorisation, obligation and integrity policies. The scope of 
subjects in the policy is limited to the agent itself. This means the enforced policy can 
describe constraints on the agent's behaviour only and does not have any direct influence 
on other agents or objects in the system. 
Variables that can be used in policies that are enforced by this mechanism are the 
agent variables and observable control variables and parameters of interface invocations 
made by this agent. An example of a rule that is enforceable by this mechanism is the 
obligation example in Section 3.4.3. 
3.5.2 Vigilant Objects 
Vigilant objects can enforce authorisation, delegation and integrity policies. The scope 
of objects in the policy is limited to the object itself. This means the enforced policy is 
limited to the object itself and does not directly influence decisions made for other objects, 
nor enforces obligations of subjects in the system. 
Variables that can be used in policies that are enforced by this mechanism are the object 
variables, observable control variables for this object and parameters of the controlled 
interfaces. An example for a policy that is enforceable using this mechanism was given in 
Section 3.4.5. 
3.5.3 Security Enforcer 
The security enforcer can protect a group of objects and is representing a centralised 
architecture. It can enforce authorisation, delegation and integrity policies for objects in 
that group. The scope of the policy is limited to this group. As it is the case for vigilant 
objects, this mechanism cannot enforce obligations on subjects. 
The choice of distributing security enforcer mechanisms in the system will strongly 
depend on the distribution of the objects themselves. From a specification point of view a 
security enforcers can enforce policies for objects that are distributed in the system, how- 
ever implementation consideration will in most cases restrict the scope to a single network 
node. Other considerations for the choice of distribution are performance considerations. 
To avoid performance bottlenecks it can be advisable to place independent (from the view- 
point of the policy specification) groups of objects under the control of different security 
enforcers. This, however, restricts the enforceable policies as the variables that can be 
referenced in policies are limited to the control variables of objects in this group and in- 
put and output parameters of the controlled interfaces. To maintain the encapsulation of 
objects, access to the object variables is not possible. 
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3.5.4 Enforcement Mechanism in SANTA 
Enforcement Mechanisms in SANTA represent the n. ssociation of a policy with the concrete 
mechanism for the enforcement. This association allows to check the constraints on the 
policies to be enforceable by the mechanism statically. The following listing provides 
three examples of how a policy can be &%sociated with a vigilant agent, vigilant object, or 
a security enforcer. 
Listing 3.4: Exam pk"Af Enforcement Mechanisms 
i /* Vigilant Object "/ 
2 enforce pid with oid 
3 /* Vigilant Agent "/ 
4 ! enforce pid with aid 
sý 
a /* Security Enforcer w/ 
7 securityenforcer SE 
s protect (oidi, oid2 /* 
9 end 
10 
11 enforce pid with SE 
... . /) 
Line 2 states that the policy with the identifier pid is enforced by the enforcement mech- 
anism implemented in the vigilant object aid. Similarly Line 4 states that the policy pid 
is enforced in the vigilant agent aid. Line 7 to 9 define a security enforcer with the name 
SE that controls access to the objects oidl and oid2. Line 11 then associates the policy 
identified by pid with the security enforcer Sc. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the computational model and the SANTA design- 
language. It described the components that define the behaviour of the SMAS: 
" Agents are active and execute sequentially local or remote actions (computation, 
respectively synchronous communication). The execution model consists of three 
main phases: a) Deliberation: Prioritisation of actions; b) Enforcement: Constrain- 
ing actions for execution; and c) Execution: Execution of the selected action. 
" Objects are passive and can be accessed through defined interfaces. They are pro- 
tected by either vigilant or security enforcer ineclianism s. The acci.. s to objects is 
mutually exclusive. 
" Policies define constraints on the execution of the SMAS. They are enforced 
by 
enforcement mechanisms. Policies can dynamically change over time and on events. 
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Policies are expressed in terms of rules that can depend on behaviours that have been 
observed in the past. They are categorised as: a) Authorisation: who is allowed to 
execute what; b) Delegation: Who is allowed to delegate what; c) Obligation: Who 
must execute what. c) Integrity: Constraints on the effect of the execution. 
" Enforcement Mechanisms enforce policies. They are distributed in the system: a) 
Vigilant Agent: the policy is enforced as part of the agent's behaviour; b) Vigilant 
Object: the policy is enforced as part of the object's behaviour; c) Security Enforcer: 
A system process mediating the interaction. 
The benefit of the approach is that it integrates the specification of functional, tem- 
poral and security requirements in a uniform formal framework. Policies cannot be seen 
independent of the system, as their interpretation and enforcement is highly dependent 
on the observable events in the system. This means that reasoning about policies that 
depend on the history of the system execution and events is only possible if one can also 
reason about the system itself and the influence that the enforcement of policies has on 
the behaviour of the system. 
The following chapters formalise the computational model and give the specification- 
oriented semantics of the SANTA design-language. To convey the semantics in a more 
understandable manner incremental subsets of SMAS are defined that gradually increase 
the complexity of the model. Chapter 5 formalises the execution model of agents and their 
local computation. Chapter 6 then extends this by introducing objects and communica- 
tion. Chapter 7 formalises the SANTA policy model. The formalisation of the enforcement 
mechanisms is given in Chapter 8, and the refinement of policies into concrete mechanisms 
is discussed in Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 4 
Preliminaries 
In this chapter we provide an introduction to Interval Temporal Logic 
(ITL) as the underlying logic of our formal framework. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) (40] is a flexible notation for both propositional and first 
order reasoning about periods of time found in descriptions of hardware and software 
systems. It can handle both sequential and parallel composition unlike most temporal 
logics. There is a very powerful and practical compositional proof system for ITL (98]. 
That is, much of the proof of a system specified in ITL can be decomposed into proofs of 
its parts. It offers powerful and extensible specification and proof techniques for reasoning 
about properties involving safety, liveness and timeliness. 
Our choice of ITL as the underlying logic to our formal framework is mainly founded 
in its compositionality. Especially noteworthy is the sequential composition which is nat- 
ural to procedural programming languages that we aim to be the target implementation 
languages of our Multi-Agent System. Further, being a temporal logic it allows us to 
naturally reason about time. We use this for example to give guarantees on the time the 
enforcement of a policy does take. The ability to easily trap between specifications defined 
at different granularities of time is a great advantage in the specification of policies. It 
ensures that their semantics is not affected by low-level implementation choices made in 
the development of the MAS. 
Other work, e. g. [145] has used Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) (82] to 
express policies. Although TLA is a suitable logic to represent the execution of programs 
we preferred ITL in this work as it provides a intuitive operator for sequential composi- 
tion (Chop) and iteration (Chopstar) and also allows for the specification of intervals at 
different granularities of time (Temporal Projection). The sequence of actions can also 
be expressed using TLA, but the specification would not be as concise as in ITL. As 
this work uses the above mentioned concepts frequently, ITL represented a more suitable 
choice. The advantage of a formalism like TLA is that the notion of atomic actions is a 
fundamental part of the logic itself. This may have been more suitable for the modelling 
of agent actions, however since the main focus of the thesis is the integration of security 
and functionality we feel that the advantages of the sequential composition and temporal 
projection outweigh TLA's benefit of atomic actions. 
4.2 Syntax and Semantics 
The key notion of ITL is an interval. An interval a is considered to be a (in)finite sequence 
of states ao, Cl ..., where a state a; is a mapping from the set of variables Var to the set 
of integer values Z. The length jai of an interval ao ... a is equal to it 
(one lows than the 
number of states in the interval, so a one state interval has length 0. This has always been 
a convention in ITL). 
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fi hcºIciti (highlighted ill red) is slnºa'"l With tlW itutc'rvaal cºvtýr Whi('11 f-2 This is 
ill list º"actecl ill Figure "1.1. 
11 
i 
ý, I 
Figure 4.1: Informal Semantics of fl ; f2 
" J'': lu>1c1s if tluv intervaa. l is cfec"cuulxatiaal>le into n finite nanulaer of intervals such thitt 
fur c. aclº of them f holds, OF the interval is infinite and call he clec"unºlm.. ecl intu an 
infinite number of fiuite intervals for which f holds. 'I'laiti is illust rated in Figure "1.2. 
rr 
ITii 
ý 
/T, 
. r., 
i" 
r 
ý 
,,,, 
f' Fi. pnrc -1.2: Informal Semantics of 
" C>r,: value of v ill the uext Stttte when evaluated oll all interval of longt 11 al one, 
cºtlºcrwitie an arbitrary value. 
" fin v: vrclnc of 1, in the final statte wIum cwººIructecl oil ºº finite iutcrvaI, olluv-wisc, ººu 
ecrbit rºtir, y value. 
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4.3 Formal Semantics 
The meaning of terms and formulae is defined in this section. We are only interested in the 
functions and relations over integer numbers. Let Z stand for the set of integer numbers, 
and Var the set of integer variables. In the sequel, we denote by E -º F the set of all 
total functions from E to F. 
We assume that a total function gE Z'ß -+ Z is associated with each n-ary function 
symbol g, and a total function pE 7L'ß -º {tt, ff} is associated with each n-ary relation 
symbol p. Function symbols, e. g. + and -, and relation symbols, e. g. > and =, are 
assumed to have their standard meanings. In particular, the truth-values tt and if are 
associated with true and false, respectively. 
Expressions and formulae are evaluated over intervals. Remember that an interval is 
defined to be a (in)finite nonempty sequence of states a= oval..., where each state ai is 
a value assignment which associates an integer. number with each variable: 
ui E S-: 2 Var --º Z. 
We denote by E+ and El the sets of finite intervals and the set of infinite intervals 
respectively. If a is an infinite interval, we take (a] = oo and write a= a00,1 ... 0o0" 
Furthermore, for any i, jEN and an interval or such that i<j< jal, we write Q[i, j] 
to denote the subinterval of ... aj of a. Given two intervals or, or' E (E+ U E''), we write 
a -v a' if the intervals or and a' are identical with the possible exception of their mappings 
for the variable v, i. e laj = la'l and v0 v' =a (v') =a (v') for i=0,1, ... , 
jal. 
The semantics of an expression e is a function 
C[e] E (E+ U Ew) --º 7L, 
defined inductively on the structure of expressions by 
cH (0, ) 
CQ9(el,..., e, )](0') 
EQOvl(Q) 
Elfin v] (o, ) 
oo(v) 
s(ýQelý(ý), ... , 
EQenj (ý)) 
al(v) if 10,1 >0 
X(Z) otherwise 
aI,, I (v) if v is finite 
X(Z) otherwise 
where X denotes a choice function which maps any nonempty set to some element in the 
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3.5.4 Enforcement Mechanism in SANTA 
Enforcement Mechanisms in SANTA represent the association of a policy with the concrete 
mechanism for the enforcement. This association allows to check the constraints on the 
policies to be enforceable by the mechanism statically. The following listing provides 
three examples of how a policy can be associated with a vigilant agent, vigilant object, or 
a security enforcer. 
Listing 3.4: Examples of Enforcement Mechanisms 
i 
2 
3 
4 
b 
8 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
/* Vigilant Object */ 
enforce pid with oid 
/* Vigilant Agent */ 
enforce pid with aid 
/* Security Enforcer */ 
securityenforcer SE 
protect (oidl, oid2 /* ,. 
end 
enforce pid with SE 
.. */) 
Line 2 states that the policy with the identifier pid is enforced by the enforcement mech- 
anism implemented in the vigilant object oid. Similarly Line 4 states that the policy pid 
is enforced in the vigilant agent aid. Line 7 to 9 define a security enforcer with the name 
SE that controls access to the objects oidi and oid2. Line 11 then associates the policy 
identified by pid with the security enforcer SE. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter provided a brief overview of the computational model and the SANTA design- 
language. It described the components that define the behaviour of the SMAS: 
" Agents are active and execute sequentially local or remote actions (computation, 
respectively synchronous communication). The execution model consists of three 
main phases: a) Deliberation: Prioritisation of actions; b) Enforcement: Constrain- 
ing actions for execution; and c) Execution: Execution of the selected action. 
" Objects are passive and can be accessed through defined interfaces. They are pro- 
tected by either vigilant or security enforcer mechanisms. The access to objects is 
mutually exclusive. 
. Policies define constraints on the execution of the SMAS. They are enforced by 
enforcement mechanisms. Policies can dynamically change over time and on events. 
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set. The semantics of a formula f is a function 
MQfl E (E+ U E°') --> {tt, ff}, 
defined inductively on the structure of formulae below, where the following abbreviation 
is used: 
u f-- f=M [fl (0') = tt 
U=M Qf1 (0, )=ff 
The definition of M[f] is 
a ý= p(ei, ..., en) 
if 
Q-, f if 
Or ý fl A f2 if 
Uýdv" f if 
or ý skip if 
Qýfl; f2 if 
U ý= f" if 
ý(ýQe1D(ý), ... , EQýD(o)) 
cr f 
a=fiand a=f2 
Q f, for all a' such that 
IQ) =1 
U^'vQ 
(a[0, k] ý= fl and v[k, lorl] [-- f2, 
forsomekEN, 0<k<jQl)or (lQl =ooand Qý fl) 
(exist lo, 
..., l,,, E IY such that lo =0<... < in 
and U[li, 1i+1] ý= f, 0<i<n- 1) or 
(exist lo, ..., lco E IY such that lo =0 
and li < li+l and v[li, li+i] ý= f, iE N) 
A formula f is valid, written f if aff for every interval aE (E+UE"). A formula 
f is satisfiable if or f for some interval a. ITL has got a sound and compositional proof 
system. Interested readers are referred to [40,101] for the proof system and further details 
about the logic. 
4.4 Derived constructs 
The following is a list of some derived constructs which are useful for the specification of 
systems or policy rules: 
Of=skip; f 
more = Otrue 
next f, f holds from the next state. Example: OX = 1: Any 
interval such that the value of X in the second state is 1 and 
the length of that interval is at least 1. 
non-empty interval, i. e., any interval of length at least one. 
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empty = -' more interval, i. e., any interval of length zero (just one state). 
inf = true ; false infinite interval, i. e., any interval of infinite length. 
finite = inf finite interval, i. e., any interval of finite length. 
Of= finite ;f sometimes f, i. e., any interval such that f holds over a suffix of 
that interval. Example: OX 0 1: Any interval such that there 
exists a state in which X is not equal to 1. 
Qf= -' 0 -If always f, i. e., any interval such that f holds for all suffixes of 
that interval. Example: Q(X = 1): Any interval such that the 
value of X is equal to 1 in all states of that interval. 
Of=f; true diamond-i, i. e., any interval such that f holds over a prefix 
sub-interval. 
o f©-, f 
of=o(of) 
of=, o(, f) 
box-i, i. e., any interval such that f holds over all prefix sub- 
intervals. 
diamond-a, i. e., any interval such that f holds over a sub- 
interval. 
box-a, i. e., any interval such that f holds over all sub-intervals. 
keep f =E (skip D f) keep f, i. e., any interval such that f holds over all unit sub- 
intervals. 
halt f= O(empty - f) terminate interval when f holds. 
fin f= Q(empty D f) final state, i. e., any interval such that f holds in the final state 
of that interval. 
v :=e= (Ov) =e assignment, i. e., the value of v will be e in the next state. 
v <- e= finite n (fin v) =e temporal assignment, i. e., the value of v in the final state will 
be the value of e. 
stable v= Q(more Dv := v) remain stable, i. e., the value of v remains stable in the 
interval. 
v gets e= Q(more Dv := e) gets, i. e., in every state except the initial state the variable 
v will be assigned the value of e evaluated in the previous state. 
len(e) = 31 I. (I = 0) A (I gets I+ 1) A fin (I = e) holds if the length of the interval is e. 
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4.5 Operator Always-followed-by 
As most other policy models, our policy nwclel ltses rules it's the smallest unit of s1>ecilica- 
tiou. '1'lie semantics of the operator has been introduced 1>y Siewe [12"11 using t Iic o1>crtctor 
alwrlvS -followccl-by, denoted by the symbol " ý--+ 
". The operator is deliued iiti follows: 
fý ým =l7 ((Of) D fin w) ( 1. I) 
where f stands for any ITL fortnººhl, and w is it state foruaººlaº (ºui I'I'I, 1,01-1111111i without 
teuºl>ral constructs). The ºlefinition (4.1) states that, whenever the formula f holds ill 
a (finite) sub-interval then the state formula III must hold ill the final state of that snlº- 
ittt, erval. That is, f is always followed by v'. 'l'he iufornnº1 nºeaniut; of the oI>erntor is 
Ixºrtralyecl in Figure 4.3. 
I 
..... 
"ll' 
... 
ý i" 
,,,, 
,, 
(T(i (71 - (TI - (7A 01 
Figiºre 4.3: Iººfcºrtual Semantics of f- it, 
Note that in (4.1), tn can I>e true ill a state evcu if f doeS aot I1o1iI ill tlue Ief"t ueit; Ia- 
honrlmod of tlic state. This operator will be used tiulºsecluefatly ill ('Iaapter 7 1() express 
I)olic"y rules. For a discussion of useful In"oI>erticti of the oI>eratln' we refeº' t lic reader to 
[124]. 
4.6 Temporal Projection 
To he able to express the spcc"ification of policies and erºforcelucrlt 'It a li4; lier Ieýrl of 
abstraction we use in this work the temporal projection operator Hull has been prcsclited 
Iýy 1\loszkowski in [100]. Temporal projection allows to relate spec"ific"alt ions t lºaºt are clefirºec) 
on a different granularity of time. It is used in this work to define policies and their 
enforcement lnechanislus in abstraction of their concretc implement lit ions. The following 
informal definition is adapted from [1U0]. 
Ruuglºlv speaking, the fcºrtººiilºº , S,, 7' is clelinecl to he triºc on Jill iººterunl (7 i! 1' 
two conditions are ºnet. First, the fcºrºnu1Jº 7' ºnust he Irne on some interunl 
al ohtJJinecl 1, v tn"cº. jec'ting. sunºe states from cT. Sc c uncl, tlºe tiJrºuJºln S ºnnst he 
true nºº each of the snhinter<<ºls of rr bridging. the gals between the l, rujoc"ttvl 
states. 
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The semantics of SAT is formally expressed as: 
(T SAT if for some o>0, a' and l0 i ... , 
l" : 
0=10<"""<i =Jul, and for each i<n, Q[i, i+i]ý= S, 
and a' 7' where lo'I =n and for all i<n, ai = Qii 
It can be shown that the operator f* can be expressed in terms of the projection 
operator as f Otrue. Moszkowski also provides a simple example that shows the application 
of the projection operator. The example is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
leu(2) 
I 
1 r; Iý i 9 
len(2) 
3 
len(2) 
1 4 i 8 
ýýi 
K gets K+2 
i (i 
Figure 4.4: Example of Temporal Projection 
hi the interval rJ the value of K increases from 0 to 8 in steps of one. The interval 
rr satisfies (len(2))0(Ii gets K+ 2). (len(2)) is true if the interval is of length two and 
(K gets K+ 2) is true if the K increases by 2 from state to state. The gaps between the 
projected states (highlighted in red) are bridged by the formula len(2). This shows how 
specifications that are defined at different levels of temporal granularity can be mapped. 
We use temporal projection in Chapter 8 to define the mapping between policies and 
systeiu specification. More detail on projection and its properties can be found in [100]. 
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Agents 
We formalise the behaviour of independent agents that perform only 
local computations on their encapsulated variables. The focus is on the 
execution model of an individual agent, and the interaction between 
the initialisation, deliberation, enforcement, execution and termination 
phases. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the specification oriented semantics of a subset of the SANTA design 
language. The subset, referred to as SMAS1, consists of a set of agents, that perform 
local computations independently from each other. Communication using shared objects, 
policies and their enforcement mechanisms are introduced subsequently in Chapters 6 to 8. 
The motivation to split the description of SANTA's denotational semantics in different 
chapters originates from its complexity. 
The focus of this chapter is the execution model of a single SANTA agent and the 
semantics of the initialisation phase, the deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle, and 
the termination phase. The syntactic constructs of the language that allow to define 
agents are formally defined and their semantics is described both informally and formally 
as ITL formulae. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 the SANTA syntactic constructs 
for the specification of agents and their informal semantics is given, along with a small 
motivating example. Section 5.3 formalises the definitions provided in the previous section, 
yielding the semantics of a single agent. Section 5.4 combines the definitions to yield the 
semantics of the SMAS1 that consists of a set of agents. This is illustrated in Section 5.5 
where the motivating example, that was given in Section 5.2.4, is discussed formally. 
Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this chapter with a summary. 
5.2 Agents in SANTA 
The syntax of a SMAS1 is given in EBNF as described in the ISO/IEC 14977: 1996(E) 
[70] in Listing 5.1. Terminal strings are character sequences enclosed in single quotes. 
Meta-identifiers are defined using the defining symbol "=". Concatenation is expressed 
by a comma. Optional sequences are enclosed in square brackets; repetition sequences are 
enclosed in braces. Parentheses are used for grouping. Each declaration is terminated by 
a full stop and the vertical bar depicts a choice. 
The definitions for expressions (expr), identifiers (id) and literals (lit) are omitted 
and assumed to follow standard conventions. Expressions are side-effect free. 
Given this syntax the system is specified as a set of agents, in the following denoted 
by A. Each agent definition aEA is introduced by the keyword agent followed by its 
system wide unique identifier id,,,, that is separated from the agent's variable definitions 
by a colon. The agent definition is closed by the keyword end. An agent optionally defines 
a set of variables and actions and exactly one deliberation section. 
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Listing 5.1: EBNF for SMAS1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
MAS ={ agent }. 
agent = 'agent', id, , 
{vardecl}, {actdecl}, delib, 'end'. 
vardecl = 'var', id, '=', lit. 
actdecl = 'when', expr, 'do', id, , statement. 
statement = 'idle' 
( id, { id expr, { expr, '}) 
( id, { ', ', id expr, { expr, }) 
( statement, '; ', statement ) 
(' if ' expr, 'then ', statement ,[ 
'else ' statement]) 
( 'for', id, '<' expr, 'do', statement ) 
( 'var' id, id lit, {', lit statement 
) 
( 'terminate' ) 
( '{', statement, '}' ). 
',. delib = 'deliberation 
(( 'I ', {vardecl} 
, statement , 'I ') 
I 'external ') . 
5.2.1 Agent State Variables 
All variables must have an agent-wide unique identifier and are assigned an initial value. 
Variables can be declared at the agent level (Agent Variables, denoted by Va, decl), at 
the action level (Local Variables) and in the deliberation section (Deliberation Auxiliary 
Variables, denoted by Va, delib)" Auxiliary Variables required for the enforcement (Enforce- 
ment Auxiliary Variables, denoted by Va, enf) are implicitly defined by vigilant enforcement 
mechanisms. The Agent Control Variables, denoted by Va, contr, are defined at the semantic 
level. The set of all Agent State Variables, denoted by Va is the union: 
Va = Va, decl U Va, delzb U Va, enf U 
Va, 
contr 
In the semantics all variables in the set Va are modelled as ITL state variables. This is 
important to keep in mind, as the SANTA syntax does allow to define lower-case variable 
names. Although not following the ITL notational convention these are ITL state variables. 
As all variables are state variables the behaviour of the agent is required to define the 
value of variables for every state, typically leading to large specifications. To keep the 
specification small, the statement semantics is defined with respect to a set of variables. 
The intuition is that the statement semantics defines the behaviour of all variables in 
this set in such a way that the variables can be thought of as being memory variables. 
Memory variables, sometimes also called program variables, are persistent and maintain 
their previous values, unless they are explicitly assigned. The concept of memory variables 
105 
CHAPTER 5. AGENTS 
is introduced for the convenience of the specification, as ITL state variables do not by 
default maintain their values. A complete ITL specification must define their values for 
each state. Memory variables are formally defined in Section 5.3.3. 
Accessibility of Agent State Variables 
All Agent State Variables are encapsulated in the agent and are not accessible by other 
agents or objects. Table 5.1 provides an overview of the accessibility of the agent's state 
variables during the different phases of an agent's execution. 
Symbol Deliberation Enforcement Execution 
Agent Variables Va, decl read read read/write 
Deliberation Aux. Variables Va, delib read/write 
Enforcement Aux. Variables Va, enf read/write 
Agent Control Variables Va, contr 
done (ida, x) donea, x read read read 
failed(ida, x) faileda, x read read read 
Priority Variables IIa, x write read/write 
Termination doterma write write write 
Others readya, terms 
Table 5.1: Accessibility of Agent State Variables 
Agent Variables are local to the agent definition and may be read in any expression 
that is used in the agent definition. They may only be assigned in the statement of actions 
that are defined in this agent. Local Variables are declared as part of the statement syntax 
and can only be read and assigned in the subsequent statement. Deliberation Auxiliary 
Variables are declared at the beginning of the deliberation section. They are local to this 
phase and can only be read and assigned by the statements in this phase. 
Some of the Agent Control Variables are accessible using predefined constructs. The 
Boolean variables donea,. and faileda, y denote the success or failure of agent a's action 
x. They are accessible using the done(ida, x) and failed(ida, x) constructs, where 
ida, x 
denotes the identifier of the agent's action x. The priority variables IIa, x denote the 
priority with which the agent a's action x is to be executed. They are accessible in the 
syntax by the identifier of the action ida, x. To allow for the termination of a single agent 
the boolean control variable doterma is introduced. Its value is initialised to false and 
can only be set to true using the dedicated statement terminate in the statement syntax. 
The constraints, listed in Table 5.1, on the accessibility of the variables can be statically 
checked. 
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5.2.2 Agent Capabilities 
An action definition is introduced by the keyword when that is followed by a Boolean 
expression representing the precondition of the action. The precondition of the agent a's 
action x is denoted by pa, x. Separated from the precondition by the keyword do is the 
agent wide unique identifier of the action. The identifier of agent a's action x is in the 
following denoted by ida, x. It is used in policy specifications to constrain the agent's 
behaviour and in the syntax of the deliberation section to reference the action's priority 
variable. Introduced by a colon follows the statement that defines the behaviour of the 
agent when executing the action. The statement of agent a's action x is denoted in the 
following by Sa, x. The action definition is closed by a full-stop. 
Precondition 
The precondition pa, x is a constraint describing a necessary condition for the action's 
execution. It should not reflect the choice of the agent, as this is encoded in the deliberation 
phase and the policies that constrain the behaviour, but rather conditions under which 
the action can possibly be executed. For example: 
An agent that is controlling a robot arm, implements an action droppayload, that drops 
the payload to a predefined destination. A precondition for this action would be that the 
arm is currently holding some payload, as it is otherwise impossible to drop it. However, 
the fact that the agent is holding a payload does not imply that it will drop it. 
An action may only be executed if its precondition is true. This makes the precondition 
a static design decision that cannot be overruled by decisions made in the deliberation or 
enforcement phase. As a consequence obligations cannot be enforced if the agent's state 
does not satisfy the precondition. Care should be taken in the agent design to keep the 
constraints expressed by preconditions limited, as this enhances the maintainability of the 
agent. 
We currently assume that the deliberation process of the agent is not aware of the 
policy decisions. Consequently the agent will decide on the execution of an action using 
for example the action's utility. If the chosen action was not permitted the agent is 
informed of the failure by the appropriate settings of the control variables in the next 
iteration of the deliberation phase. To minimise performance degradation the agent can 
prioritise actions as opposed to choosing exactly one action. If the highest priority action 
is not permitted the execution defaults to the action with the second highest priority. We 
believe that this approach outweighs the complexity of computing the access rights for all 
agent actions before the 
deliberation step. 
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Statement 
The statement syntax is used to define the computation steps of the agent when executing 
the action and also to specify the deliberation phase. The commonly used procedural 
constructs are available. Additionally the temporal multiple assignment is provided as a 
specification construct. The statements have the following meaning: 
The Idle Statement denotes a unit interval wait, during which all Agent State Vari- 
ables maintain their values. 
Concrete Multiple Assignment assigns a list of values to a list of variables concur- 
rently. The assignment of all values is performed within one unit interval. As this may 
not always be implementable the use of the Temporal Multiple Assignment is encouraged 
for the specification. Constraints on the statement are that the number of identifiers on 
the left hand side of the F7=-] operator matches the number of expressions on the right 
hand side. Additionally each identifier may only occur once on the left-hand side of the 
operator. An assignment of a single variable over a unit interval represents a special case 
of the concrete multiple assignment. 
An example of the use is a swap statement that exchanges the values of two variables: 
a, b :=b, a , where a and b are Agent Variables. 
Temporal Multiple Assignment assigns a list of values to a list of variables. It 
is provided as a specification construct, as it does not specify the time in which the 
assignment completes. The time is only assumed to be finite. This allows for the later 
refinement to take advantage of the target execution platform's capabilities. The same 
constraints as for the concrete multiple assignment apply. 
The temporal multiple assignment: a, b b, a can be for example be implemented as 
a concrete multiple assignment: Fab :=b, a or for target platforms that do not support 
concurrent assignment, as the sequence: var t *--- a :{a :=b; b :=t} 
Sequence The sequential composition of two statements is denoted by [Si S; S2 
Conditional Choice is denoted by if expr then Si else S2 I. The expression expr must 
evaluate to a Boolean value. If expr is true then S1 is executed, otherwise S2. The 
part is optional. 
Ase S2 Fe- 
Iteration is denoted by the for id < expr do S construct, where id is the loop variable 
that starts with 0 and expr must evaluate to an integer. The loop statement is executed 
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and the loop variable incremented by one as long as it is lower than the specified limit. 
The limit is evaluated once, before the first execution of the statement S. The statement 
may not assign any value to the loop variable. This can be statically checked. 
Local variables are introduced using the I var v expr :S construct. The variable iden- 
tifiers must be unique within the agent definition. The scope of the variables is limited to 
the subsequent statement. The initialisation of local variables is defined using the Tem- 
poral Multiple Assignment, allowing to refine the time that the variable allocation and 
initialisation take with respect to the target platform. 
Termination of the agent is indicated by the statement terminate j. Informally it means 
that the agent will terminate at the end of the current deliberation-enforcement-execution 
cycle. 
Expressions All expressions are assumed to be free of side-effects, viz. the assignment is 
strictly a statement and the evaluation of any expression is assumed to be instantaneous. 
The expression syntax is not detailed here, as this would not provide any additional insights 
into the behaviour of the system and the enforcement of policies. However, Listing 5.2 
provides a quick overview of some of the expressions that are allowed. We assume that a 
primitive type system can be implemented, that supports boolean, integer and lists. 
The common arithmetic operators are defined for integers. The + operator is over- 
loaded and can also be used to concatenate lists. The conditional expression is similar to 
the ternary operator in procedural programming languages. Relational operators can be 
used for integers. Equality and inequality can be also used to compare boolean and list 
expressions. 
List expressions are in order of occurrence: list dereference, yields the element of the 
list the specified index; sublist, yields the sublist from a given start index to a given 
end index (both inclusive); The length of the list is obtained using the bars. Universal 
and existential quantification can be used to quantify over lists. It is possible to define 
functions as part of the agents, objects and policies. These definitions can be used locally 
in expressions. 
There are several reserved keywords in the language. Their usage is often restricted to 
a specific context, in which the expression can be used. The identifiers list, int and bool 
denote the different types that are available. The identifier T is used in the specification of 
policy rules to reference the time that elapsed since the rule started to be enforced. The 
identifier any is used in the policy scope definitions, to denote that the universal set of 
subjects, objects or actions is to 
be used. The predefined functions done and failed are 
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used to access the respective control variables that indicate the success or failure of the 
last executed action. 
Listing 5.2: EBNF for Expressions 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
expr = /* Arithmetic */ 
expr, '% ' expr expr, *', expr expr, '/', expr 
expr expr ý expr, -', expr ý 
/* Conditional */ 
' if ', expr , 'then ', expr ,[ 'else expr 
/* Relational */ 
expr ,' <' expr ( expr expr expr ,' >' expr 
expr expr ý expr, expr expr, ' <>', expr 
/* Boolean */ 
'not' expr ý expr, 'and' expr ý expr, 'orexpr ý 
'type', '(', expr, expr, 
/* List */ 
expr , '[ , expr, expr, expr, '.. ', expr , 
expr, 'I' I 
( 'forall 'I 'exists' ), id, '<', expr, ., expr ý 
/* Function */ 
id, '(', [ expr, expr 
/* Reserved */ 
'list' 'iat' I 'bool' I 'T' ý 'any' 
'done'' '(', id, ')' ý 'failed', '(', id, ')' 
'done', ['(', id, 
'failed', '(', id, ', ', id, ', ', id, ['(', id, { , id 
/* Identifier 
, 
Literals */ 
id I lit I listlit . 
The anchor of the expression definition is an identifier, an integer or boolean literal, 
or a list literal. List literals are an enumeration of expressions of the form: [expr, 
{', ', expr}], ']'. 
5.2.3 Agent Deliberation 
The deliberation phase abstracts from the complex decision making processes of (intelli- 
gent) agents. The deliberation phase is loosely coupled with the execution of the agent, 
using the priority variables as an interface. As a result the deliberation phase can be seen 
as a distinct module within the agent, that decides on the agent's course of action by pri- 
oritising its capabilities. The SANTA design-language allows us to leave the deliberation 
phase at an abstract level using the keyword external . 
This means that the agent assigns 
non-deterministically a non-negative integer value as the priority for each of its actions. 
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Alternatively the deliberation phase can be explicitly defined using deliberation auxil- 
iary variables and the statement syntax. The observable variables in the statement are all 
Agent Variables and Deliberation Auxiliary Variables. Additionally the Boolean Control 
Variables that indicate the success or failure of the last action can be accessed using the 
special language constructs: done(id) and failed (id) , where id is equal to id,,,,;, the name 
of one of the agent's actions. The access to the control variables provides feedback of the 
success or failure of the previously executed action to the agent's deliberation phase. This 
gives the agent the opportunity to adequately respond to security failures. Access to this 
variables is also important in the specification of history dependent policies. 
Variables that can be assigned in the statement of the deliberation section are the 
Deliberation Auxiliary Variables and the Priority Variables of the agent's actions. The 
latter are syntactically represented as variables with the identifier of the corresponding 
action. The range that can be assigned to priority variables is restricted to non-negative 
integer values. The value 0 has the special meaning that the corresponding action should 
not be executed; 1 denotes the highest priority and greater values denote lower priorities. 
Theoretically the lowest priority is unbounded, however any implementation will have to 
define a lower bound for priorities, which is denoted by 1nl. 
The choice to encode the priority values as integers is arbitrary. Any total ordering 
reflecting the priority of actions can be used, provided it defines a single element (0) 
that indicates that the action must not be executed. The ordering must satisfy that 
Tn <0< 1n. In the following we assume that the priority ordering defined as integers, 
with the integer value 0 as the middle element, Tn = MININT and 1n = MAXINT. The 
concrete values of MININT and MAXINT depend on the actual implementation platform. 
5.2.4 Motivating Example 
Assume a simplistic system consisting of a single agent A that continuously increments 
its encapsulated variable x if it is even or doubles it if its current value is odd. Listing 5.3 
shows the SANTA agent specification for this example. 
The agent A encapsulates a single Agent Variable x that is initialised to 0. It defines 
two internal actions named inc and dbl. The precondition for inc is that the current value 
of x is less than 232 -1 and the precondition for dbl is that the current value of x is less 
than 231. In this case the preconditions are used to prevent an integer overflow in case 
that x represents an 32-bit unsigned integer. The statements of the actions define the 
respective computation on the variable x. 
'The bounds Tn and In should be read as the top priority and the least priority. The corresponding 
integer values are exactly reversed. 
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Listing 5.3: Example Agent Specification 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
/* Agent Definition */ 
agent ag : 
/* Agent Variables */ 
var x=0 
/* Agent Actions */ 
when x< 232 -l do inc :x := x+l 
when x< 231 do dbl :x := 2*x 
/* Deliberation */ 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, dbl. - 1,0 
else inc, dblr- 0,1 } 
end 
The deliberation is in this example explicitly specified and implements the decision to 
give inc preference if x is even, viz. x modulo 2 is zero, and otherwise give preference to 
the action dbl. This example is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.5, where the use of 
the control variables that are needed to give the formal semantics of the SMAS1 system 
are illustrated. 
The provided example is kept simple, deliberately. They illustrate the formal semantics 
of the SANTA language constructs, described in the subsequent sections. The specification 
is used to provide a concise definition of the system behaviour to show the interaction 
between the system and the enforced policies. This interaction is not influenced by the 
amount of action definitions nor the complexity of the action or deliberation statements. 
5.3 Single Agent Semantics 
The system consists of a set of agents A of independent sequential processes that are 
executing concurrently. To control that the agent does only execute one action at a 
time, an additional control variable is introduced to capture the readiness of an agent to 
execute an action. This is especially important in the subsequent chapters that introduce 
communication. 
Agent Readiness An agent as a sequential process may only execute one action at a 
time. In order to capture this requirement we introduce the additional control variables 
readya E Va, contr, where aEA readya is a boolean ITL state variable; 
its behaviour is 
specified by the semantics of the agent. readya = true indicates that the agent is ready 
to execute an action. 
In the following the different phases of an agent's execution cycle are formalised. 
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5.3.1 Initialisation Phase 
Before an agent enters its deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle, it initialises its agent 
state variables. The initialisation is defined in (5.1). 
init. = ready. = false A (keep ready. = false) A doterm., terms +- false, false n 
A (done., x +- false A faileda, x +- false A IIa, x +- 1) A 
XEXa 
A (v F- 
Iv) 
vEVa, dect 
(5.1) 
The initialisation of an agent must ensure that the agents control variable readya is false 
throughout the initialisation. This reflects that the agent cannot engage in the execution 
of an action during initialisation. The initialisation also ensures that when the agent enters 
its deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle the control variables doterma and terma are 
set to false. This is expressed in the first line of (5.1). 
Additionally the boolean control variables done,,,.., and faileda, x are initialised to the 
value false, reflecting that no action has been executed, yet. The priority variables are all 
assigned to the same value; the choice of the value 1 is arbitrary. This is expressed in the 
second line of (5.1). 
The last line of (5.1) denotes the initialisation of the agent variables to their initial val- 
ues. Here I denotes the initialisation value that has been specified in the agent definition. 
After the initialisation the agent enters the deliberation phase. 
5.3.2 Deliberation Phase 
The agent enters its deliberation-enforcement-action cycle at the deliberation phase. In 
the SANTA language, this phase is either left unspecified using the key word external 
or explicitly defined by deliberation auxiliary variables and a statement that defines the 
agent's behaviour during the execution of this phase. The semantics of both cases is 
provided in the following. 
External Definition 
The keyword external denotes that the priority variables IIa x of the agent a's actions 
xE Xa take any non-negative integer value in the final state of a finite interval. The 
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semantics of deliberation : external 
deliba, external 
m= 
is: 
finite n 
A fin (na, x>OnIIa, x<ln)n 
xEXa 
A vEVa\{IIa, zl xEXa}\Va, del+6 (keep stable v) 
(5.2) 
The first conjunct expresses that the length of the interval representing the execution of 
the deliberation is finite. The second conjunct expresses that all priority variables Ra, y of 
the agent a are assigned a non-negative value in the final state of the deliberation interval. 
The third conjunct denotes that all other Agent State Variables maintain their values 
throughout this interval. The set of Deliberation Auxiliary Variables is in this case the 
empty set (Va, delib = 0)" 
Explicit Definition 
The specification of external for the deliberation phase has the advantage that reasoning 
about the agent's behaviour is possible without the concrete knowledge of the implemen- 
tation of its decision making component. However, it is also desirable to be able to specify 
the behaviour of this component explicitly as a reaction on the current state of the agent 
(see for example Listing 5.3). In this case the deliberation section can define additional 
auxiliary variables and an explicit statement S that defines the behaviour of the agent's 
priority variables. The behaviour of the deliberation phase is determined by the statement 
S and has the following semantics: 
deliba, 
explicit 
° deliba, external n 
[SlV0 
The behaviour of the deliberation as described by deliba, external is 
further restricted by 
the statement. QSI Va denotes the semantics of the statement S with respect to the agent 
state variables Va. The statement semantics is provided subsequently in Section 5.3.3. 
This means that any statement must assign the priority variables in such a way that they 
comply with the specification of deliba, external " 
Although it is possible to restrict the statement semantics for the deliberation section 
to allow only the assignment of non-negative values to priority variables, only a single 
statement semantics is used in this work to avoid the additional complexity that arises 
from two slightly different statement semantics for deliberation and actions. This means 
that care needs to be taken when defining the deliberation step, as it is possible to violate 
the specification of deliba, explicit by assigning negative values to priority variables. 
An 
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example of this would be the statement inc: =-1 , as it would assign the priority value 
IIa, inc to a negative value, violating the constraint in the final state of the deliberation. 
The language that is used here to describe the reactive deliberation of an agent is 
very simple, however higher-level language constructs to express the reaction in a more 
behaviour-oriented fashion can easily be constructed using these primitives. In the follow- 
ing deliba denotes the behaviour of the agent during its deliberation phase, and is either 
deliba, externai if the deliberation 
is specified to be external or deliba, explicit if an explicit 
statement is provided that defines the behaviour. 
5.3.3 Statement Semantics 
The statement semantics defined in this section applies to statements in the deliberation 
section and to statements that are part of the action definition of an agent. The semantics 
is inductively defined with respect to a specific set of variables that are controlled by this 
statement. This technique effectively models the behaviour of memory variables using ITL 
state variables, by maintaining the values of all variables in the set, which are not currently 
modified by the statement. For the detailed informal description of the statements refer 
to Section 5.2.2. 
Idle 
idle Q skip AA stable (u) (5.3) 
UEV 
Defines an interval of length one (skip) over which all state variables u in the set V are 
maintained (stable u). This models the behaviour of memory variables: all variables in 
the set V maintain their value. Similarly the assignment statements maintain all variables 
in V that are not assigned by the statement. 
Concrete Multiple Assignment 
Q 1 xpý... xn .= ep,..., en IV = skip nA ((Oxi) = ei) AA stable (u) (5.4) 
0<i<n uE V \{xp,..., xn } 
Defines an interval of length one (skip) over which all state variables on the left-hand side 
of the assignment symbol are assigned in the next state the values that the corresponding 
expressions on the right-hand side yield 
in the initial state. Additionally all state variables 
u in V that are not assigned 
in the statement maintain their value (stable u). 
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Temporal Multiple Assignment 
Q xp,..., xn''- e0,..., en 1 v= n (xiF--e; )n A 0<i<n uEV\{xp,..., xn} 
(wn[ Sl Iv)V(-, wn 
Defines an interval of finite length in which all state variables on the left-hand side 
of the assignment symbol are assigned in the final state of that interval the values that 
the corresponding expressions on the right hand side yield in the initial state (temporal 
assignment, xi 4-- ei). Additionally all state variables u in V that are not assigned in the 
statement maintain their value throughout the interval (stable u). 
Sequence 
I Sl ; S2 Dý=ý IV; I Iv (5.6) 
Defines an interval that can be decomposed into a prefix interval in which the semantics 
of Sl holds and a suffix interval in which the semantics of S2 holds. 
Conditional Choice 
B if w then S1 else S2 
I if w then Sl 
Iv 
Iv 
stable (u) (5.5) 
S2 Iv) (5.7) 
(5.8) (wn II SII ]v)V(-wnempty) 
Equation (5.7) defines the general case; Equation (5.8) the special case that the else part 
is omitted. If the state formula w holds in the initial state then the interval is defined by 
the semantics of S1, otherwise it is defined by the semantics of S2. For the special case: if 
the state-formula w does not hold in the initial state, the interval is a single state (length 
zero: empty). 
Iteration 
I I for K< edo S 1v= 3K, n"n= max(e, 0) n 
Q K4- 0 IVU{K} ; 
(Q S; K: =K+1 11VU{K}ýn 
(5.9) 
Defines a finite interval in which the maximum number of iterations (n) is evaluated in the 
initial state of the interval. The max function ensures that this value is non-negative. The 
interval is decomposed into a prefix and a suffix interval. In the prefix interval the loop 
variable K is allocated and initialised to the value 0. For this the temporal assignment 
statement (K 0) is used to allow for concrete implementations that take more than 
one unit-interval. In the suffix interval the iteration of the statement S and the increment 
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of the counter are captured ((... )n). It is decomposed into n subintervals, for which the 
semantics of S holds over a prefix and the concrete assignment, that increments the loop 
variable, holds over a suffix. Note that the value of the loop variable K is maintained 
during the execution of the statement, as the semantics of the statement is defined with 
respect to the augmented set VU {K}. 
Local Variables 
S var X0, ... 
Xn - e0, ..., en : 
Q 
Iv = Mo,..., X 
Xp,... Xn .- ep,..., en ;S 
(5.10) 
ývu{xo,..., x} 
Introduces a set of local variables. As for the iteration variable before, the temporal 
multiple assignment is used to allow for concrete implementations to define the time that 
is required for the allocation and initialisation of the variables. The values of the local 
variables are maintained, unless they are explicitly modified in the statement. 
Terminate The termination statement terminate can be executed by an agent. It is an 
abbreviation to set the control variable doterma of the agent a to true. 
terminate v= Qdoterma+- truelv (5.11) 
The terminate statement can be used in any statement and assigns the variable doterma 
of the agent executing the statement to true. At the end of the next execution phase, the 
agent will break the deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle and enter the termination 
phase. 
5.3.4 Enforcement Phase 
After the deliberation phase the agent enters the enforcement phase of its execution cycle. 
This phase implements vigilant mechanisms for the enforcement of security policies on the 
agent. The detailed description of this phase is delayed to Chapter 8, and only a high 
level specification is provided at this point. 
The specification is similar to the external specification of the deliberation phase, how- 
ever, the priority variables IIa,, x can be assigned to negative values. With the exception 
of the value 0 lower values denote a 
higher priority, allowing for the enforcement of obli- 
gations by assigning them a negative priority value. This guarantees that any obligation 
enforced by vigilant mechanisms can overrule the preferences decided by the deliberation 
phase. For implementation concerns an upper boundary Tn is introduced, to denote the 
117 
CHAPTER 5. AGENTS 
highest priority. 
XEXa vEV / 
(5.12) 
Where V= Va xE Xa} \ Va, enf, the set of all agent state variables, except the 
priority and enforcement auxiliary variables. Equation (5.12) states that the enforcement 
phase is decomposed into a finite prefix interval and a suffix interval of length one. In the 
prefix the agent state variables, except the priority variables flax and auxiliary enforce- 
ment variables Va, enf, keep their values. All priority variables assume in the last state a 
value that is between the lower and upper bound of priority values (Tn, 1n). 
The suffix indicates that the agent is ready for the execution of an action by setting 
the control variable readya to true. Subsequently the agent enters its execution phase. 
5.3.5 Execution Phase 
In the execution phase the action that has been assigned the highest priority is chosen for 
execution, provided its precondition is true. This is captured in the functional guard ga, x 
of the action x. 
Functional Guard The functional guard ga, x of an agent a's action x 
is true if the 
corresponding precondition pa,,.,, is true and the action has the highest priority IIa, x amongst 
all those actions for which the precondition is fulfilled. 
ga, x = Pa, x n 
rIa, 
x #0AA (na, x < Ija, x, V -pa, x' V IIa, x' = 0) 
x1EXa 
(5.13) 
The mechanism is best explained using a small example. Let an agent a define three 
actions xo, xi and x2, with the preconditions of these actions being pa, xo = false, pa, x, = 
true and pa, x2 = true. 
Assuming the agent prioritises its actions as follows: IIa, xo =1 
(highest priority, assignable in the deliberation phase), IIa, x, =0 
(must not execute) and 
IIa, x2 = 1n 
(lowest priority) then the guards will evaluate as follows: 
enf a= finite nA fin 
(Tn < na, x < ln) nn (stable v) ;Q readya := true Iv, 
XEXa vEV 
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ga, xo = 
false 
ga, xl = 
false 
ga, x2 = 
fx2xo A fx2x1 A fx2x2 
f22XU 
fx221 
fx2x2 
= true 
= true 
= true 
= true 
as a direct consequence of Pa, xo = false 
as a direct consequence of Ila,, To =0 
where . Tx' = (IIa, x < 
Ila, 
x' V -Pa, x' V 
Ila, 
xi = 0) 
because 
as a direct consequence of pa, xo = false 
as a direct consequence of IIa, xj =0 
as a direct consequence of Ha, x2 = IIa, x2 
It follows that only the guard ga, x2 is true and therefore the agent can only choose x2 
for execution. The intuition is that the priority can never overrule the precondition and 
only those actions with the highest priority (different from zero) can have a true functional 
guard. 
Given the intuition that the action with the smallest priority value different from zero 
has a true functional guard, the assignment of a negative priority value in the enforcement 
phase could overrule any priority decision made in the deliberation phase. This way the 
obligations that are specified in vigilantly enforced policies can be enforced. An action x 
for which the functional guard ga., z is true is said to be enabled if the agent is ready to 
execute. 
Enabled Local Action An action xE Xa is enabled if the agent a is ready and the 
functional guard ga, x of the action is true. 
enableda, x = ga, x n readya = true (5.14) 
In this chapter we consider only the execution of local actions that involve the agent itself 
in the execution. Chapter 6 extends this definition to synchronise the agent and the object 
for remote actions. The control variable ready0 is set to true at the end of the agent's 
enforcement phase (see Section 5.3.4, Equation 
(5.12)). 
Local Action 
An action can only be executed if it is enabled. When executed, the semantics of the action 
indicates that the agent started the execution by setting the control variable readya to 
false, viz. no other action can be enabled. Subsequently the statement Sa, x of the action 
is executed. This is denoted by stata, x 
(defined subsequently in Equation (5.16)). The 
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semantics of local actions is denoted by t'a, x, defined in Equation (5.15). 
iPa, x = enableda, x AI readya := false (5.15) 
Iva 
; stata, x 
The conjunct enableda, x guarantees that the agent is ready for execution and that the 
functional guard ga, x of the action is true. The control variable readya is set to false in the 
second state of the execution, guaranteeing that readya is true only in the initial state. 
The semantics of the statement execution is denoted by stata, x. 
Statement Execution Access Control and Obligation decisions for the agent have al- 
ready been enforced in the enforcement phase of the agent's execution cycle. Integrity 
policies however cannot be enforced beforehand and require evaluation after the effect 
of the statement execution is known. Consequently the semantics of an action must al- 
low for the failure of the action due to violated integrity constraints. This is captured 
in the semantics of the statement execution. Recall from Section 3.2 that the failure of 
an action means that all agent variables keep the values they had in the initial state of 
the execution. This semantics is captured by performing the computation on a set of 
local variables of the agent variables v0,. .., vj and copying their values after 
a successful integrity check back to the agent variables (denoted by succeeda, x, defined 
in Equation (5.17)). If any integrity constraints are violated the values are simply dis- 
carded (denoted by faila, x, defined in Equation (5.18) ). This is expressed in the following 
Equation (5.16). 
stata, x =3' vo, ..., vi 
v0,... vj 4- v0i... I vj lv+; QSxv+; (succeeda, ý(Dfailax)) 
(5.16) 
Va+ denotes the here the set V. U {vä, ... , vj}, that is the set of agent state variables 
augmented by the local copies of agent variables that are assigned in the statement Sa, x. 
The set of assigned variables can be obtained by static analysis at compilation time. 
The statement Sa, x = 
Sa, x [vö, """+V /vo, ... , vj] 
denotes the statement Sa, x where every 
occurrence of a variable vE {vo, ... , vj} is replaced by the corresponding 
local variable 
v' E {vö..... vý }. This guarantees that the agent variables Va decl are not changed during 
the execution of Sa, x. 
The statement semantics is the same as defined in Section 5.3.3. 
The operator ® denotes non-deterministic choice, viz. either succeeda, x or faila, x are true, 
but not both. The choice is left non-deterministic, because the failure can only occur 
due to security decisions, that are determined by policies. The non-deterministic choice 
is refined into a deterministic choice with the implementation of enforcement mechanisms 
(see Chapter 9). 
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Action Succeeds The successful execution of the action is described by succeeda, x. The 
successful execution of the action x is indicated by setting the control variable donea, x. 
succeed,,, -. 
=I donea, x, donea, x, vo, .... vj true, false, vÖ, ... , v' i lV+ 
We denote here by donea, x the complementary list of all control variables 
donea, x ={donea, x, 1 x' E Xa \ {x}} U {faileda, _ 
1xE Xa} 
(5.17) 
and by false a list of false literals that has the same length as donea, x. This means that 
all control variables that indicate the failure of an action for this agent are set to false, as 
are all control variables indicating success but the variable donea, x. 
Although this may seem to be a large overhead for the maintenance of the control 
variables, a concrete implementation can take advantage of the fact that only one of 
the control variables can be true at the end of the action execution (per agent). For 
example, encoding the Boolean control variables in a single signed integer variable allows 
to implement the setting of the control variables as a single (multiple) assignment. The 
encoding would enumerate the actions contained in the agent and indicate by a positive 
value the successful execution of the corresponding action and with a negative value its 
failure. A value of zero would denote that none of the variables is true, indicating that 
none of the actions has been executed in the last cycle. 
Action Fails The failure of the execution is described by faila, x. The 
failed execution 
of the action x is indicated by setting the control variable faileda, x. 
fdZta, x =[ 
faileda, 
x, 
faileda 
x 
.- true, false I VQ 
(5.18) 
Similarly to the successful execution the control variables are set to indicate failure. Here 
faileda, x 
denotes the complementary list of control variables. 
faileda, x 
= {faileda, x, I X' E Xa \ {x}} U{donea, x, I X' E Xa} 
It is not necessary to define the values of the agent variables in the case of failure, as their 
value remained unchanged during the execution of the rewritten statement Ss, x" 
Choice of Execution In the execution phase one of the agent's enabled actions is chosen 
for execution non-deterministically. In the case that none of the agent's local actions is 
enabled, the agent remains 
idle, viz. it continues with the execution of the deliberation 
phase. The fact that the agent remained 
idle is indicated by the control variables: none of 
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the agent's control variables done,,,.,, or faileda, x is true. This is captured by the definition 
of the execution phase in Equation (5.19). 
exec,, = ((®t, ba, y) (D idle. ) ; [if doterm. then term,, := truel v, (5.19) 
XEXa 
Exactly one of the agent's actions is chosen for execution. Since the semantics of the action 
demands that the action is enabled (see Equation (5.15)) the operator exclusive-or 
represents a non-deterministic choice between the enabled actions, only. Alternatively 
the agent may remain idle (denoted by idles). The conditional choice at the end of 
the execution phase ensures that the control variable terms, indicating the termination 
condition for the agent a is set to true. The use of two variables to capture the termination 
of the agent are necessary: doterma indicates that the agent wants to terminate at the 
end of the next deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle, whereas the control variable 
terma marks the final state of this cycle. This becomes clear in Section 5.3.7, where the 
criteria for the agent to leave the deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle and enter the 
termination phase is defined. 
Remaining Idle The possibility to remain idle originates from the fact that there may 
not be an enabled action. This intuitively would mean that idle describes the behaviour 
of the agent only if none of the actions is enabled. This view has been taken in [124]. 
However, it can be shown that there are cases where the choice to remain idle is required 
to satisfy the fairness criterion that is discussed later in Section 5.3.7. Consequently the 
choice to remain idle is here defined as an unconditional alternative to the execution of 
an action. Equation (5.20) defines the semantics of idle. 
idle,, =[ readya := false ; donea false Va I 
(5.20) 
Here done,, denotes the list of all agent control variables done,,,. and failed,,,,, of the agent 
a; false denotes the corresponding set of false literals. 
5.3.6 Termination Phase 
The termination phase of an agent means that the agent will leave its deliberation- 
enforcement-execution cycle and cease to execute any actions. The agent stutters until 
the distributed termination of the system. This is defined in Equation (5.21). 
terminatea = ([idle]va)* (5.21) 
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The semantics of the idle statement specifies that the control variable readya remains false, 
ensuring that the agent cannot participate in the execution of an action. 
5.3.7 Agent Semantics 
The semantics of a single agent captures the initialisation of the agent (Section 5.3.1) and 
the iteration of its deliberation (Section 5.3.2), enforcement (Section 5.3.4) and execution 
(Section 5.3.5) phases. The fairness property (denoted by faira, subsequently defined in 
Equation (5.23)) places an additional constraint on the non-deterministic choice of actions 
that is described in Equation (5.19). 
Va = inita ; ((deliba ; enf a; execa)* A fairs A halt (terms = true)) ; terminates (5.22) 
Termination Criteria The agent terminates the iteration of its DEE cycle if the value 
of terms is true. The definition of the halt statement uses an equivalence, that makes it 
necessary to use two variables to capture the termination. The variable doterm,, can be 
true during the deliberation, enforcement, execution phase, without forcing the termina- 
tion. The definition in Equation (5.19) ensures that the variable term,, can only be true 
in the final state of the execution phase, that also represents the final state of the cycle, 
as defined by the halt statement. 
Fairness The fairness property is described analogous to that in [124]. 
faira = inf QQn ((QOenabled., ) D 00, ý) 
(5.23) 
xEXa 
Equation (5.23) states that given an infinite execution, any action that is infinitely often 
enabled is also executed infinitely often. This property prevents the total starvation of 
one action. Fairness on a finite execution interval is a scheduling problem and not further 
addressed in this work. 
5.4 Multi-Agent System Semantics 
The semantics of the b1AS is the concurrent execution of all agents that terminates dis- 
tributively when the termination condition of all agents hold simultaneously (sufficient 
termination condition). This is expressed in Equation (5.24) 
SAIASI = halt (A terma = true) AA cpa (5.24) 
aEA aEA 
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We assume here that the global system state is implicitly composed of all the agents' 
states. This can be safely assumed, as all agent state variables are not shared between 
agents. Communication between agents is modelled using the concept of objects that is 
detailed in Chapter 6. 
The following section illustrates the semantics of the SMAS1 using the example pro- 
vided in Listing 5.3 on Page 112. 
5.5 Example of SMAS1 
This section discusses the example that has been used to motivate the informal semantics 
of an SMAS1 in Section 5.2.4 with respect to its formal semantics described in Section 5.3. 
The listing is here included again for the readers convenience. 
Listing 5.4: Example Agent Specification 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
/* Agent Definition */ 
agent ag : 
/* Agent Variables */ 
var x=0 
/* Agent Actions */ 
when x< 232 -1 do inc :x := x+1 
when x< 231 do dbl :x := 2*x 
/* Deliberation */ 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, dbl. - 1,0 
else inc, dbl. - 0,1 } 
end 
The following figure shows the behaviour of the SMAS1 system consisting of only the 
agent ag. 
SMAS 
Vag 
skip 'inita deliba9 enfa9 execay delibay 
all 
... - Qj1 Qkl ... - ah ... Qjs 
Figure 5.1: Specification level behaviour of the SMAS1 example 
The SMAS is undefined in the initial state (vo). This is required for the composition of 
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SMAS systems. The agent execution starts with its initialisation phase. The initialisation 
initay, defined in Equation (5.1), takes finite time and is completed in state a`,. It follows 
the deliberation phase deliba, g of the agent, defined in Equation (5.2). Again the execution 
takes finite time, and terminates in state o. After the deliberation the enforcement phase 
enf a9, 
defined in Equation (5.12), is executed ending in state Qk,. The agent then enters 
the execution phase, defined in Equation (5.19). Here the functional guards are evaluated 
and one of the enabled actions is chosen for execution non-deterministically. After the 
execution phase the agent has completed the first iteration of its deliberation-enforcement- 
execution cycle. 
Initialisation Phase The initialisation phase assigns the initial values to all agent state 
variables. The agent state variables are in this example: 
Va, 
y = 
{readyag, dotermag, termag, doneag, inc, doneag, abl, 
failedag, incqfailedag, dbl, IIag, inci flag, dbl) X} 
All variables are assigned their default values at the end of the initialisation phase, in 
state Ull, viz. the priority variables IIa, x are initialised to 1, the agent variable x is set to 
its defined initial value 0, and the other control variables to false. The variable ready, is 
false throughout the initialisation phase. 
Deliberation Phase The deliberation phase in the example checks whether the current 
value of x is even or odd. If it is even, the highest assignable preference value (IIag, inc = 1) 
is assigned to the action inc and the preference value (IIag, dbl = 0) indicates that action 
dbl must not be executed. If x is odd, the priority assignments are reversed. 
Since the initialisation phase did assign the initial value 0 to x, the priority values in 
the first iteration of the deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle will be IIag, inc =1 and 
IIag, dbl = 0. In either case the priority variables are set using the temporal assignment, 
guaranteeing that the deliberation terminates in finite time (viz. state oil). 
Enforcement Phase The SMAS1 system specification is not concerned with the en- 
forcement of policies. We therefore assume that the high-level specification provided in 
Equation (5.12) does not change any of the priority variables, viz. no policy is implemented. 
The enforcement phase is finite and terminates in state Qkl. 
Execution Phase In this phase all the functional guards are evaluated. The precondi- 
tions of both actions hold. Given the priority assignment it follows that the only enabled 
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action is inc (see Equations (5.13) and (5.14)). The behaviour of the execution of action 
inc is depicted in Figure 5.2: 
winc 
Figure 5.2: Specification level behaviour of action inc 
Initially the agent is locked by setting the control variable readyag to false, viz. the 
agent cannot execute any other action. The setting of the variable is defined to take 
exactly one time step. Subsequently the agent's state is copied into the local variables. 
The specification does define that this happens in finite time and that in the final state 
all local variables (here x') have the same values that the corresponding agent variables 
(here x) had in the initial state of the assignment. The final state of the assignment is 
denoted by Uk . 
The statement is executed on the local variables. As the statement uses the concrete 
assignment we know that this takes exactly one time step. If the action succeeds, the now 
updated values of the local variables are subsequently copied back into the agent variables, 
representing that the action does actually take effect and the control variable doneag, inc 
is set to true (defined in succeedag, inc, Equation (5.17)). Alternatively the specification 
allows the action to fail, i. e. the agent variables remain unchanged and the control variable 
failedag, inc is set to true (defined in failag, inc, Equation (5.18)). Both possibilities take 
finite time and terminate in state ah, in which the action execution terminates. 
This completes the first deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle of the agent. The 
agent will subsequently reenter its deliberation phase, where the assignment of the priority 
variables will be reversed. Table 5.2 lists the values of the agent and control variables in 
the described states. The "? " indicates, that the value of the variable is not defined in 
the state. 
The specification uses the temporal assignment. A concrete implementation must 
refine this assignment into either a concrete parallel assignment or a sequence of simple 
assignments. The refinement of this example is provided in Chapter 9, Section 9.3. 
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Agent Variables Co Cl CL1 O'jl Oki 0'12 C2 
x Variable x ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 
Priority Variables 
IIag; ný 
Priority of inc ? ? 1 1 1 1 0 
llag, dbl Priority of dbl ? ? 1 0 0 0 1 
Control Variables 
ready,, ag is not ready ? F F F T F F 
doneag, iac ag successfully executed inc ? ? F F F T T 
failedag, iac ag failed executing inc ? ? F F F F F 
doneag, dbl ag successfully executed dbl ? ? F F F F F 
faileda db1 ag failed executing dbl ? ? F F F F F 
Table 5.2: States in the Execution of Listing 5.3 
5.6 Summary 
This chapter defined the syntax and the specification oriented semantics of the SMAS1 
subset of the SANTA language. The subset allows for the specification of fully autonomous 
agents, that are executing local actions to perform computations on their encapsulated 
variables. The execution of an agent is staged in phases. The execution starts with 
the initialisation phase, where the agent state is initialised (Section 5.3.1). Subsequently 
the agent enters its deliberation-enforcement-execution cycle. These three phases are 
constantly iterated until the agent decides to terminate. 
In the deliberation phase (Section 5.3.2) the agent prioritises its actions for execution. 
In the enforcement phase (Section 5.3.4) these priorities are reassigned to ensure the 
compliance with vigilantly enforced policies. In the execution phase (Section 5.3.5) the 
action with the highest priority is executed, provided its precondition is true. The agent 
can choose to terminate by executing the terminate statement, and leave the cycle to enter 
the termination phase. In the termination phase the agent remains idle, allowing for the 
distributed termination of the system. 
The advantage of the separation of the phases is the increased modularity of the system 
description. The deliberation phase can be used to encode (intelligent) decision making 
algorithms. These may be specified explicitly or left undefined using the keyword external 
indicating that their implementation is not formalised within the framework. The notion 
of priority variables provides a clear interface to the rest of the system. The enforcement 
phase encodes enforcement mechanisms for policies; this is detailed later in Chapter 8. 
Finally the execution phase captures the behaviour of the actual action execution. The 
execution either succeeds, viz. the agent variables are updated, or fails, viz. the agent 
variables remain unchanged. 
This is indicated in the control variables. 
An example of a single agent that is alternating between the execution of two action 
has been described at the specification level, where only the states between the phases in 
127 
CHAPTER 5. AGENTS 
the execution are considered. The behaviour of all agent state variables over these states 
has been detailed. 
Not addressed in the SMAS1 subset is the existence of a shared environment through 
which agents can communicate and the existence of policies and their various enforcement 
mechanisms. The shared environment is introduced using the notion of objects in the 
next chapter as the SMAS2 subset of the SANTA design language. Chapter 7 introduces 
the syntax and specification oriented semantics of policies that are then linked with the 
behaviour of the system by enforcement mechanisms in Chapter 8. 
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Objects 
Objects represent the shared environment of agents. The focus is on 
the formalisation of objects as passive entities and the communication 
between agents and objects using remote actions. Key is the formali- 
sation of different points of failure in the communication due to policy 
decisions. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Having introduced SANTA agents and their semantics we augment the SMAS1 with the 
notion of objects. Objects are passive entities that represent the agents' shared environ- 
ment. Agents can invoke object interfaces and thus modify or perceive the state of their 
environment. The invocation of object interfaces is synchronous. This chapter describes 
how objects are specified in the SMAS2 subset of the language and how agents can use 
objects as a means of sensing and affecting their environment. 
The emphasis is on the execution of an agent's remote action and the various points 
in which a remote action can fail due to policy decisions. As in the preceding chapter, 
the actual condition for this failure remains undefined and captures only the effect that a 
policy decision has on the result of the communication. 
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2 the additional syntactic constructs 
are defined and described informally. In Section 6.3 the semantics of a single agent is 
extended to include the execution of remote actions. Following this, the behaviour of 
objects is formalised in Section 6.4. These definitions are combined in Section 6.5 to yield 
the overall semantics of the SMAS2 subset of the SANTA language. The chapter concludes 
with an example of an SMAS2 program in Section 6.6 and a brief summary in Section 6.7. 
6.2 Objects in SANTA 
The following syntactic constructs are introduced to describe objects. Only the new or 
augmented production rules are included in the Listing 6.1 
Listing 6.1: EBNF for SMAS2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
MAS = {agent I object}. 
object = 'object', id, ': ', { vardekl I intdekl 'end'. 
actdekl = 'when', expr, 'do', id, , 
(statement ý external). 
external =[ lit .'] id, . 
', id, '(', [ vallist ], ')'. 
intdekl = id, '(', [ paramlist ], ') ', ', statement , I 
paramlist= [ 'in '] ,[ 'out'] , id, { ', ', [ 'in '] ,[ 'out '] , id } 
vallist =( expr, { ', , expr 
}). 
The SMAS2 system specification contains additionally to the set of agents also a set 
of objects 0 that constitute the agents' shared environment. An object specification is 
introduced by the keyword object followed by its system wide unique identifier id. Similar 
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to an agent definition, an object definition encapsulates a set of variables. Instead of 
actions an object provides a set of interfaces that are accessible by other entities in the 
system. The definition of an object closes with the keyword end. 
6.2.1 Object State Variables 
Object variables are defined in the same way as agent variables. They denote the explicitly 
declared state of the object, that can be only modified by the execution of interfaces. The 
set of object variables is denoted by Vo, decl. Additionally, auxiliary variables are part of the 
object's state. These are control variables, denoted by the set Vo, contr, and enforcement 
variables, denoted by the set Vo, enj. 
The set of control variables contains the variable readyo that indicates that the object is 
accessible by an agent. The control variables doneo, a, i and failedo, a, i indicate the success 
or failure of the previous invocation of interface i by agent a. Contrary to the control 
variables for agents they are indexed with three subscripts. This allows to reference not 
only the past execution of interfaces in policies but also the agents that invoked these 
interfaces. The set of enforcement variables accommodates all variables that are required 
by the vigilant enforcement mechanism to enforce the object's policies. 
The set of all object state variables, denoted by V0, is the union: 
Vo = Vo, dec! U Vo, enf U 
Vo, 
contr 
In the semantics all variables in the set Vo are modelled as ITL state variables. Similar to 
the case discussed in the previous chapter these are explicitly controlled by the statement 
semantics and resemble the behaviour of memory variables. 
6.2.2 Object Interfaces 
An object interface is introduced by an object wide unique identifier followed by an op- 
tional parameter list that is enclosed in parenthesis. The list defines parameters that are 
designated as input parameters by the keyword in or as output parameters by the keyword 
out. If a designator is omitted the parameter 
is assumed to be used for both, input and 
output. Parameters are passed 
by value. The statement describing the behaviour of the 
interface follows the colon. The semantics of the statements is the same as previously 
introduced in Section 5.3.3, however, the use of the keyword terminate is prohibited. 
6.2.3 Remote Actions 
The syntax for action definitions 
has been augmented to allow for the execution of remote 
actions. The effect that 
the action has on the environment is defined by the invoked 
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object interface, which is defined in the remote action by the object's identifier and the 
interface identifier. The optional parameter list allows for the exchange of information 
between the agent's state and the state of the invoked object. If the parameter is defined 
in the interface as an output parameter the expression is syntactically restricted to be the 
identifier of an agent variable. 
Time Out As the concrete implementation of the object interface is generally unknown 
to the agent, a time-out for the execution of external actions is provided. The time- 
out is optional and precedes the object name in the invocation. If the computation of 
the interface exceeds the specified timeout, the system can abort the computation and 
both the agent's and the object's state remain unchanged. The specification does not 
guarantee that the time the agent is involved in the invocation has a strict upper bound 
of the specified timeout. However, it guarantees that if the time limit is exceeded before 
the results of the computation are available, then the action is considered to be failed, and 
the available results are discarded. A concrete implementation will potentially be able to 
give guarantees on the worst-case scenario. 
Parameterised Interfaces The communication between agent and object is semanti- 
cally similar to the communication using joint actions as it is defined in [124]. However, 
interfaces and parameter lists allow to clearly define the data that can be accessed by the 
calling and the called side without requiring knowledge of the internal structure of the 
interface. This makes it possible to analyse potential information flow in the system based 
solely on the definition of object interfaces. This is important as knowledge of the internal 
structure cannot be assumed in an open environment. 
Explicit Naming of Remote Actions The rationale to name the external action 
within the agent is to be able to control different actions of the agent using policies. An 
agent may define two external actions that invoke the same object interface albeit with 
different parameter lists, e. g. to store the results in different output variables. From 
the agent's point of view both actions are distinct. However, from the viewpoint of the 
invoked object both are indistinguishable. To be able to define accurate policies that 
control the behaviour of the agent it must be possible to distinguish between the two 
different invocations of the same object interface. 
This is best explained by the following example. Assume the following specification: 
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Listing 6.2: Example for explicitly named remote actions 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
/* Agent Definition */ 
agent ag : 
var x=0 
var y=0 
/* Save to variable x */ 
when true do readX : ob. read(x) 
/* Save to variable y */ 
when true do readY : ob. read(y) 
end 
/* ... */ 
In Listing 6.2 agent ag could choose to alternate between executing readx and readY 
to keep always the previously read value. Although both actions invoke the same object 
interface their effect on the agent is different and a policy could make different decisions 
for each of the actions. 
6.2.4 Motivating Example 
The example given in this section modifies the example provided in Section 5.2.4. The 
new example specification is as follows: 
Listing 6.3: Motivating Example for SMAS2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
/* Agent Definition */ 
agent ag : 
/* Agent Variables */ 
var x=0 
var y=0 
/* Agent Actions */ 
when x< 232 - Ido inc : ob. set(x+1, x) 
when x< 231 do dbl : ob. set(2*x, x) 
/* Deliberation */ 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, dbl«- 1,0 else inc, dbl+- 0,1 } 
end 
/* Object Definition */ 
object ob : 
/* Object Variables */ 
var x=0 
/* Interfaces */ 
set (in a, out b) :{x, b. - a, a } 
end 
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The example in Listing 6.3 introduces the object ob that encapsulates the variable 
x. The object provides the interface set(in a, out b) that will update the value of the 
object's variable x to the input parameter a and returns this value also as the output 
parameter b. The actions inc and dbl are changed to remote actions that invoke the 
interface set(in a, out b) of the object ob with the appropriate new value. 
6.3 Single Agent Semantics 
This section describes the conservative extensions to the definitions in Section 5.3 that are 
required to take the execution of remote actions into account. By conservative we mean 
that if none of the constructs that are introduced in the SMAS2 subset are used, then the 
semantics of the SMAS2 system is equivalent to the semantics of the SMAS1 system. 
In the following the set of actions Xa of the agent a is the union of the set of local 
actions, denoted by X 'O', and the set of remote actions, denoted by Xä t. The sets Xä°c 
and Xä t are disjoint. 
cUXa t Xa=Xa10 
The initialisation phase of the agent remains unchanged. However, the set Xa now ad- 
ditionally contains the set of remote actions. Similarly, the definition of the deliberation 
phase remains unaffected, as does the definition of the enforcement phase. In the execution 
phase changes are required to allow for the execution of remote actions. 
6.3.1 Execution Phase 
The definition of the functional guard provided in Section 5.3.5, i. e. Equation (5.13) is 
retained, however using the enlarged action set Xa,. As remote actions must synchronise 
with their target object the definition of an enabled action requires modification. 
Enabled Action 
Equation (6.1) augments the definition of enableda, x that was provided 
in Equation (5.14) 
to include the readiness of the invoked object o. 
enableda, x 
= ga, x nA readyj 
(6.1) 
jEEa, x 
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where Ea,, x denotes the set of system entities that must synchronise 
for the execution of 
the action x. The set Ea, x is defined as follows: 
EQ, y = 
{a} if xE Xä°` 
{a, o} if xE Xä t and x invokes an interface of object o 
(6.2) 
This is clearly a conservative extension of the original definition because Xa = Xä°C means 
that Ea, x = 
{a} for any xE Xa, rendering Equation (6.1) identical to Equation (5.14). The 
choice to introduce the set Ea, x is based on the fact that the introduction of a Security 
Enforcer later in Chapter 8 will require an additional entity to synchronise with the 
execution. 
Action Semantics 
The semantics of the action must be augmented to take into account that all entities that 
are involved in the execution must be locked. Equation (6.3) augments the definition of 
the action semantics 7Pa, x (Equation (5.15)) in this sense. 
? Pa, x = enableda, x AQ ready := false Iv ; stata, x (6.3) 
where ready denotes the list of all ready] for jE Ea,., and false the list of false literals 
of the same length. The set V is the union of all state variables of the involved entities: 
V= UjEEa, 
m 
Vj. The major difference between local and remote actions is the semantics 
of the statement that is executed. 
Statement Semantics 
The semantics of local actions remains as defined in Section 5.3.5, i. e. Equation (5.16). 
However, the semantics of the remote action is defined by the statement in the invoked 
interface. The semantics of the statement associated with an action is extended to include 
the semantics of remote actions: 
stata, x = 
(x E XäOO A statd°ý) V (x E Xä tA stata'"xt) (6.4) 
The model does take into account the possibility of failure. Given that two entities are 
involved in the execution, the failure model of the remote action is more sophisticated 
than for the local action case. We differentiate two points of view. The viewpoint of the 
invoking agent and the viewpoint of the invoked object. Figure 6.1 depicts the different 
phases and the potential points of 
failure in the execution of a remote action. We use 
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i here to refer to the interface, viz. the viewpoint of the object, and x for the external 
action, viz. the viewpoint of the agent. a denotes the agent and o the object, S0,1 the 
statement defined in the interface definition. 
2. i, x failed 
1. vars initialised 4. i, x failed 
3. So,; executed 6. x failed 
5. i succeeded 
7. x succeeded 
Figure 6.1: Schematic of remote action statement 
1. Local variables are created and initialised. They represent local copies of the ob- 
ject variables that are modified by the execution of the statement, as well as the 
input parameters and output parameters of the invoked interface. The enforcement 
mechanisms then perform an authorisation check. 
2. The execution failed due to the authorisation check. i, x indicates that the execution 
fails from both points of view, i. e. the failure is visible to the object and the agent'. 
3. The statement is executed. The execution of the statement requires time. If the 
specified timeout for the execution is exceeded, or an integrity check for the object 
fails, then the action will fail (4. ). Otherwise the execution succeeds from the objects 
point of view (5. ) 
4. The execution failed due to a timeout or an integrity check made by the objects 
enforcement mechanisms. This failure is again indicated to both the agent and the 
object. 
5. The statement execution succeeded and the object's state is updated. At this point 
the involvement of the object finishes and the object can be accessed again by other 
agents. Subsequently the agent will perform an integrity check on the output values. 
'There are different opinions within the security community whether the access control failures should 
be indicated to the requesting party. Arguments for this approach are that the requesting side can take 
another course of action to cope with the failure. Some authors even provide a framework that gives 
more detailed information on why the access failed to allow the requesting party to obtain the required 
credentials for the execution. Arguments against providing information on failure is that the system 
becomes prone to attacks that use black-box analysis techniques that to develop a model of the system's 
security mechanisms in order to exploit covered channels. 
136 
6.3. SINGLE AGENT SEMANTICS 
6. The agent's integrity check failed. This means that the computation did not meet 
the agent's expectations. The failure is indicated only to the agent. Changes made 
to the object state are not rolled back. The integrity check is a foundation on which 
trust models can be built. 
7. The agent's integrity check succeeded and the values of the output parameters are 
copied to the receiving agent variables. The execution is successful. 
The semantics of the remote action statement is formalised in Equation (6.5). 
statt = 3vp ... vj)po ... jlk, pö ... 
Pi, T" 
, 
(T=1nTgets T-I-1)n 
(initi, 
x ; ((QS ilv+ ; (((su. cceedi nT< t7nax) ; (succeedx ® failx) (6.5) 
) (D faili, 
x) 
)® faili, 
x)) 
The first line of the equation introduces local variables that store the temporary results of 
the computation (variables vö ... vý) and the passed parameter values 
(input parameter: 
In2 = {po ... Pk}, output parameter: 
Outs = {pö ... pi}). The state variable 
T models a 
local clock that is started with the statement execution. The behaviour of T is defined in 
the second line of Equation (6.5). It follows the formalisation of the different phases that 
have been depicted in Figure 6.1. The constant tmax denotes the time-out specified in the 
remote action definition. The set 
V+=VU{vö... vý}U{po... pk}U{pö... Pl} (6.6) 
denotes the set of all state variables of the entities eE Ea, x that are involved in the 
execution of the remote action together with the local variables. 
The different phases, that are depicted in Figure 6.1 are formalised in the following. 
Table 6.1 provides a short index to the definitions. 
Local Variable Initialisation Local variables, representing a temporary copy of the 
object state, as well as the input variables of the interface are initialised. 
initi, x 
[vö, 
... ý vk, Po, ..., pl 4- VO)- .., vk, eo, ..., elJl v+\{po,..., Pl } (6.7) 
We denote the object variables that are modified in the statement by vj, where 0<j<k 
and v? E Vo, decl. Their 
local copies are denoted by vj. The set of input variables Ini of the 
interface as pj, where 0<j<1 and pj E Ini. The corresponding values that are passed 
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Phase Formalisation defined in 
1. vars initialised initi,,, (6.7) 
2. i, x failed faili,,, (6.8) 
3. S0, i executed [S'o iIv (6.9) 
4. i, x failed faili,,, (6.8) 
5. i succeeded succeedi (6.10) 
6. x failed fail,, (6.12) 
7. x succeeded succeed,, (6.11) 
Table 6.1: Phases in Remote Action Execution 
by the agent during the invocation are denoted by ej. During the initialisation the state 
of all participating entities is maintained. This is expressed by defining the semantics of 
the statement with respect to the variables in V+ (defined in Equation (6.6)). The values 
of the output parameters p' E Outi are not maintained by the initialisation. 
Following the initialisation, the action either fails or continues with the execution of 
the statement Si defined in the interface. 
Remote Action and Interface Failure A failure at this point means that neither the 
object variables are modified (the viewpoint of the object), nor are the output parameters 
committed to the agent variables (the viewpoint of the agent). The failure is defined as: 
faili, 
x 
= Qfailedo, 
a,,, 
faileda 
x, 
failedo 
a i, 
failed 
a x. - true, true, 
false, 7i; readyo: =trueJv 
(6.8) 
The failure of an agent a's external action x, that invokes an interface i, is indicated in 
the agent by the control variables faileda, x and in the object by failedo, a, i" 
Similar to the 
case of local actions in the previous chapter the complementary control variables failedo, a, i 
and faileda,., are set to false. 
The local variables that store the temporary results of the computation are not main- 
tained during the failure. This is required to be able to delay the failure due to a time-out. 
This is discussed in detail later in this section. 
The agent and object variables remain unchanged. The lock on the object will be 
released in the final state. The lock on the agent must not be removed, as the agent 
immediately enters its deliberation phase. 
Interface Statement Execution In case the access check was successful, the statement 
defined in the interface is executed on the local copies of the object variables. 
S'o, i _ So, i Iv'/v] 
(6.9) 
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S'oi denotes the statement So, i[v'/v] where every variable v is substituted by the corre- 
sponding local variable v'. 
Interface Execution Succeeds (Object) After the execution of the statement, the 
action can again fail or succeed dependent on the outcome of an integrity check. This 
check is made from the object's point of view and represents assertions on the executed 
statement. If it fails, the action is considered to be failed from the object's and from 
the agent's viewpoint, viz. when the object discovers a fault, it will indicate this to the 
agent. This case is already formalised in Equation (6.8). The successful execution from 
the object's point of view is formalised as: 
oai, VO, ... , vj <-- true, false, vö,... , 
vý ; ready,, := truely+ succeed, = Idoneo, a, i, done 
(6.10) 
The successful execution of the interface is indicated by the control variable doneo, a, i, viz. 
agent a successfully executed object o's interface i. Similarly to the control variables for 
the agent only one of the variables doneo, a, i or failedo, a, i can be true. This means that all 
other control variables are reset to false. The complementary set of control variables is 
denoted by doneo, a, i, where false is the list of false literals of matching length. 
The result of the computation (reflected in the local variables vö, ..., vj) 
is committed 
to the object's state. In the last state of the interval defined by succeedi, the lock on the 
object is released by setting the control variable readyo to true. The specification succeedi 
represents only a success from the object's point of view, viz. the integrity constraints on 
the object are met. The action may only succeed if the time-out that has been specified 
in the invocation has not elapsed (conjunct T< tmax in Equation (6.5), where t,,,. is the 
specified time limit). 
Time-out The specification of the time-out in Equation (6.5) is not strict. It only states 
that no action may succeed if the time-out has elapsed, viz. every successful execution is 
performed within the time limit tmax. However, the maximal execution time is not bounded 
by the time limit. A concrete implementation can strengthen this requirement to ensure 
that tmax is a strict upper bound of the execution time. The following shows how the 
decision to fail can actually be delayed until the timeout does occur. The discussion uses 
the notion of refinement that is introduced in Chapter 9. However the example is simple 
enough to understand without referring to the concrete definitions. 
The specification of failure in Equation (6.8) makes use of the temporal assignment to 
indicate failure, viz. the concrete time needed for the failure is not specified. This is used 
to delay the decision. 
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The statement S= is executed on the local variables and does not modify any of the 
variables that are controlled by faili, x. By rewriting the statement Si to S= it is guaranteed 
that only the local variables v' are modified and all state variables in the set V remain 
stable. The specification of failure does not define the values for the local variables, 
and they can therefore assume any value over the interval. Consequently, by applying 
Theorem 9 (Chapter 9) we can introduce a finite prefix that maintains all agent variables: 
faili, x 9 (finite n ([idle IV)*) ; failz, x 
a finite prefix can be introduced that maintains all variables in V. This prefix can be 
refined into any prefix interval of Sj'. The statement syntax guarantees that SS is finite. 
C f; faili, x 
where f is a prefix of Sj' (Si' =f; g) and f does also refine the idle prefix ((finite A 
([idle]v)*) C f). The latter is guaranteed by the substitution with local variables and the 
statement syntax. 
This means that an implementation can delay the actual choice between the statement 
execution by executing f until the timeout does occur. If the time out is not reached, 
the chopping point is in the final state of the interval, viz. g= empty. In this case the 
statement branch is chosen. Otherwise the chopping point is defined by the time out and 
instead of executing the suffix g, a failure is indicated by the execution of faili, x choosing 
the fail branch of the first non-deterministic choice. 
Remote Action Success (Agent) The successful execution from the viewpoint of the 
object does not necessarily mean that the action does succeed from the agent's point of 
view. Once the execution succeeded from the object's point of view, the agent verifies the 
results against its expectations that are expressed as integrity rules. If the results satisfy 
the constraints, the execution succeeds from the viewpoint of the agent. This is formalised 
as: 
succeeds = Qdonea, x, donea,,, eö, ... , ek 4'- true, 
false, pö,... , pk1 v+\vo (6.11) 
The successful execution is indicated to the agent by setting the control variable donea, x 
to true. donea, x denotes again the complementary set of control variables. 
All output 
variables e,.. ., ek that 
have been specified in the external action are assigned to the 
results stored in the output parameters pö, ... , pk. 
The set of variables that is controlled 
in this step excludes the object state variables, as the object can already be involved in 
another computation. 
140 
6.4. SINGLE OBJECT SEMANTICS 
Remote Action Failure (Agent) If any of the integrity constraints are not met, then 
the execution fails. The failure affects only the agent and is formalised as follows: 
failx =Vaileda 
.,, 
faileda x, trae, false]v+\vo (6.12) 
The failure is indicated to the agent by setting the control variable failed,,, -,; 
the list 
faileda, x denotes again the complementary set of control variables. 
Agent Semantics 
The changes to the action semantics in the preceding Section 6.3.1 cover all modifications 
that are required to conservatively extend the semantics of an SMAS1 agent to an SMAS2. 
The extension does only affect the execution phase of an agent. 
6.4 Single Object Semantics 
Having defined the semantics of the execution of an external action by an agent, the 
semantics of a single object is straight forward. Let the semantics of a single object be 
defined by Wo: 
cpo _ inito ; (((DOo, x) ® 
[idleIvo)* (6.13) 
xEX0 
Here inito denotes the initialisation of the object's state and is subsequently defined in 
Equation (6.14). Xo is the set of all remote actions that invoke one of object's o's interfaces. 
The semantics of an interface invocation by the external action x is denoted by ,,, x and 
subsequently defined in Equation (6.15). The exclusive-or guarantees that only one agent 
can access the object at a time. In the case that none of the agents in the system executes 
a remote action that invokes one of the interfaces of o, the object can stay idle. This 
behaviour is iterated (Chopstar). 
6.4.1 Object Initialisation 
The initialisation of objects is defined analogously to the initialisation of agents: 
inito = readyo = false A (keep readyo = false) A 
An (doneo, a, x "- false A failedo, a, x 4- false) n 
aEAxEXa 
A (v`-Iv) 
vEVo, decl 
(6.14) 
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Throughout the initialisation the control variable ready, remains false, preventing access to 
the object. All control variables done,, a, y and failed,, a, x are initialised to 
false. All object 
variables are initialised to their initial value I,, as provided in the object specification. 
6.4.2 Interface Invocation 
Every remote action invokes exactly one of the object's interfaces. The semantics of this 
invocation is denoted by ý10 ý. 
ýo, x = enabledQ, x A[ ready := false 
(6.15) stato, x 
Here a denotes the agent executing the remote action x. Again ready: =false sets the lock 
on all entities Ea,, x that are involved in the execution of x. Compare to Equation 
(6.3) on 
page (135). The semantics of the interface invocation differs only in the statement stata, y. 
The statement stata, x is a prefix of stata, y defined in Equation (6.5): 
stator = 3vö ... V' 
I po ... pk, pö ... 
p1, T" 
(T=1ATgetsT+1)A 
(initi, 
x ; ((QSJ y; (((succeedi AT< tmaz) 
(6.16) 
)® faili, 
x) 
ED faili, x)) 
The semantics of the object interface execution does not contain the success or failure from 
the agent's perspective, enabling other agents to access the object, whilst the previously 
accessing agent is still performing the integrity check on the results of the computation. 
The synchronisation between the object and the invoking agent is expressed by the 
fact that the semantics of the object's interface execution coincides with the semantics of 
the external action. An implementation, however, will not duplicate the behaviour, but 
instead keep one process idle whilst the other performs the computation. This may require 
the introduction of special marker variables to synchronise between both processes. 
The following abstract example illustrates this. Let pi and p2 be two processes exe- 
cuting in parallel. Let pl be the behaviour of an object and p2 the behaviour of an agent. 
At some point in time, after a finite execution, the agent executes a remote action that 
invokes an interface of the object. f2 denotes the behaviour of the agent executing the 
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remote action and fl the behaviour of the corresponding interface execution. 
Sys=PlAP2 
Pl = finite; fl ; true 
P2 = finite ; f2 ; true 
Assume that the finite prefix of pl and p2 has the same length. In the SMAS semantics 
this is ensured by the use of enableda, x. 
Sys = finite; ((fl ; true) A (f2 ; true)) 
since fl is a prefix of f2 
f2=f1; 9 
we can substitute 
Sys = finite ; ((f, ; true) A (fl ;g; true)) 
Still each conjunct would behave like fi initially. To avoid the duplication the marker m 
is introduced: 
Sys C finite ; 3m "m= false A (((fl A (keep m= false) A fin (m = true)) ; true)A 
((fl A (keep m= false) A fin (m = true)) ;g; true)) 
Whilst before both conjuncts could take a different amount of time to behave like fl, the 
processes now synchronise on the marker variable m, viz. the execution of fi terminates 
in the same state for both processes. The behaviour fi of one of the processes is now 
redundant and can be eliminated. 
=finite; Bm "m =false A (((fl A (keep m= false) A fin (m =true)); true)A 
((true A (keep m= false) A fin (m = true)) ;g; true)) 
Similarly to this abstract example, the synchronisation between a remote action as part 
of the behaviour of an agent and 
the interface semantics that is part of the object be- 
haviour can be synchronised. The semantics of remote actions and their corresponding 
interfaces cannot be refined independently, as all design decisions made must preserve the 
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synchronisation between them. 
6.5 Multi Agent Semantics 
The semantics of the overall SMAS2 system is a conservative extension of the SMAS1 
semantics. It combines the extended semantics of agents with the semantics of objects as 
follows: 
QSMAS21 = (halt (n terma) n n(cPa) AA cpo) 
aEA aEA oEO 
(6.17) 
Given the SMAS2 specification the whole system could remain idle although the execu- 
tion of an action is possible. It would be sensible to strengthen the specification to ensure 
that at least one action in the system is executed. In this case the additional conjunct 
prog, expressing a simple progression property, can be added to the SMAS2 specification. 
The progression property is formalised as: 
prog =Q ((v V enableda, x QvV lPa, x aEAxEXQ aEAxEXa (6.18) 
In every suffix interval in which one of the actions in the system is enabled, one of the 
actions is executed. The semantics of the agents already ensures that any executed action 
is also enabled. 
6.6 Example of SMAS2 
In this section the semantics of the motivating example provided in Section 6.2.4 is detailed 
and the behaviour of the agent and object explained on a state by state basis. The 
following listing is identical with Listing 6.3 on page 133 and is included here for the 
readers convenience. 
144 
6.6. EXAMPLE OF SMAS2 
Listing 6.4: Motivating Example for SMAS2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
/* Agent Definition */ 
agent ag : 
/* Agent Variables */ 
var x=0 
var y=0 
/* Agent Actions */ 
when x< 232 -1 do inc : ob. set (x+1, x) 
when x< 231 do dbl : ob. set(2*x, x) 
/* Deliberation */ 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, dbli-- 1,0 else inc, dbl«- 0,1 } 
end 
/* Object Definition */ 
object ob : 
/* Object Variables */ 
var x=0 
/* Interfaces */ 
set (in a, out b) :{x, b. - a, a } 
end 
The example introduces the object ob that encapsulates the variable x and provides 
the interface set(in a, out b) that will update the value of the object's variable x to the 
input parameter a and returns this value also as the output parameter b. The actions inc 
and dbl are now external actions that invoke the interface set(in a, out b) of ob with the 
appropriate new value. The key difference is that the variable y that is stored in the object 
can be accessed by other agents in the system via the object's interface. 
The example is again kept simple and includes only a minimum of variables. The 
number of agents, objects, actions and interfaces, as well as the amount of information, 
that is transmitted in an interface invocation and the complexity of the computation that 
is performed are not providing any additional insights in the behaviour of the system and 
would only hinder the understanding of the mechanism. This example is only discussed 
at the specification level. The abstract behaviour of the system is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
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SAiAS 
Wob 
Figure 6.2: Abstract behaviour of the SMAS2 example 
Figure 6.2 depicts the agent's behaviour on the top of the state sequence and the 
object's behaviour below the state sequence. The behaviour of the agent is similar to the 
one shown in the example for SMAS1. The object starts with its initialisation phase. The 
object initialisation completes in state ag. The state op is depicted after state a11. This 
is an arbitrary choice; it may as well be before or coinciding with the state atl dependent 
on the actual implementation of both initialisation phases. The object then remains idle 
as there is no enabled remote action for its interface set. This is because the agent is not 
yet ready. 
After the agent finished the execution of its deliberation and enforcement phase in 
state Ckl the remote action inc is enabled, as the agent and the object are ready and 
the action's guard evaluates to true (because x=0 is an even number). The agent now 
behaves as defined by 0ag, inc whilst the object will behave as ýob, inc" Both behaviours 
are identical representing the synchronisation between the agent and the object until the 
state a,,, where the object finishes with the execution of V)ob, inc" It is ready again and 
remains idle until the next interface invocation. The agent continues with the behaviour 
Oag, inc and updates the agent's state, terminating in state at.. The agent then reenters 
its deliberation phase. 
Table 6.2 shows the variables and their values in the depicted states of the execution. 
The "? " denotes that the value of the variable is not defined. 
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Agent Variables oo Ql o Ql', ail aki Aral X12 ail 
x Variable x ? ? 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Object Variables 
Y Variable y ? ? ? 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Priority Variables 
II, g,;, c Priority of inc ? ? 1 ? 1 1 1 1 1 
Hag, dbl Priority of dbl ? ? 1 ? 0 0 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
ready., ag is not ready ? ? F F F T F F F 
done, g, inc ag successfully executed inc ? ? F F F F F T T 
failedag, ioc ag failed executing inc ? ? F F F F F F F 
done, 8, db1 ag successfully executed dbl ? ? F F F F F F F 
failedag, dbl ag failed executing dbl ? ? F F F F F F F 
readyob ob is ready ? ? T T T T T T T 
doneob, a,, set ag successfully executed set ? ? ? F F F T T T 
failedob, 
a , eet 
ag failed executing set ? ? ? F F F F F F 
Table 6.2: Execution of the SMAS2 Example. 
The reason why the values of the priority variables are not defined in the state ali is 
that it lies within the agent's deliberation phase. The specification of this phase, however, 
does only guarantee that the priority values are defined in the final state of the phase. 
The synchronisation between the agent and the object is given by the fact that both 
l'ag, inc and ybob, inc start in the same state and that 
Oob, 
inc is a prefix of Y , g, inc" 
6.7 Summary 
The syntactic constructs for the specification of objects that represent the shared envi- 
ronment of agents have been introduced. The state of the environment is represented by 
the states of all objects in the system. Access to objects is controlled by interfaces that 
define computation on the state of the encapsulating object. These interfaces are invoked 
by agents in remote actions. The notion of local and remote actions provides a clear 
distinction between local computation and communication. The passing of parameters in 
remote actions enables agents to modify and sense their environment. 
The execution of remote actions is more sophisticated than local actions as at least 
two system entities must synchronise for the communication. More entities also increase 
the number of points in which the execution can fail. If the remote action is authorised by 
the policy enforced by the invoking agent the execution can commence. Parameters are 
evaluated and passed to the 
invoked object. Based on the input parameters an authorisa- 
tion policy, enforced for the object, can cause the remote action to fail. Similarly a time 
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out for the remote action may cause a failure. At the end of the execution the action may 
fail due to integrity constraints enforced for the object, or the result may violate integrity 
constraints enforced by the agent. Failure generally means that the agent and object vari- 
ables are not modified and the failure is indicated in the control variables. However, the 
exception is that the failure due to an agent's integrity check does not affect the object. 
This means that the local decision of the agent to reject the results of the computation 
does not affect the environment and therefore can not be observed by other agents. 
The behaviour of the SMAS2 has been defined as a conservative extension to the 
semantics that was presented in the previous chapter. This means that the semantics of 
an SMAS2 that does not contain objects and therefore does not contain remote actions 
is identical with the semantics of the SMAS1 system. The semantics of the additional 
constructs has been described informally in Section 6.2 and was formalised in Section 6.3, 
6.4 and 6.5. The example provided in the previous chapter has been modified and uses now 
remote actions that increment or double the value of a variable that part of the agent's 
environment. The example has been detailed and related to the formal definitions of the 
SMAS2. 
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Policies 
Policies express access control, obligation and integrity requirements on 
agents and objects. This chapter introduces the syntax and semantics 
of SANTA policies. It shows how complex protection requirements can 
be expressed with ease using the expressiveness of policy rules and the 
composition of policies. 
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7.1 Introduction 
A security policy expresses protection requirements on the system in a precise and un- 
ambiguous form. Policies in SANTA are concerned with access control, obligations and 
integrity. They relate to the entities in the system, and define constraints on their in- 
teractions. Access control requirements in this model are authorisation requirements, 
viz. constraints on the actions that a subject can perform on objects, or delegation re- 
quirements, viz. which subject can delegate which right to another subject. Obligation 
requirements express that subjects must perform specific actions. Integrity requirements 
define constraints on the effect that the execution of an action has on subjects and objects. 
The aim of policies is to express these requirements at a high level of abstraction, hiding 
the details of the implementation that is necessary for their enforcement. In SANTA, 
policy rules are used as the basis for policy specifications. Rule-based languages are well 
established and well suited because most of these requirements are already informally 
expressed in the form of conditions and consequences. Each rule is expressed in terms of 
subjects, objects and actions. Subjects are the actors in the system. They can request 
access to objects, that represent the available resources. The term action is used to denote 
the mode of access. A typical example is the -rwx (read, write, execute) mode commonly 
used in UNIX systems to distinguish the mode of access to a file. 
In SANTA two different types of policies are distinguished: environmental and be- 
havioural policies. The former represents the more traditional view that the access to 
shared resources in the environment is protected. The latter addresses constraints on the 
behaviour of agents in the system. 
Environmental Policies Environmental Policies protect the access to and the integrity 
of objects. For environmental policies subjects are SANTA agents. We assume that any 
user is represented by one or more agents in the SMAS. SANTA objects are resources in the 
shared environment of the agents - they are also the objects in the environmental policy. 
The actions that can be performed on an object are represented by the object's interfaces. 
Using the example from the previous chapter a policy could for example describe under 
what conditions the agent ag can invoke the interface set(in a, out b) on the object ob, or the 
constraints that must be met for the execution to be successful. Environmental policies 
can be enforced by vigilant objects and security enforcer mechanisms. They represent the 
traditional view of policies controlling the access to shared system resources. However, for 
agent systems another view is also of interest. 
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Behavioural Policies Behavioural Policies restrict the behaviour of subjects. Subjects 
are represented by agents. The behaviour of an agent is defined in terms of its actions by 
the deliberation phase, viz. the deliberation phase decides on the sequence of actions the 
agent executes. Agents can be complex software programs that could for example employ 
AI learning techniques to adapt to changes in the system or to the users preferences. 
These mechanisms are abstracted in SANTA in the deliberation phase of an agent. The 
functioning of the agent's decision making is not always transparent to the user. This is 
either due to the complexity involved or because modules that are provided by third parties 
are used. In this case it may be difficult for the user to trust the agent's reasoning. Whilst 
a user will undoubtedly appreciate smarter behaviour of the software agent most users will 
also be wary of the risks and the unpredictability that is involved. Behavioural policies 
define constraints that the user wishes to be adhered to. They are enforced by vigilant 
agents and can then provide some guarantees on the agent's behaviour. Behavioural 
policies do not protect the resources within the environment, but are restrictions on the 
behaviour of the agent itself. 
For example: My software agent has access to my bank account, which is represented 
by an object. The policy controlling access to the resources ensures that only my bank 
and the agent acting on my behalf have access to the account. However, anticipating that 
the reasoning engine of my software agent may be exploited by other malicious agents I 
want to constrain my agent to allow only 10 withdrawals of a maximum of 100 GBP a 
month. This is a requirement that does not represent a constraint on the bank account, 
but a constraint on the behaviour of the agent. 
A behavioural policy defines the conditions under which the agent can or must choose 
to perform a specific action. It also can place constraints that must be met before the 
agent accepts the result of an execution. For this type of policies the subject and the 
target of the execution is the agent. The actions that can be controlled are the agent's 
local and remote actions. 
The distinction between environmental and behavioural policies is at the conceptual 
level. At the language level, the only difference is the subject, object and action pairing 
of a rule. This means with respect 
to the policy language the view of both policy types is 
uniform. 
151 
CHAPTER 7. POLICIES 
Policy Specification is the process of expressing informal protection requirements 
within the policy language. Policy rules form the basis of SANTA policy specifications 
and one of the major tasks during the specification process is the development of rules 
that adequately capture the informal requirements. The accurate specification of rules 
can be difficult when complex requirements need to be expressed. These are for example 
dependencies on the state of the system or dependencies on the history of the execution. 
The SANTA policy language provides support for both state and history dependencies. 
Not all requirements can be easily expressed in form of rules. One example would be 
an electronic paper submission system that is staged in different phases, e. g. registration, 
submission, review, etc. During each phase a different policy applies, controlling the 
ability of users to submit, review and comment on a paper. This would require the 
policy to change dynamically at the transition from one phase to the next. This form of 
requirements is difficult and cumbersome to encode in rules, because the different phases 
have to be considered in each of the rules. The approach in SANTA is different in that 
these types of requirements are captured through policy composition. 
Policy Composition The advantage of SANTA policies over the majority of other 
policy languages is that policies can be specified in small units, which are composed using 
a rich set of operators. The provided operators allow for policies to be composed along a 
temporal and structural axis. 
Temporal composition leads to policies that change dynamically over time or on the 
occurrence of events. This can be used to specify the transition from one policy to another, 
for example to capture protection requirements for different phases. 
Structural composition is concerned with the separation of subjects, objects, actions 
and policies, that apply only to a certain subset of these entities. A typical example is 
a hierarchical organisational structure, where each department defines its own policies. 
The combination of all these policies, together with some general protection requirements, 
yield the overall policy that applies to the organisation as a whole. 
The concept of Dynamically Changing Access Control Policies has been recently inves- 
tigated by Siewe [124]. Indeed, his work on temporal composition of authorisation policies 
forms the basis of the SANTA policy model. It has been significantly extended to capture 
other types of requirements, such as delegation, obligation and integrity. The structural 
composition and the unique problems that arise for the conflict resolution between two 
dynamically changing policies are addressed. 
Using these new concepts, policies can be specified as compositions of smaller, simpler 
policies along both the temporal and structural axis. This compositionality is also of great 
advantage for the enforcement of policies. Whilst the overall composition allows for the 
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analysis of the system wide effects that the enforcement of the policy has, it is also a great 
aid to decompose policies into units that are enforceable by the mechanisms present in 
the system. This makes it possible to drop the assumption of a centralised enforcement 
mechanism and replace it by the notion of vigilant agent, vigilant object and security 
enforcer, that describe (de-)centralised enforcement. 
The SANTA language constructs that can be used to specify policies rules and their 
compositions are described in Section 7.2. This section provides examples of how policy 
rules for authorisation, delegation, obligation and integrity can reference the current sys- 
tem state or the history of the execution. Section 7.4 describes the operators that can 
be used to compose policies along the temporal and structural axis. The specification 
oriented semantics of the policy language is given in Sections 7.3 and 7.5. Section 7.6 
summarises the policy model presented in this chapter and highlights its advantages over 
other models. 
7.2 Policies in SANTA 
Policies in SANTA are an integral part of the system specification. They capture pro- 
tection requirements for the SMAS. The smallest unit of a policy specification is a policy 
rule. Rules capture individual requirements, such as: "allow administrators to change 
user passwords. " The rule syntax and the informal semantics is detailed in Section 7.2.1. 
Sections 7.2.2 to 7.2.5 provide examples and the informal meaning of authorisation, dele- 
gation, obligation and integrity rules. 
Rules are combined into larger units, named simple policies. Simple policies are a 
set of rules that are all enforced simultaneously. They define for example the protection 
requirements that apply in a specific situation or phase of the system execution. Simple 
policies are detailed in Section 7.2.6. This is followed by the informal description of the 
operators that can be used 
for the composition of policies along the temporal axis and the 
structural axis in Section 7.4.2. 
Listing 7.1 shows the EBNF of the policy syntax. The individual constructs and their 
use are detailed in the subsequent sections. 
153 
CHAPTER 7. POLICIES 
Listing 7.1: EBNF for Policy Syntax 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
poldef = 'policy', id, .'{ funcdef policy. 
policy = policy, '; ', policy I 
unless ', expr ,, policy 
i 
aslongas ', expr ,, policy 
I 
intlit , 
': policy 
'if', expr , 
'then ', policy, 'else ' policy I 
'repeat', policy I 
policy, 'and', policy, [ 'deconflict ', (spolicy I id)] 
scope, policy 
'(', policy, 
spolicy 
id . 
spolicy= '(', { rule 
rule = conseq, '(', id,, id, ', id, ')' 'when', f. 
conseq = 'allow' I 'deny I 'decide' I 'oblige 'l' integrity '. 
f=f, '; fIf, 'or', flf, 'and' fl 'sometimes', fI 'always ', f 'keep 'fl 'if' expr, 'then' f, ['else', f 
( intlit listlit '. ', f 
('exists 'I'forall'), id, (('<', expr)I('in', expr)), ': ' f 
'(', f, ')' I expr 
scope = 'scope' '(', (listl 'any'), ', (listl 'any '), ', ', (listl 'any 
funcdef= 'def' id, '(', [ id, id} expr, 'end'. 
id = /* ... /I , 5, I , o, l , A, I , T, I 
'subjects 
'objects 
'actions 
[ '. '] 
, conseq, 
,). 
A policy definition is introduced by the keyword Policy, followed by the system wide 
unique identifier of the policy. A policy definition can contain an optional set of function 
definitions. These can reference the system state and provide a way to abbreviate complex 
expressions for the use in the policy. The operators that can be used for composition are 
detailed in Section 7.4. The basic element of each composition is either a simple policy 
definition or the identifier of another policy. A simple policy is a set of policy rules enclosed 
in parenthesis. The set may be empty. 
Each rule within the simple policy is introduced by a keyword, identifying its conse- 
quence. The consequences distinguish between the different types of rules that can be 
used in SANTA, e. g. authorisation rule, delegation rule, etc. Examples of these are given 
in Sections 7.2.2 to 7.2.5. The consequence is followed by a triple of identifiers that denote 
the subject, object and action to which the rule applies. 
The premise of a policy rule is separated from the consequence by the keyword when. 
The premise can specify a past behaviour of the system that, when observed, leads to the 
consequence. This is detailed in Section 7.2.1. The keyword T is used to refer to the time 
that elapsed since the policy started to be enforced. 
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Each policy in SANTA is scoped, viz. the rules in the policy apply only to a specific set 
of subjects, objects and actions. These sets can be referenced in the policy specification 
using the keywords subjects, objects and actions. To avoid the overhead of having to define 
rules for each specific subject, object and action pairing, the keywords S, 0 and A can be 
used to reference free variables in the policy rule. They are bound by the scope of the 
policy, viz. S denotes any subject in the scope (S E subjects), 0 denotes any object in the 
scope (0 E objects) and A denotes any actions in the scope (A E actions). 
The keywords subjects, objects, actions, as well as the consequences can be prefixed or 
suffixed with a dot. The use of the dot notation is restricted to the parallel composition 
of policies and is detailed in Section 7.4.2. 
7.2.1 Policy Rules 
The rule-based approach to policy specification is advantageous because it provides a 
higher level of abstraction to the specification. An access control rule for example describes 
under what conditions a specific access control decision is taken - it does not define the 
actual mechanism that is used to enforce this decision. In this sense the policy is more 
abstract than a concrete check that is implemented directly in the accessing code. Also, the 
syntax of policy rules contains some high level constructs to reference the past behaviour 
of the system. Examples are the temporal modalities always and sometime. 
Rule Structure Every rule consists of a premise and a consequence. The premise 
describes the condition that when observed by the enforcement mechanism leads to the 
specified consequence. The general form of a rule is: 
consequence (x ,y, z) when premise 
The consequence of a rule distinguishes the class of requirements that can be expressed 
in that rule. The triplet (x, y, z) references the subject, object and action to which the rule 
applies. Finally, the premise of the rule describes the condition under which the rule fires. 
Policy Scope Every policy has a scope, that defines to which subjects, objects and 
actions the policy applies to. 
The scope of a policy is accessible in the syntax using the 
keywords subjects, objects and actions, that represent the set of subjects, the set of objects 
and the set of actions in the scope of the policy. The scope of a policy affects the rules 
contained in that policy. 
The subject, object and action in each rule definition must be 
within the scope of the policy 
(x E subjects, yE objects and zE actions). 
Rules can also be defined in terms of all subjects, objects and actions in the scope 
using the keywords S, 0 and A. 
This provides a greater flexibility in the expression of 
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rules. By default the scope is the universal scope, viz. the sets of all subjects, objects and 
actions in the system. 
Using the keywords S, 0 and A Often rules apply to more than one subject, object 
or action. To avoid the effort to duplicate the rules for the different subject, object and 
action pairings, the keywords S, 0 and A can be used to reference free variables in the rule 
definition. These free variables are bound by the scope of the policy in the semantics of 
each rule. For example, given that the scope of the policy is: 
subjects = {xl, ... 7 xn} objects = 
{yl} actions = {read} 
The requirement to unconditionally grant all subjects in the scope of the policy the right 
to perform read on object oi, would require the definition of n rules: 
allow (xl, yl, read) when true 
allow (x2, yl, read) when true 
/* ... */ 
allow (x,, , yl read) when true 
Using the keyword S this could be written more compact as: 
allow (S, yl, read) when true 
Referencing state and history in rules Rules in SANTA can express state and 
history-based dependencies. This is achieved by allowing the premise of a rule to reference 
the current state of the system or the behaviour of the system in the past. The referenced 
state and behaviour is restricted to the part of the system that is observable by the 
mechanism enforcing the policy. This means that policies and the mechanisms enforcing 
them cannot be seen in separation if the requirements are dependent on the system state 
or the history of the execution. The following is a brief overview of the constraints for the 
different enforcement mechanisms: 
Vigilant Agent A vigilant agent can enforce behavioural policies. Rules that are en- 
forced using this mechanism can reference the agent variables as well as the control 
variables done(x) and failed (x) that indicate the success or failure of the action x. 
Vigilant Object A vigilant object can enforce environmental policies. Rules that are 
enforced using this mechanism can reference the object variables as well as the control 
variables done(x, y, z) and failed (x, y, z) that indicate the success or failure of object y's 
interface z by subject x. Parameters of the interfaces can also be referenced. 
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Security Enforcer A security enforcer can enforce environmental policies. Hides dint 
are enforced using this mechanism can reference variables defined ill the security 
enforcer, as well as the control variables done(x, y, z) and Failed(x, y, z) for the objects 
under its protection. Parameters of the interfaces can also be referenced. 
These constraints arc not a limitation of the policy language itself. Policies crºu violate 
these restrictions. However, it is beneficial to he aware of the limitations oft he enforcement 
niechaciisins when writing the policy to ensure that it is enforceable. 
Premise of Policy Rules 
The premise of it rule allows the expression of it, set of' behavioln's, that when observed 
trigger (or fire) the rule. The syntax of the promise is restricted to ensure t hat t he mules 
are inºpletnentable. Due to the expressiveness of the model care needs to be taken to 
ensure that the premise does capture the rcctuirement correctly and clues not define it too 
large (or too narrow) set of behaviours that trigger the rule. Figure 7.1 depicts inlitrntally 
the relation between the set of behaviours expressed in the premise and t be consequence. 
I 
Figure 7.1: Informal Interpretation of a Policy lulle 
Asslnne the policy containing the rule started to he enforced in state (7, '). Given t lilt 
the premise of a rule is represented by the formula f and the conseyrteuce of t he rifle i. 
evaluated in the state cr;, then the consequence is true if the behaviour described by f 
is satisfied by at least one of the intervals depicted in Figure 7.1. For (Xaniple the rule 
consequence when x=0 would mean that 
if x has been Zero ill state (7(t), of (T. ") t I>('tl 
the consequence would be true in state o, 51. 
The expressiveness of the polic'. y model is both a boon and it bane. The henetits 
are that many complex requirements can be captured ill a concise and short turns. The 
disadvantage is that some requirements, that are straightforward to express in of her policy 
models, require more thought. This' is especially the case When rule s depend ou t he past 
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behaviour of the system. The following illustrates the syntax that can be used to specify 
premises of policy rules that are state or history-dependent. 
Constraining the length of the behaviour Often rules are state-dependent, this 
means that f does not actually express a behaviour, but rather a predicate on the current 
state of the system. For example to express that the rule should only fire if x is now (in 
state a) equal to zero then the length of the formula f must be explicitly restricted by 
writing: 
consequence when 0: x=0 
It is also possible to specify a list to restrict the length of the behaviour, for example the 
rule: 
consequence when [0.. 21 : x=0 
would fire if x=0 holds in a, 04 or a3, viz. on an interval of length 0,1 or 2 in the past. 
The concrete meaning of 2 states in the past depends on the concrete enforcement mech- 
anism that is chosen for the enforcement of the policy. For the enforcement mechanisms 
described in this work the transition from one policy state to the next means that the 
enforcement mechanisms solicited (granted or denied) exactly one access. The different 
abstraction level of the policy and the computational model and their mapping is key to 
the refinement of policies into enforcement code. The mapping is formally specified in 
Section 8.5.2. 
This can be combined using other operators in the syntax of the premise. For example: 
consequence when (true ; ([0.. 2] : x=0)) and (3: x>0) 
would express that in one of the last three states x was zero and in state o the value of x 
was positive. 
Given this form of constraining the time over which the premise of the rule should 
be evaluated, it is obvious that some requirements cannot be expressed. One example 
is the requirement that "the rule should fire if x was true when the policy started to be 
enforced. " This type of requirement demands knowledge of the history with respect to to 
the enforcement. In SANTA the special keyword T has been introduced, that represents 
a local clock that is started with the enforcement of each policy rule. T references the 
enforcement time of the rule. This allows to express the above requirement as: 
consequence when T: x=0 
158 
7.2. POLICIES IN SANTA 
Another type of requirement where the enforcement time T is required is typically the 
informal meaning of "the rule should fire if x was zero 3 states in the past". Of course this 
can be readily expressed as: 
consequence when 3: x=0 
This would restrict the interval to length 3. The problem with this solution manifests 
itself in the beginning of the enforcement. Assume that the rule is to be enforced in state 
o. In this case there are only two intervals that can be checked whether they satisfy 
the premise: the unit interval a ii and the empty interval oi. None of them can satisfy 
the requirement that the length of the interval is 3. Often these types of requirements 
imply that if there is not enough history available then the requirement should hold for 
the available history. This lenient interpretation of the example can be expressed as: 
consequence when [T.. 3] : x=0 
consequence when 3: x=0 
This means that in the initial state the premise is evaluated over any interval spanning 
from length zero to length 3, in the second state of the enforcement over any of the intervals 
spanning from length 1 to length 3 until finally from the fourth state onwards only the 
past intervals of length 3 are considered'. 
The use of the construct [O.. T] is discouraged, as is the omission of the length specifi- 
cation (it is easy to see that x=0 in the premise is the same as [O.. T] x= 0). Whilst in 
principle computable, the evaluation of the rule is increasingly costly the longer the policy 
rule has been enforced. 
Sequence It is possible to use the sequential composition in the premise of rules: 
consequence when 1: x=2 ; 1: x=1 ; 0: x=0 
This rule fires if x is now zero, in the previous state it was one and in the state before x 
had the value two. This is similar to writing : 
consequence when 2: x=2 and (true ; 1: x=1) and (true ;0: x=0) 
but provides a more convenient form to express the sequence, especially if time ranges are 
specified within a sequence. 
Temporal Modalities Often the modalities always or sometime are used informally in 
requirements. These can be directly expressed in SANTA. Their scope is restricted by the 
length of the interval specification that contains the modality. For example writing: 
'The list production [i.. j] results in a list of integers k such that j<k<j. It produces the empty 
list, if i>j 
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consequence when 2: sometime x=0 
Denotes within the past interval length two there is some suffix interval that satisfies 
x=0. In other words it means that: 
consequence when 2: (x=0 or (1: true ; x=0) or (2: true ; x=0)) 
The global length specification is important, to limit the interpretation of the behaviour 
to the past interval of length 2. The case for always is similar, however all suffix intervals 
must satisfy x=0, which is equivalent to replacing the or in the above rule with an and. 
The informal meaning of the conditional choice is self explanatory. The existential and 
universal quantification can be used to quantify over lists, e. g. the list subjects, objects and 
actions that can be used to access the policy scope. 
Consequence of Policy Rules 
Authorisation, Delegation, Obligation and Integrity rules are distinguished syntactically 
by their consequence. Table 7.1 provides an overview of the available consequences: 
Authorisation (see Section 7.2.2) 
allow (x, y, z) 
deny (x, y, z) 
decide (x, y, z) 
positive authorisation 
negative authorisation 
decision rule 
Delegation (see Section 7.2.3) 
allow (x, y, de1eg(xl, x2, yl, zl)) 
deny (x, y, deleg(xl, x2, yi, zl)) 
positive delegation 
negative delegation 
Obligation (see Section 7.2.4) 
oblige (x, x, z) obligation 
Integrity (see Section 7.2.5) 
integrity (x, y, z) integrity 
Table 7.1: Consequences in Policy Rules 
7.2.2 Authorisation Rules 
Authorisation rules express access control requirements. Three different types of rules are 
concerned with authorisation: positive authorisation, negative authorisation and decision 
rules. 
Positive Authorisation Positive authorisation rules are statements that indicate under 
which condition an access request should be granted. It is important to note that it is 
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only an indication, which is taken into account for the final access decision of the policy. 
Listing 7.2 provides some examples of positive authorisation rules. 
Listing 7.2: Example Positive Authorisation Rules 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
allow (S, 0, A) when true 
allow (S, passwd, write) when 0: group(S, admin) 
allow (S, 0, A) when T: 
exists y in objects : exists z in actions 
( (dataset(O) = dataset(y)) and 
(sometime done(S, y, z)) )) 
The first rule states an unconditional positive authorisation for all subjects, objects 
and actions in the scope of the containing policy. This is an example of an activity based 
authorisation rule. 
The second rule states the positive authorisation for any subject in the policy scope 
that is a member of the group admin. Here the predicate group(subject, group) denotes the 
group membership test. This relation is maintained by the system and must be accessible 
to the mechanisms that enforce the policy. The preceding 0: denotes that this condition 
must be fulfilled at the time of the access control check. This is an example of a state-based 
authorisation rule. 
The third rule states a positive authorisation from the Chinese Wall policy [35]: 
Once a subject [denoted by S] has accessed [denoted by z] an object [denoted by 
y], the only other objects [denoted by 0] accessible by that subject are within 
the same company data-set [denoted by dataset] ... 
The preceding T: denotes that the length of the subsequent behaviour is the time since the 
rule started being enforced. The rule is actually more precise, as it explicitly specifies that 
O and y must have been in the same data-set at the time the rule started being enforced. 
The sometime done(S, y, z) denotes that at some point in time since the enforcement of the 
rule the subject S successfully performed an action z on an object y in the same data-set. 
This rule is an example of a history-based authorisation rule. 
Negative Authorisation Negative authorisation rules are statements that indicate un- 
der which condition an access request should be denied. Similarly to positive authorisa- 
tions, they are only an indication, which is taken into account for the final access decision 
of the policy. Listing 7.3 shows examples of negative authorisation rules. 
Listing 7.3: Example Negative Authorisation Rules 
i 
2 
deny (S, passed, write) when 0: group(S, user) 
deny (S, O, read) when 0: (level(O) > clearance(S)) 
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The first rule denies all subjects in the group user to write to the object passwd. The 
second rule is the no read up rule from the Bell-LaPadula policy [86]. It states that no 
subject with a clearance level (denoted by clearance(S)) that is lower than the security 
level of the object (denoted by level(O)) is allowed to read information. 
Decision Rules and Conflict Resolution Decision rules specify the final access con- 
trol decision of a policy. Any policy should contain at least one decision rule, as otherwise 
no access will be granted by the policy. The alternative term "conflict resolution rule" 
originates from the fact that this rule de-conflicts the policy if a positive and negative 
authorisation is derived for a specific access. The term decision rule describes more accu- 
rately the fact that any access control decision is defined by the policy is decided by one 
or more of these rules - not only decisions in the conflicting case. Listing 7.4 provides 
three widely used decision rules. 
Listing 7.4: Example Decision Rules 
1 
2 
3 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: allow(S, O, A) 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: not deny(S, O, A) 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: also w(S, O, A) and not deny(S, O, A) 
The first rule states that access is granted if a positive authorisation can be derived 
from the policy. This rule is used in closed policies, where any access is denied, unless 
it is explicitly allowed. The rule ignores all negative authorisation rules, viz. negative 
authorisation rules in a policy with this decision rule are not having any effect on the 
policy decision and should be omitted. 
The second rule states that access is granted if no negative authorisation can be derived 
from the policy. This rule is used in open policies, where any access is allowed, unless it 
is explicitly denied. Blacklists are typical examples of open policies. The rule ignores all 
positive authorisations, viz. positive authorisation rules in a policy with this decision rule 
are not having any effect. 
The last rule in Listing 7.4 states a rule that is used in hybrid policies. Hybrid policies 
are taking into account both, positive and negative authorisation. Hybrid policies are 
suitable to express more complex access control requirements. The difficulty with hybrid 
policies is that conflicts can occur, in the sense that a subject is at the same time allowed 
and denied to access a resource. In this cases the decision rule does also resolve the conflict. 
The rule in the example states that access is only granted if explicitly allowed and not 
explicitly denied in the policy. It therefore gives precedence to denials. 
It is allowed to have more than one decision rule in the policy. However, it is important 
to note that it is sufficient to have one decision rule firing for the access to be granted. 
Like other rules, the decision rules can also contain state and history-dependent premises. 
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7.2.3 Delegation Rules 
Delegation in this work means the delegation of rights, only. Delegation of duties is 
not considered. Delegation rules define which subject is allowed to delegate which rights 
to which other subjects. The delegating subject is referred to as the delegator (or also 
grantor) and the target subject of the delegation as the delegatee. The delegated right 
here denotes the right to execute an action on an object. 
Delegation rules are modelled as specialised authorisation rules, where the controlled 
actions are delegate and revoke. The object of the delegation action is dependent on the 
concrete implementation of the delegation mechanism. In this work the target object 
is required to be the same system entity that implements the enforcement mechanism 
that controls the access to the object. This means either the object, in case of vigilant 
enforcement or the security enforcer that is controlling the access. 
In general the only assumption is that all enforcement mechanisms that control the 
access to the object for which the right has been delegated can determine whether the 
right has been delegated or not. This can be implemented by simply requiring the object 
of the delegation to be the enforcement mechanism itself. Alternatively a trusted third 
party authority could be the object for the delegation action, if a certificate based imple- 
mentation for delegation is used. This work constrains itself to the first, simpler version, 
although undoubtedly certificate-based models have the advantage of better scalability in 
open environments. 
Listing 7.5: Delegation and Revocation 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
/* Check if currently delegated */ 
def deleg(g, d, y, z) : [g, d, y, z] in delegations end 
/* Interfaces for delegation */ 
delegate(in g, in d, in y, in z) { 
var set. - false :{ 
for i< Idelegationsl :{ 
if (delegations[i] _ [] and not set) then { 
delegations[i]i- [g, d, y, z]; 
set .- true 
} 
I; 
if (not set) then { 
delegations. - delegations + [g, d, y, z] 
} 
} 
} 
revoke(in g, in d, 
in y, in z) :{ 
for i< Idelegationsl :{ 
if (delegations[i] _ [g, d, y, z]) then 
delegations[i] :_ [] 
} 
} 
163 
CHAPTER 7. POLICIES 
The effect of a successful delegation is denoted by the predicate deleg(g, d, y, z) with the 
meaning that the delegator g has delegated the right to perform action z on object y to 
the delegatee d, viz. deleg(g, d, y, z) is true if the right has been delegated. A successful 
revocation means that the predicate deleg(g, d, y, z) is false from thereon. This is formally 
described by the following two SANTA interfaces that every vigilant object and security 
enforcer implements. The enforcement mechanism must maintain local data structures 
to keep track of the current delegations. The listing above assumes that delegations are 
stored in a list delegations that contains the delegation quadruples. Listing 7.6 provides 
small examples of delegation rules. 
Listing 7.6: Example Delegation Rules 
1 
2 
3 
allow (S, O, delegate(g, d, y, z)) when 0: S=g 
allow (S, O, revoke(g, d, y, z)) when S=g and sometime done(d, y, z) 
allow (S, O, revoke(g, d, y, z) when 0: group(S, admin) 
The first rule states that any subject S is allowed to delegate any right from itself to any 
other subject d. The target 0 of the delegation is in this case not explicitly specified, but 
could for example be the object y. This would mean that the delegator notifies the object's 
vigilant enforcement mechanism directly of the delegation. The second rule states that 
the delegator of a right is only allowed to revoke the right it delegated if the delegatee has 
at some point in time successfully exercised this right. The third rule shows an example 
where a subject S can revoke rights that have been delegated to other subjects d if S is a 
member of the group admix at the time of the check. 
Effect of delegations 
Access rights are delegated with the intention to affect access control decisions. Delegation 
rules, however, do only define who can delegate which right to whom. The effect that 
delegation has on authorisation is modelled as authorisation rules, that depend on the 
delegation predicate deleg(g, d, y, z). Listing 7.7 shows several examples of how a delegation 
can affect authorisation decisions. 
Listing 7.7: Effects of delegations 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
allow (S, O, A) when 0: 
( exists g in subjects : deleg(g, S, O, A) ) 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: 
( exists g in subjects : deleg(g, S, O, A) and 
not deny(g, O, A) ) 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: 
( exists g in subjects : deleg(g, S, O, A) and 
not deny(g, O, A) and not deny(g, O, A) ) 
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The first rule states that a positive authorisation can be derived for any subject S from 
the fact that a subject g delegated the right to it. This does not necessarily ensure that 
g does hold the right itself. Additionally the authorisation decision is also dependent on 
the decision rule in the policy. 
The second rule is a decision rule that explicitly grants the access in case the right has 
been delegated to subject S and S is not explicitly denied to exercise this right. Similarly 
to the first rule this rule does not take into account the authorisation of the delegator at 
the time of the access. 
The third rule is very similar to the second, but includes am additional check whether 
the delegator is currently permitted to exercise the delegated right himself. 
These examples show the diversity of different notions of what it actually means to 
delegate a right. The fact that the effect of a delegation on the access control decision is 
made explicit is highly beneficial, as there is no definite agreement in the community of 
what a delegation actually means and how the access control decisions of the system are 
affected by it. 
7.2.4 Obligation Rules 
Obligation rules state under which condition a subject must perform a specific action. 
Given the autonomy of agents in the model, obligations cannot be enforced externally, 
viz. an agent that is engaged in some computation cannot be interrupted to comply with 
its obligations. Consequently obligations can only be enforced if they are defined as 
behavioural policy rules. Using the bank example, that was used to motivate behavioural 
policies, the owner of an agent could define the obligation to notify the owner whenever it 
withdrew money from the bank account. This would be expressed by the rule in Listing 7.8: 
Listing 7.8: Example Obligation Rule 
I oblige (S, S, notify) when 0: 
done(S, S, withdraw) 
This assumes that the agent, does define the actions withdraw and notify. Obligations 
were the main motivation to introduce priorities in the action selection process of an agent. 
The intuition is that an obligation in a behavioural policy can overrule the decision made 
by the agent in its deliberation phase. The owner of the agent can therefore force the 
agent to the execution of an action using obligations. 
However, even if the agent is obliged 
to perform a specific action it is not necessary the case that it does execute the action. 
The following list describes the cases where the action is not executed: 
1. synchronisation requirements with other system entities (for example in the case of 
remote actions) prohibit the execution. 
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2. the obligation does conflict with the authorisation, viz. the obliged action is not 
permitted. 
3. the obligation conflicts with the action's precondition, viz. the obliged action cannot 
execute. 
4. the obligation does conflict with another obligation. The agent has two different 
obligations simultaneously. In this case the choice between the obliged actions is 
non-deterministic2. 
7.2.5 Integrity Rules 
Integrity rules in policies provide a far more flexible way to define assertions on the correct 
execution of the system. Traditionally assertions are checks whether the state of the system 
satisfies a specific constraint, typically expressed as a boolean expression. If the constraint 
is satisfied the execution commences, otherwise the system stops. Other forms of integrity 
checks are less rigid and indicate the failure through error messages and log entries. 
Most integrity checks that can be expressed in other languages are not able to dis- 
tinguish between the users that are actually executing the action. In SANTA integrity 
constraints can differentiate between users. For example: In a system, where integrity 
constraints define the maximum allowed deviation of the results from experienced values, 
there may be different threshold for different users. Systems that use statistical methods 
typically need to be calibrated by a dedicated system maintainer. During the calibration 
some of the results deviate more than would be deemed acceptable during normal oper- 
ation. In this case there should be different integrity constraints for a system maintainer 
than for a normal user. 
Another advantage of SANTA integrity constraints is that rules allow not only to access 
the current state of the system, but also the history. This means that an integrity rule 
could state that the results from the action execution are in a specific relation to results 
that have been previously computed. A good example is the computation of Fibonacci 
numbers. Listing 7.9 shows the definition of a SANTA object that computes Fibonacci 
numbers. 
The variable x is initialised to a list containing the first two Fibonacci numbers. The 
interface getout n) can be invoked by agents to obtain the next number in this sequence. 
'It is in principle possible to deconflict obligations along the line of the conflict resolution between 
positive and negative authorisations. However, as the number of potential obligations is determined by 
the number of actions the agent does encapsulate, the conflict resolution rules will be more complex. It is 
advisable to check the policy for conflicting obligations by analysing whether the premises of two different 
obligations can be satisfied simultaneously. It is also of interest to show that the obligation is authorised, 
by checking against the premise of the decision rules. 
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The statement in the interface definition states that the return value is the first element 
of the list. 
Listing 7.9: Example Integrity Rule 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
object fibo : 
/* Fibonacci sequence */ 
var x= [0 , 11 
/* Returns the Fibonacci sequence */ 
get(out n) { 
n, x[0] , x[1] "- x[0] , x[1] , x[01+x[1] 
} 
end 
It also shifts the Fibonacci number stored in the second list element to the first position 
and computes the next number in the sequence. To use this example to check the integrity 
of the object fibo a random error is introduced in the statement, by rewriting line 7 in 
Listing 7.9 as: 
7 
8 
n, x[O] , x[1]. - x[0] , x[1] , 
if (random(1)=1) then x[0]+x[1] 
else x[1]-x[O] 
Of course we assume that in a real-world application, the faults are not introduced on 
purpose and are a result of mistakes that are made by the programmer. An integrity policy 
can be used to check whether the computation satisfies certain constraints. Typically the 
constraints that are expressed are simpler than the actual computation itself and represent 
only some of the necessary constraints. For the computation of Fibonacci numbers this 
could be for example that it is a monotonic increasing function. Listing 7.10 shows an 
integrity policy that captures just this: 
Listing 7.10: Example Integrity Rule 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
policy vo_fibo : 
( 
integrity (S, fibo, get) when 0: ( x'[0] >= x[0] and x'[1] >= x[1] ) 
end 
The prime notation is used to reference the new value of the variable. The above states 
that the new value of each list element must be greater or equal to its previous value. This 
is a policy that references the internal state of the object, which limits the mechanisms 
that can be used for its enforcement to the vigilant object mechanism. 
The effect of enforcing this policy would be that any computation that would try to 
assign a list element to a value that 
is less than its previous value would fail. As a result 
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of the failure, the list values would effectively remain unchanged. In the example above 
it would mean that every time the else branch of the conditional expression is chosen, 
the action would fail. The exception to this is if the else branch is chosen for the first 
execution of get. In this case the new value for x[11 would be assigned to 1 (1 - 0), which 
is incidently the correct number in the sequence. 
Of course the integrity rule could be specified more accurately to amount to the exact 
specification of the interface. More interesting is the case where the integrity policy is 
defined solely in terms of the object's interface, viz. not requiring any knowledge of the 
internal state of the object. This kind of policies can be enforced by security enforcer 
mechanisms, viz. externally. Listing 7.11 shows an example of an integrity policy that 
accurately defines the constraints for the Fibonacci sequence. 
Listing 7.11: Example Integrity Rule 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
policy se_fibo (any, [fibo], [get]) 
integrity (S, fibo, get(n)) when T: 
always (forall s in subjects : (not done(s, fibo, get))) 
and n=0 
integrity (S, fibo, get(n)) when T: 
(keep (forall s in subjects: (not done(s, fibo, get)))); 
(1: done(S, O, get)) ; 
(keep (forall s in subjects: (not done(s, fibo, get)))) 
and n=1 
integrity (S, O, get(n)) when 
( 1: done(S, O, get(n0)) ; 
(keep (forall s in subjects: (not done(s, fibo, get)))) 
1: done(S, O, get(nl)) ; 
(keep (forall s in subjects: (not done(s, fibo, get)))) 
and n= n0+n1 
end 
The specification contains three different rules that apply to three special cases in the 
execution. The first rule states that if the interface get has never been invoked before, 
then the returned value must be equal to zero. More accurately the rule reads that if over 
the past T states (viz. since the policy is enforced) it has always been the case that no 
subject successfully executed the interface get then the return value must equal zero. This 
is depicted in Figure 7.2. 
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integrity(S, fibo, get(n)) 
Figure 7.2: 1. Integrity Rule: No previous access to get 
6 
The second rule states that if the interface get has been invoked exactly once before, 
the returned value must be equal to one. More accurately it means that the interval 
describing the behaviour since the policy enforcement started, can be decomposed into 
two intervals in such a way that the interface get has only been successfully executed in 
the shared state. This is depicted in Figure 7.3. 
integrity (S, fibo, get (n) ) 
n=1 
Figure 7.3: 2. Integrity Rule: One previous access to get 
The last rule then states that whenever get has been invoked successfully at least two 
times before, then the result of the current invocation must be the sum the results of the 
two previous invocations. Note that this rule checks all possible past time intervals. This 
is depicted in Figure 7.4. 
integrity(S, fibo, get (n) ) 
0 C6' 
Figure 7.4: 3. Integrity Rule: Two or more previous accesses to get 
This example shows how integrity policies can be specified on the interface level even if 
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the constraints are dependent on the past behaviour of the system. A potential application 
is the verification of interactions with stateful services, to ensure that the service meets 
constraints that are defined in terms of the integrity policy. In this case we assume that 
the service instance can be represented by an object. 
7.2.6 Simple Policies 
Simple policies represent a collection of policy rules that all apply simultaneously. In the 
SANTA language this is currently represented by grouping a set of rules using parenthesis. 
Siewe showed in [124] that set theoretic operators can be used to compose simple policies. 
He also defined some operators to filter rules based on their type (e. g. positive authori- 
sation, negative authorisation rules). These operators for the set theoretic composition 
of simple policies are currently not included in the SANTA syntax, but can be included 
without much difficulty. 
7.3 Semantics of Policy Rules and Simple Policies 
The semantics of policies defines the possible behaviour of boolean ITL state variables, 
that capture access control decisions, the outcome of integrity checks and the current 
obligations. 
7.3.1 Control Variables 
The consequences of policy rules are captured by the boolean state variables. For each 
type of rule a specific variable, that is subscripted with a subject, object and action, is 
introduced. Policies define the behaviour of these variables. 
Access control Access control decisions are captured by the boolean state variables: 
" autho+(s, o, a) = true, denotes the positive authorisation of subject s to perform 
action a on object o. 
" autho-(s, o, a) = true, denotes the negative authorisation of subject s to perform 
action a on object o. 
" autho(s, o, a) = true, denotes the authorisation decision for subject s to perform 
action a on object o. This decision is enforced by the enforcement mechanisms. If 
the value is true then the corresponding access request succeeds. If the value is false 
it fails. 
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For environmental policies, viz. policies controlling the access to interfaces of SANTA 
objects by SANTA agents, the set of all variables capturing access control is: 
Vautho, 
env -UUU 
lautho+(s, o, a), autho 
(s, o, a), autho(s, o, a)} 
sEAoEO aElo 
where A is the set of agents in the SMAS, 0 is the set of objects in the SMAS, and Io is 
the set of interfaces of the object o. For behavioural policies, viz. policies controlling the 
sequence of actions an agent can execute, the set is: 
Vautho, beh =UU {autho+(s, s, a), autho (s, s, a), autho(s, s, a)} 
sEA aEX. 
where A is the set of agents in the SMAS and X8 the set of actions that are encapsulated 
in the agent a. The set of all access control related control variables is the union of these 
two. 
Vautho = Vautho, env U 
Vautho, 6eh 
Obligation Obligations are captured by the boolean state variables oblig(s, o, a). The 
value true denotes the obligation of subject s to perform the action a on object o. The 
policy model can capture obligations in form of environmental and behavioural policies. 
Voblig, 
env =UUU 
{oblig(s, o, a)} 
sEA oEO aElo 
For behavioural policies, viz. policies controlling the sequence of actions an agent can 
execute, the set is: 
Voblig, beh =UU {oblig(s, s, a)} 
sEAaEX, 
The set of all control variables related to obligation is the union of these two. 
Vo6lig = Vo6lig, env U 
Voblig, beh 
Although obligations can be expressed in environmental policies, SANTA does currently 
not provide enforcement mechanisms that can enforce them. This means that an obligation 
of an agent to perform an action can 
be enforced, but an obligation of an agent to invoke a 
specific object interface not. 
The reason for this is that an agent can only execute actions 
it encapsulates. The definition of an obligation in form of an environmental policy would 
require the definition of an action 
by the policy. The enforcement mechanisms would in 
this case be required to execute the action as it is defined by the policy. This is principally 
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possible, but leads to concerns whenever the policy is updated, as a policy would then 
be able to introduce new actions in the system. In this case the policy would represent 
a special form of mobile code. The impact of such policies on the security of the system 
would require further investigation that is not within the scope of this work. 
Integrity Integrity decisions are captured by the boolean state variable integ(s, o, a). 
The value true denotes that the execution of a on o by s satisfies the integrity constraints. 
For environmental policies the set is: 
Vinteg, 
env =UUU linteg(s, o, a)} 
aEAoEO aElo 
For behavioural policies, viz. policies controlling the sequence of actions an agent can 
execute, the set is: 
Vinteg, beh =UU {integ(s, s, a)} 
sE. A aEX8 
The set of all control variables related to integrity is the union of these two. 
Vinteg = Vinteg, env U Vinteg, beh 
7.3.2 Policy Scope and Free Variables 
In the policy specification the set variables Subj, Obj and Act are free variables that 
denote the set of subjects, set of objects and the set of actions in the scope of the policy. 
They are free in the policy specification and are bound in the semantics of the SMAS3 (see 
Chapter 8). These free set variables can be referenced in the syntax of the policy using 
the keywords subjects, objects and actions. 
[subjects] = Subj [objects] 2 Obi Qactions] = Act 
Similarly the variables s, o and a are free variables in the specification of policy rules. 
They denote any subject, object or action within the policy scope. They are bound by 
the semantics of a simple policy (see Section 7.3.4). They can be referenced in the syntax 
of rules using the keywords S, 0 and A. 
Qsý =S Qo] -o QAý =a 
The following example illustrates: 
allow (S, file, read) when S= bob or S= alice 
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Assume that the free set variables are bound by the system semantics as follows: 
Subj = {bob, alice, eve} Obj = {file} Act = {read, write} 
then the semantics of the rule would bind the variable s as follows: 
VsESubj [allow (S, file, read) when S=bob or S=slice] 
where in the SANTA syntax s is represented by the keyword S. This means that the rule 
that references the free variable S is instantiated to mean the conjunction of: 
[allow (bob, file, read) when bob=bob or bob=alice]] A 
[allow (alice, file, read) when alice=bob or alice=alice]J A 
[allow (eve, file, read) when eve=bob or eve=alice]j 
The use of the free variables has the advantage that it defines rules more abstract and 
allows different instantiations of the same rule, dependent on the binding of the variables 
in the simple policy. It also provides a way to express requirements that apply to several 
individuals more compactly - especially if the premise is more complicated than in the 
above example. 
7.3.3 Rules 
Policy rules define the behaviour of the access control, obligation and integrity control 
variables. The semantic of a rule is captured by the operator always followed by that has 
been introduced by Siewe in [124]. The operator captures the dependency of the policy 
decision on the preceding behaviour as follows: 
fHw =0 ((Of) D fin (w)) (7.1) 
The intuition of the operator is that whenever f holds in the left neighbourhood of a 
state it implies that the state formula w holds in that state. This is depicted in Figure 7.5. 
f 
",... , ",... , Qp Ql 2 Q3 
ýw ýw --lw w 
0, 
a4 
to 
Figure 7.5: Operator Always-Followed-By 
I 
w 
0, 
as 
ýw 
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The implication Of D fin to means that to can be true in a state even if f does not 
hold in the left neighbourhood of that state. In Figure 7.5 this is the case for the state Q4. 
This is addressed by transforming the policy into a complete policy, that defines the access 
decision in every state. This is important for the enforcement of policies and discussed in 
detail in Chapter 8. 
Premise 
The syntax that is used in the premise is actually an ASCII representation of a subset of 
ITL formulae. The semantics of the constructs is straight forward. 
If ; g] [fI ; [g] 
[fandg][fI A [g] 
if or g] = [fI v [g] 
[sometime fD = o[fI 
[always 
f1 = O[f] 
[keep 
fI 
= keep [fI 
[if expr then f else g] = (expr n [f1) v (-, expr n [g11) 
[exists i<expr: f13i"i> 0A i<exprn[f] 
[expr : fI = Ien(expr) A [f] 
[list : f] = [exists e in list : (e: f)] 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
(7.4) 
(7.5) 
(7.6) 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
(7.9) 
(7.10) 
(7.11) 
The existential and universal quantification over lists (viz. exists e in expr : f) is an ab- 
breviation that allows to directly reference the list elements. Its semantics can be easily 
expressed in terms of the bounded quantification. 
Basic Rule Definitions 
The consequence of a rule determines the type of the rule and the subjects, objects and 
actions the rule applies to. The operator always-followed-by is used to capture the relation 
between the premise of a rule and its consequence. The basic definition of the SANTA 
rule constructs is then as follows: 
[allow (S, O, A)when premise] = [premise] i-+ autho+(s, o, a) (7.12) 
174 
7.3. SEMANTICS OF POLICY RULES AND SIMPLE POLICIES 
where S, 0 and A, denote the free variables s, o and a in the rule. These can also occur in 
the premise. Instead of the free variables, identifiers of subjects, objects and actions can 
be used as constants. This represents an instantiation of the variables (e. g. s= const). 
The definition for the other types of rules is similar: 
[deny (S, O, A)when premise] = [premise] i-º autho-(s, o, a) (7.13) 
[decide (S, O, A)when premise] = [premise] F-º autho(s, o, a) (7.14) 
[oblige (S, O, A)when premise] = [premise] i--º oblig(s, o, a) (7.15) 
[integrity (S, O, A)when premise] = [premise] ; skip i-4 integ(s, o, a) (7.16) 
For example the semantics of the policy rule: 
allow (S, file, read) when owner(S, file) 
is then 
owner(s, file) H autho+(s, file, read) 
where s is a free variable and we assume that the predicate owner is defined by the policy 
or the enforcement mechanism. 
The definitions all rules follows the same pattern, except for integrity policies. Here 
the skip in the semantics of the rule guarantees that the premise as it is defined in the rule 
does not reference the state in which the decision is made. This is necessary, because the 
enforcement of integrity rules states that a rule may only have succeeded in a state if its 
integrity constraints are met. The dependency of the successful execution on the integrity 
prohibits that the integrity depends itself on the successful execution in the same state, as 
this could otherwise lead to an infinite recursive definition of an integrity rule that would 
not be enforceable. 
In the following the definitions of authorisation (Equations (7.12), (7.13) (7.14)) and 
integrity rules (Equation (7.16)) are augmented to allow for the referencing of parameters, 
temporary results and the enforcement time in their premise. Obligation rules are currently 
only allowed in behavioural policies and can therefore not contain references to parameters 
(SANTA actions are not parametrised). 
Referencing Results in Integrity Rules 
Integrity rules can reference temporary results of an action/interface execution, using 
the prime notation. The primed variables have the same values that the agent/object 
variables would be assigned 
if the action/interface execution succeeded. This allows to 
write assertions on the action/interface execution to 
determine the success or failure of 
the action/interface based on the results. 
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Auxiliary Variables The temporary results have been modelled in Chapters 5 and 6 
using local variables. The scope of these variables is limited to the execution of the ac- 
tion/interface and cannot be observed otherwise. For the enforcement of policies this is 
without consequence, as the refinement of policies to concrete enforcement mechanisms 
affects only those parts of the system that are within the scope of the local variable def- 
inition (see Chapter 9). However, for the abstract specification of policies the problem 
of accessibility persists. The following shows how local variables that capture the tempo- 
rary results of the computation can be replaced by dedicated auxiliary variables at the 
agent/object level. 
The set of local variables that are created during execution of an action/interface is 
determined by the parameters (for interfaces) and the set of agent/object variables that 
are modified by the action/interface. For example in the following agent specification: 
2 
3 
4 
agent ag : 
var x=0 
when true do computex :{ /* some computation on x 
deliberation : external 
end 
*/ } 
The execution of the action computex creates exactly one local variable x' to store 
the temporary result of the agent variable x. Instead of using the local variable, the 
set of object variables is augmented with the auxiliary variable computex. x. The naming 
convention for these auxiliary variables is to precede the agent/object variable with the 
respective action/interface name. 
The auxiliary variable computex. x can be used instead of the local variable x' in the 
execution of the action because the semantics of the SMAS guarantees that the execution 
of an agent's actions/object's interfaces are mutually exclusive, viz. there is no concurrent 
modification. 
Another concern is the validity of the values of the auxiliary variables, i. e. that they are 
only accessible in the right context. The auxiliary variables for a specific action/interface 
are initialised at the beginning of the action/interface execution. The actual computation 
is then performed on the auxiliary variables. If the action/interface execution succeeds, 
the values of the auxiliary variables are copied to the corresponding agent/object variables 
(successful execution) or left unchanged (failed execution). The values of the auxiliary vari- 
ables are maintained until the next execution of the same action/interface. This means 
that the auxiliary variables always contain the result of the last execution of the action/in- 
terface. In particular, when an integrity decision has to be made for an action/interface, 
the auxiliary variables contain the results of the computation of that action/interface and 
the decision on the success of failure can be based on their values. This ensures that the 
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values in the auxiliary variables contain updated values at, the tiuic the check is ncade. 
In the following it is assumed that for every agent/object variable, that is nxodified l, v 
the action/interface execution, an auxiliary variable with t he since moue as the argent /ob- 
ject variable, preceded by the name of the action/interface is introduced as it tiubstit lit iou 
of the local variables that have been introduced in Chapters 5 and (i. 
Augmented Semantics of Integrity Rules '1'lºc tieºua. nticS c, f iute}; rit; v rnlc ; ti is aut; - 
ººxcutecl to defiºue the iiieaººiººg, c>f the f>riºººecl variables rº, v fiºllc>wti: 
1 integrity (S, O, A)when premise] 
(17' " (v' = fin z. i) n (Qpremise] ; skip)) i-s integ(.,, o, a) 
(7.17) 
Again S, 0 and A denote the free variables s, o and cc in the riºIe. Ilcre r' is cº list of locººI 
static variables. Each variable v' E r' represents the vudne of the corresponding , ºuxiliary 
variable x. v in the final state of the interval over which the rule is (valuate(]. This means ill 
the saine state in which the action succeeded or failed. Any primed ººgeut/object varinlºIe 
references the corresponding local static variable n' of the rile. The füll()wing simple 
example illustrates: 
integrity (ag, ag, computex) when 0: x' >x -ý 
'1'1ºe rule asserts, that the new value that has been computed for x (represented by . r') 
is greater than the value of x before the execution started. A part, of the behaviour d('fiuº' I 
by the action computex and the above integrity rule are depicted in Figure 7.6 below. 
Ocornputex 
Ill 
3 x' = fin computex. x 
Figure 7.6: Primed Variables in Integrity Miles 
The action computex defines the behaviour of the agent over the interval (7A ... C!,. The 
auxiliary variable computex. x is initialised to the agent variable x in state aý. ' . 
The resiilt 
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of the action execution is available in the auxiliary variable after n steps. From thereon 
the auxiliary variable remains stable until the execution of the next action in state ak2. 
In state aki+n the agent will either succeed in the execution or fail. 
The definition of the policy is more abstract than the definition of the system. For 
a vigilant agent the states that are selected for the policy interpretation (016 and a, ) are 
those where the agent is ready3. In Figure 7.6 these are the states akl and ak2 (highlighted 
in red). The semantics of the above rule over the interval a' = aöai is: 
(lx' " (x' = fin computex. x) A ((x' >xn len = 0) ; skip)) ý-º integ(ag, ag, computex) 
This states that there is a local static variable x' that has the same value over the in- 
terval a ai as the auxiliary variable computex. x has in state oi. The rule defines that 
integ(ag, ag, computex) is true in state al if the value of x' is greater than the value of x in 
state ao. 
Informally the enforcement of an integrity rule means that an action must not succeed 
if its integrity constraints are not met. Given that the value of the auxiliary variable 
computex. x does not change in the interval aki+n ... ak2 the value of x' can 
be determined 
earlier, i. e. in state aki+n. By refining the non-deterministic choice between the action 
success and failure into a conditional choice that depends on the constraints defined in the 
integrity rule, the integrity rule can be enforced to guarantee the action does not succeed 
if the constraint is not met. 
From the viewpoint of the premise, the primed variables are prophecy variables. This 
means they reference the result of the computation (only available in the final state of the 
interval) at an earlier point in time. However, from the viewpoint of the rule the primed 
variable represents the variable at the time the integrity check takes place and occurrences 
of the variable x in the premise the value of the variable at some point in the past. 
The prime notation to reference the temporary results applies for integrity rules that 
are expressed as behavioural or environmental policies. Environmental policies addition- 
ally allow to reference the parameters that are passed in interface invocations in the 
specification of access control and integrity rules. 
Referencing Parameters in Environmental Policies 
Parameters can be referenced in two different ways. The most common usage is that an 
authorisation or integrity rule depends on the parameters that are being passed. Alter- 
natively parameters can be referenced in the premise of rules using the done(x, y, z(pO,.. , pn)) 
construct. 
3The enforcement is discussed in detail in Chapter 8 
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For example a delegation rule is an authorisation that controls a specific, parame- 
terised interface and is almost always dependent on the parameters that are passed. The 
delegation rule that allows all subjects to delegate their own rights is a good illustration: 
I allow (S, O, delegate (gl, dl, yl, z1)) when 0: S= gi 
This rule denotes, that the first parameter gl, identifying the delegator of the right 
must match the identity of the subject S that is invoking the interface. The values of the 
other parameters are not used in this rule. 
Similarly to the case of temporary results, input and output parameters can be rep- 
resented by auxiliary variables. We assume here that the enforcement of environmental 
policies ensures that all parameters have been appropriately set before the evaluation of 
the policy rule. The naming convention for parameter auxiliary variables is to prefix the 
name of the parameter with the interface name. Assuming that the interface delegate 
is defined as in Listing 7.5, the following four auxiliary variables for the parameters are 
introduced: delegate. g, delegate. d, delegate. y, and delegate. z. 
The semantics of rules that reference parameters is augmented along the same lines as 
discussed for the referencing of temporary results. 
[allow (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(3p " (p = fin z. p) A [premise]) i-* 
[deny (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(Bp " (p = fin z. p) A [premise]) 
[decide (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(3p . (p = fin z. p) A 
[premise]) ý--> 
autho+(s, o, a) 
autho-(s, o, a) 
autho(s, o, a) 
[integrity (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(8p, 7 . (p = fin z. p) A(7= fin z. v) A ([premise] ; skip)) i--> integ(s, o, a) 
(7.18) 
(7.19) 
(7.20) 
(7.21) 
Here the local static variables that capture the parameter values p' are assigned to the 
corresponding values of the auxiliary variables that are used for the parameters z. p in the 
final state. This means that parameters specified in the consequence of rules reference the 
value of the auxiliary parameter variables at the time of the decision. It is easy to see that 
without parameters the augmented rule 
definitions are identical to those previously intro- 
duced in Equations (7.12) to (7.15) and (7.17). It is also possible to reference parameters 
in the premise of rules at a different point in time. 
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Referencing Parameters of Past Interface Executions To reference a parameter 
at a different point in time requires the exact specification of that time point. To ensure 
that the parameter values that are stored in the auxiliary variables are fresh, the time 
point is determined using the construct done(x, y, z(q)) in the premise of a rule. q is a list 
of local static variables, that have the same value as the parameters at the time where 
done(x, y, z) is true. This guarantees that the parameters q are referenced in a state, where 
the action has successfully executed, viz. the auxiliary variables contain meaningful values. 
The concrete state depends on where in the specification of the premise the construct is 
used. 
The mechanisms used to capture this is similar to the parameter definitions in the 
consequence of rules. For each referenced parameter a local static variable is introduced 
that captures the value of the parameter at the specified point in time. 
Contrary to the prime variables and the parameters in the consequence of the rules, 
the values that are assigned to these local static variables are not the value of the auxiliary 
variable in the final state, but the value in the state where the control variable referenced 
by done(x, y, z) is true. 
For every occurrence of the construct done(x, y, z(q)), where q denotes the parameter 
list of the interface z the set q is introduced as local static variables in the premise 
of the rule. The corresponding construct done(x, y, z(q)) is replaced with the expression 
done(x, y, z) Aq=z. q, viz. the assignment of the local static variables q to the values of the 
corresponding auxiliary variables for the parameters in the same state. This is a purely 
syntactic transformation, that allows to reference parameters with relative ease. 
The semantics of policy rules that was provided in Equations (7.18) to (7.21) is aug- 
mented to allow for the referencing of past parameter values as follows: 
allow (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(2p, q" (p = fin z. p) A [premise']) ý-+ 
[deny (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(3p, 4- (p = fin z. p) A [premise']) 
[decide (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
(2p, q" (p = fin z. p) A [premise']) º-º 
[integrity (S, O, A(p)) when premise] 
autho+(a, o, a) 
autho-(s, o, a) 
autho(s, o, a) 
h-º integ(s, o, a) 
(7.22) 
(gyp, q, v' " (p = fin z. p) A (v' = fin z. v) A ([premise'] ; skip)) 
(7.23) 
(7.24) 
(7.25) 
Here q is a list of all local static variable identifiers that are used in the premise to 
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reference parameters in the constructs done(x, y, z(gl,... , qn)). These can be obtained by 
simple syntactic analysis of the rule's premise. premise' denotes the original premise, where 
every occurrence of the construct 
done (x, Y, z(gi, 
is rewritten as: 
done(x, y, z) and ql = z. ql and ... and q = z. q 
with z. qn, denoting the auxiliary variable of the corresponding parameter. 
The choice to reference parameters in this form and rewrite the original specification 
of the premise guarantees that auxiliary variables for parameters can only be accessed at 
states where they contain meaningful values. The following example of a rule illustrates. 
Any subject is denied to delegate a right to a delegatee, if it was the case that the 
subjects delegated the same right previously to another delegatee 
i 
2 
3 
deny (S, O, delegate(gl, dl, yl, zl)) when 
sometime done(S, O, delegate(g1, d2, y1, z1)) and 
S= gl and dl O d2 
Line 1 defines the negative authorisation for any subject to delegate the right to perform 
action zi on object yl from the delegator gi to the delegatee di. The premise of the rule 
states in Line 2 that the rule fires if the subject did previously delegate the same right 
from the same delegator gi to the another delegatee d2 provided that (Line 3) the delegator 
was in both cases the subject itself and the delegatee of the current request is different to 
the one of the previous delegation. The use of the same name for different parameters is 
permissible and denotes that both parameters values must be equal. The semantics of the 
above rule is then: 
(2gl, dl, yl, z1, d2 " (gl = fin delegate. g) A (dl = fin delegated) A 
(yl = fin delegate. y) A (z1 = fin delegate. z) A 
(O(doneo, s, delegate A 
(gl = delegate. g) A (d2 = delegate. d) A 
(yl = delegate. y) A (z1 = delegate. z)) 
A(s=gl)n(dl#d2)) 
r-* autho (s, 0, delegate) 
This is the fully expanded semantics of the rule. The keywords s, 0 are represented by 
the variables s and o that range over the set of subjects Subj and objects Obj. By syntactic 
analysis of the rule we can establish 
that five distinct variables are used to referencing 
181 
CHAPTER 7. POLICIES 
parameters (this is to avoid the need for an explicit quantification of these variables). The 
variables are gl, dl, d2, yi and zt. They are bound by the existential quantification in the 
premise of the rule. The variables gi, dl, ys and zi reference parameters in the consequence 
of the rule and are therefore equal to the values of their corresponding auxiliary variables 
in the final state. 
The parameters gi, d2, yi and zl are referenced in the premise of the rule using the 
construct done(S, O, delegate(gl, d2, yl, zl)). Listing the parameters in the done construct is an 
abbreviation for: 
done(S, O, delegate) A gi = delegate. g A d2 = delegate. d n 
yl = delegate. y A zi = delegate. z 
done(S, O, delegate) references the boolean control variable doneo, g, delegate that indicates the 
successful execution. This means that the action has successfully executed in that state 
and the auxiliary variables for the parameters are at that state equal to the static variables 
gi, d2, yl and zt. The last two conjuncts represent the constraints that the delegator must 
be the subject itself and that the delegates must be different. The semantics of the rule 
is depicted in Figure 7.7. 
o( done(S, O, delegate) A gi, d2, yi, zi = delegate. g, delegate. d,,... ) 
gl, dl, yl, zl = fin delegate. g,... 
Figure 7.7: Example of referencing parameter values in the past 
Given that the decision is derived for Q4 then the rule states the there exists a set 
of local static variables gi, di, d2, yl and zi, for which gi, di, yi and zi equal the value 
of the auxiliary variables in the final state (bottom interval). The sometime states that 
there is some suffix interval (the intervals depicted above the state sequence) for which 
the control variable denoted by done(S, O, delegate) is true and where the values of the local 
static variables gi, d2, yi and zi equal the values of the auxiliary variables. The overall 
interval must also satisfy that S= gi n di 0 d2 for the rule to fire. 
All the local static variables are used as prophecy variables. Their value is defined at 
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some point in the interval that is described by the premise. In the example this is the 
final state and some state in which the delegation has been successfully performed before. 
Static variables do not change their value over the interval, thus defining their value in 
any state of the interval suffices. Therefore the comparison dl 0 d2 can be made in the 
initial state of the interval provided that the whole interval is known. This is always the 
case for the premise of a rule as it references the past. 
As discussed earlier for some requirements it is necessary to reference the abstract time 
that elapsed since the enforcement of the rule started. 
Referencing Enforcement Time The keyword T is used to reference the abstract time 
that elapsed between the start of the rule enforcement and the decision. T can be used 
as an expression and yields the value of a policy specific clock in the final state of the 
premise. The behaviour of the clock variable Clock is defined in the semantics of simple 
policies (see Section 7.3.4). Similar to the augmentation of the rule definitions before, 
each premise is augmented with a local static variable T, that is initialised to the value 
Clock in the final state. The definition of the augmented rule semantics is omitted, as the 
extension is along the same lines as the extensions for temporary results and parameter 
values. 
7.3.4 Simple Policies 
A simple policy is a collection of rules that apply simultaneously. The semantics of the 
simple policy binds the variables s, o and a that are free in the rules using the universal 
quantification over the sets variables Subj, Obj and Act. Additionally a clock variable 
that is local to the simple policy is introduced. This clock provides the abstract time that 
elapsed since the rule started to be enforced. The definition is given below: 
[p] =3 Clock " ((Clock = 0) A (Clock gets Clock + 1) A 
VsESubj "doE Obj "VaEAct" Ar) 
rEp 
(7.26) 
Where the variables s, o and a can occur freely in r. The value of the clock in the state 
in which a rule decision is made is accessible using the keyword T. 
7.4 Policy Composition 
The concept of composition is powerful 
both for specification and validation purposes. In 
the specification, it helps the policy administrator to 
focus on a specific set of requirements, 
that does apply in a specific situation, or to a subset of the entities in the system. This eases 
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especially the comprehension of existing policies, which is a key factor in the maintenance 
of policies. 
The advantage for the validation and verification of policies lies in the fact the semantics 
of each policy component and the semantics of each composition is formally defined. It is 
possible to proof properties of small and simple policies and infer from those the properties 
of their compositions. For example, to prove that the sequential composition of two policies 
does never allow a specific access can be decomposed in the proof of its parts, viz. it is 
sufficient to prove that neither the first nor the second policy does allow the access. 
Two forms of composition can be distinguished: a) the composition along the temporal 
axis and b) the composition along the structural axis. These are detailed in the following. 
7.4.1 Temporal Composition 
Temporal composition of policies has been introduced by Siewe in [124]. The composition 
operators are here presented shortly for the completeness of the policy language descrip- 
tion. The temporal composition of policies yields policies that dynamically change over 
time and on events. It allows for the independent specification of policies that apply only 
in a certain situation. The composition operators are then used to define the conditions 
of the policy change. 
Sequence of Policies 
Two policies can be sequentially composed. This is denoted by the semicolon operator 
(; ). The composition P; Q of two policies P and Q means that first P is enforced and then 
Q. However, for the sequential composition to be enforceable it is necessary to define the 
exact condition for the transition from the first policy to the second. This can be achieved 
using the operators unless, aslongas or the explicit timing using the operator t: P. The 
informal meaning of these operators is depicted below: 
unless w: P 
U0 
ýw 
" 
___ 
"""ý - R1... - R1... _11.. _l... - R1... - T/ a1 v2 v3 v4 vb v6 
-1w -1w -Iw ýw w -1w 
The policy P holds unless the condition w becomes true. The definition of the operator 
ensures that P holds only over the states where w does not hold, viz. from the first to the 
penultimate state of the interval. The policy that is enforced in the final state must be 
defined by a subsequent policy. 
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aslongas w: P 
"aa" 
. 
I... _ '... _ '... _ '... _ '... _ I... _I 0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 a5 a6 
wwwwww -1w 
The policy P holds as long as the condition w is true. The definition of the operator 
ensures that P holds only over the states where w does hold. The time over which the 
policy is enforced can also be explicitly specified. 
4: P ; 2: Q 
In the depicted case the policy P is enforced over the first four states and the policy Q 
over the next two states. In the shared state a4' both policies are applies. If this is not 
desired, a unit interval in which the empty policy (denoted by the empty simple policy 
()) is enforced must be inserted between both policies. This is depicted below: 
3: P; 1: (); 2: Q 
A good example where the sequential composition of policies provides an advantage 
over other approaches is the policy that applies to the operational procedures at airports. 
It is easy to separate the overall requirements into those that apply under normal cir- 
cumstances and those that apply when a security warning 
has been issued. We assume 
here that the system that is supporting all activities at the airport provides a means for 
authorised individuals to raise a security alert. 
The sequential composition of policies in 
SANTA captures this natural separation during the specification of the policy. We assume 
that the policies for both situations can 
be specified individually and are captured in the 
policies norm-policy and alert-policy. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
policy norm policy : /* ... */ end 
policy alert policy : /* ... */ end 
policy composition : 
(unless done(S, system, alert) : norm-policy) ; alert-policy 
end 
We assume the definitions of both policies norm-policy and alert-policy. The composi- 
tion of both is defined in the policy composition, which states that unless an alert has been 
issued, the policy norm-policy applies and thereafter the policy alert-policy. This example 
shows the transition between exactly two policies. 
Conditional Policy 
Consider the case that the action alert defines a single input parameter in level and sets 
the new security level in the system to its value. In this case a decision must be made 
based on the passed parameter to determine which policy is to be enforced. This could be 
encoded using the conditional choice as follows: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
policy norm-policy /* ... end 
policy alert-policy /* ... */ end 
policy composition : 
(unless done(S, system, alert(level)) : norm-policy) 
if (done(S, system, alert(level)) then ( 
if (level = norm-level) then norm-policy 
else if (level = high-level) then alert-policy 
end 
The policy enforcement starts with the policy norm-policy until the action alert has 
been executed. The policy then changes into a conditional policy that enforces either the 
policy norm-policy or the policy alert-policy, dependent on the passed parameter. It is easy 
to see how the policy can be extended to distinguish multiple security levels. However, 
the example allows only for exactly one transition, viz. after the level has been set once 
the policy does not change anymore. 
Iteration of Policies 
The intuition behind the example is obviously that the policy changes every time the 
security level of the system is changed. To express this, the iteration construct repeat is 
used. 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
policy composition : 
(unless done(S, system, alert(level)) : norm-policy) 
repeat ( 
unless done(S, system, alert(level)) 
if (done(S, system, alert(level)) then 
if (level = norm-level) then norm-policy 
else if (level = high-level) then alert-policy 
end 
Initially the policy norm-policy is enforced, until the action alert is executed for the 
first time. This defines the initial default policy. After the security level has been set, the 
choice of policy is dependent on the currently set security level. This part of the policy 
is iterated, to capture that every execution of the action alert leads to a policy change4. 
Each iteration of the policy lasts until the next execution of the action alert. The enforced 
policy is conditional and depends on the actual security level, that was set. 
This completes the operators that can be used for the temporal composition of policies. 
Another form of composition is the structural composition, where different policies can be 
specified to apply simultaneously. 
7.4.2 Structural Composition 
Often policies are used to control large-scale systems that span over several organisations. 
Here composition along the structural axis is useful to be able to capture the requirements 
for each unit (e. g. organisation, department, project-group, etc. ) as an individual policy. 
The policy for a larger unit is then composed out of the policies defined for the smaller 
units, eventually yielding the system-wide policy. The main problem with this form of 
composition are conflicts between policies that can easily arise if the same resource or 
individual is placed under the control of more than one policy. Due to dynamics of the 
policies in the model the resolution of conflicts is sophisticated. 
The basis for structural composition is the ability to define that a specific policy only 
applies to a subset of subject, objects and actions. These sets are referred to as the scope 
of the policy. 
4The policy does even change, if the value of the level is not changed by the execution, viz. setting 
the security level from norm-level to norm-level represents a policy change. This affects the evaluation 
of the rules in the policies norm-policy and alert-policy, as 
the policy is restarted. If this is not the 
desired behaviour, the expression in the unless construct must be modified accordingly. 
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Scoping Policies 
A specific scope can be specified at the definition of the policy itself. If the scope definition 
is omitted, it defaults to the universal scope, viz. the policy applies to all subjects, objects 
and actions in the system. The scope definition determines the range of the free variables 
Si, Oi and Ai that can be used in rule definitions to reference subjects, objects and actions, 
respectively. 
1 
2 
policy p: /* ... */ end 
policy q: scope (any, [lpti], any) :p end 
Here the policy p is defined without any restriction to the scope. The policy q is defined 
in terms of policy p, however, it limits its application to the object with the identifier ipti. 
The keyword any denotes the respective universal set, i. e. S, 0 or A, dependent on the 
context. The multiple application of the scope operator does always constrain the scope 
of the policy. For example writing: 
scope ([si, s2], [ol, o2], [al, a2]) : scope (any, [ol], [a2]) :p 
is equivalent to writing: 
scope ([sl, s2], [oi], [a2]) :p 
Widening of the scope is only possible using the parallel composition of policies. 
We assume that all policies that are composed sequentially have the same scope. If this 
is not the case, the scope of the individual policies must be further constraint or widened 
to meet this restriction. 
Parallel Composition 
Two policies can apply simultaneously. The typical case is that two policies define the 
requirements for separate parts of the system. This can lead to conflicts, if the scopes of 
both policies overlap. The following example illustrates this problem. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
policy p: 
( allow (S, O, A) when true 
decide (S, O, A) when allow(S, O, A) and not deny(S, O, A) ) 
end 
policy q: scope ([si], any, any) 
allow (S, O, A) when true 
deny (S, O, A) when A= write 
decide (S, O, A) when allow(S, O, A) and not deny(S, O, A) ) 
end 
policy pq :p and q end 
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The policy p states that any access is allowed. The second policy (q) states that 
subject si is allowed any access, except write. The scopes of both policies overlap, as all 
accesses in the scope ([si], any, [write]) are defined by both policies. The composition of 
both policies leads to an obvious conflict for the action write executed by the subject ei. 
In SANTA the parallel composition takes the strictest possible interpretation, viz. both 
policies must explicitly agree on a policy decision, for the decision to be made in their 
parallel composition. 
Explicit agreement means that the decision must be derived by both of the component 
policies. In the example the policies p and q cannot agree on any decision for subjects 
other than si, because they are not in the scope of q. This means that the policy pq does 
only authorise the subject st to perform actions different to the action write on any object. 
All other subjects are denied by default, as the policy q does not specify any decision for 
them. 
The view taken here is contrary to other policy models, where an implicit agreement 
is sufficient for the decision to be made in the composition. This means that the decisions 
for all subjects, other than si are made as defined in policy p. For the above example this 
would mean that all subjects are allowed any access, with the exception of the subject 
si, which cannot write. The reason for this different view is that implicit decisions are a 
danger during the specification process. This is comparable to a "silent approval", viz. 
no statement means agreement with the decision of others. In SANTA not stating a 
decision means by default denying it. However, SANTA's parallel composition does allow 
to explicitly define the silent approval in form of an additional conflict resolution rule. 
Given the strict interpretation of the parallel composition, a dedicated simple policy 
can be used resolve occurring conflicts and weaken the interpretation of the parallel com- 
position. The conflict resolution policy may reference the scopes of both the policies, as 
well as their individual policy decisions. The notation for this is summarised below: 
. subjects, objects, actions 
subjects., objects., actions. 
. allow, 
deny, . decide, ... 
allow., deny., decide., ... 
lists of subjects, objects and actions that are in the 
scope of the left-hand side policy 
lists of subjects, objects and actions that are in the 
scope of the right-hand side policy 
reference the consequences of the left-hand side policy. 
reference the consequences of the right-hand side pol- 
icy. 
The more lenient interpretation of policy composition can then be expressed as follows: 
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9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
18 
17 
18 
def inleftscope(x, y, z) : 
(x in subjects) and (y in objects) and (z in actions) 
end 
def inrightscope(x, y, z) : 
(x in subjects. ) and (y in objects. ) and (z in actions. ) 
end 
policy join : 
( decide (S, O, A) when 0: (inleftscope(S, 0, A) and 
not inrightscope(S, 0, A) and . decide(S, O, A)) 
decide (S, O, A) when 0: (inrightscope(S, 0, A) and 
not inleftscope(S, 0, A) and decide. (S, O, A)) 
end 
policy pq :p and q deconflict join end 
The simple policy join is used to weaken the parallel composition. The conflict reso- 
lution rules state that all those decisions, for subject, object and action pairings that are 
only defined in the scope of one of the component policies are fully determined by this 
policy. The first rule addresses the access for those triplets in the scope of p that are not 
in the scope of q (viz. (any \ [si], any, any \ [write])). The second rule is the same, however, 
p and q are reversed. 
The scope of the parallel composition of two policies is the union of the scopes of both 
policies. This allows to use the parallel composition of policies to explicitly widen the 
scope of a policy. This is a precondition to compose policies along the temporal axis. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
8 
6 
7 
8 
policy p: scope ([si] , 
[ol] 
, 
[al]) /* */ end 
policy leftpref : 
( decide (S, O, A) when inscope([S, O, A], scope) and 
. decide(S, O, A) ) 
end 
policy q: p and () deconflict leftpref end 
The policy q grants the same access as policy p within the scope (any, any, any). The 
conflict resolution policy leftpref defines that any decision that is made in the left-hand 
side policy must also be made in the composition. The empty policy () has the default 
scope of (any, any, any) and does not grant any access. 
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7.5 Semantics of Policy Composition 
7.5.1 Temporal Composition 
The semantics of the temporal composition has been defined by Siewe and is only included 
here for the completeness of the policy semantics. For a detailed discussion and proof rules 
see [124]. 
SANTA Siewe's Notation ITL 
1p; Q¢ 1p; Q] [P]; M 
[asiongas expr : PI [[expr]PI ((([P] A Qexpr) ; skip) A fin --- expr) v 
(empty n -, expr) 
[unless expr : P] [(expr)PI [[- expr]PI 
[expr : PI 
[expr : PI len = expr n [Pj 
[if expr then P else Q] 
[expr? P : Q] (expr n [Pj) v (-+expr n [Qj) 
[repeat PI 
[(P)®1 n [Pnll ; ([Pll)* 
Table 7.2: Operators for the temporal composition of policies. 
7.5.2 Structural Composition 
Two operators that allow for the structural composition of dynamically changing policies 
have been introduced in the SANTA policy model: a) the scope operator that restricts 
the application of a rule to a specific subset of subjects, objects and actions and b) the 
parallel composition of two dynamically changing policies. 
Policy Scope 
Every policy has a scope that determines the set of subjects, objects and actions to which 
the policy applies to. By default the scope of a policy is the universal scope, viz. the set 
of all subjects S, objects 0 and actions A that can be controlled by policies. This means 
that the policy: 
1 
2 
3 
policy P: 
( decide(S, O, A) when true ) 
end 
allows by default all subjects to perform all actions on all objects in the system. 
However, it is possible to constrain the application of this policy to a specific scope. For 
example: 
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2 
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5 
6 
policy P: 
( decide(S, O, A) when true 
end 
policy Q 
scope (subjects, objects, [read]) :P 
end 
Here the policy Q is defined to behave exactly like policy P, however it is only applied 
to the action read. In this case the definition of P is trivial, and policy q could be as easily 
defined from scratch, but the scope does also apply if P is a complex policy composition. 
The scope definition can be seen as an instantiation of the policy P for a specific set of 
subjects, objects and actions. 
Explicit Scope Definition The scope operator allows for an explicit definition of policy 
scope. The explicit definition of a scope does affect the policy as it constraints the sets 
of subjects, objects and actions the policy is applied to. Any scope definition does reduce 
the set of subjects, objects and actions, by redefining these sets. The semantics of the 
scope operator is: 
[scope (Si, 01, Al) : PI = [P] [(Subj n Sl), (Obj n O1), (Act n A1)/Subj, Obi, Act] (7.27) 
Every occurrence of the free set variables Subj, Obj and Act in P are substituted 
with the intersection of the set denoted by the free variable and the explicit scope (e. g. 
Subj fl Si). This does not bind the free variable, as it occurs freely in the substitution. 
Referencing the Scope in Policies The set of subjects, objects and actions that are 
in the scope of a policy can be explicitly referenced in policies as the lists subjects, objects 
and actions or implicitly using the identifiers S, 0 and A. 
Useful Theorems for the Scope The following theorems are useful for the manipu- 
lation of scopes. 
Theorem 1 
Scopes can be combined. 
f- scope (Si, Ol, Al) :( scope (S2,02, A2) : P) - scope (S1 n S2, Oi n02, Al n A2) :P 
Proof 1 
Proof outline: The individual scope definitions are expanded to their semantics. The 
substitution for the outer policy is performed. The result is transformed to show that it 
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is equivalent to the semantics of the scope with the intersected sets. 
scope (S1,01, Al) :( scope (S2,02, A2) : P) 
Substituting the inner scoped policy with the definition of the scope operator yields: 
= scope (S1,01, A1) : 
([P] [(S n S2), (O n02), (A n A2)IS, O, A]) 
Given the semantics of the inner scoped policy, the outer scope is expanded, too: 
= ([P][(SnS2), (On02), 
(AnA2)/S, O, A])[(SnSI), (0n01), (AnAI)/S, 0, A] 
Performing the substitution as defined by the outer policy yields: 
= QP] [((S n Sl) n S2), ((O n 01) n02), ((A n A1) n A2)/S, O, A] 
The associativity of the set intersection is used to rearrange the order of the intersection: 
= QPl [(S n(Sl n S2)), (O n(Ol n02» , (A n(Al n A2))/S, 0, A] 
Given the definition of the scope operator this is the same as: 
scope (S1nS2iO1nO2, 
A1nA2) :p 
Theorem 2 
A wider scope is absorbed. 
S12S2A01202AA1DA21- 
scope (S1, O1, A1) : scope (S2,02, A2) :P= scope (S2,02, A2) :P 
Proof 2 
The proof of Theorem 2 follows the same lines as Proof 1. However, the subset relations 
S1 2 S2,01 02 and Al J A2 and the fact that XDY implies that X fl Y=Y (set 
theory) is used to remove the wider scope. 
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Theorem 3 
Scoping is commutative. 
I- scope (Si, 01, Al) : (scope (S2,02, A2) : P) - scope (S2,02, A2) : (scope (Si, 01, Al) : P) 
Proof 3 
The proof of Theorem 3 follows the same lines as Proof 1. However, instead of the 
associativity of the set intersection, the commutativity is used. 
Theorem 4 
Scoping distributes over sequential composition and repetition. 
F- scope (Sl>01vA1) : (P ; Q) - (scope (Si, 01, Al) : P) 7 (scope (Si, 01, Al) : Q)) 
F- scope (Sl, Ol, Al) : (repeat P) - repeat (scope (Si, 01, Al) : P) 
Proof 4 
Substituting S, O and A in the sequential composition P; Q is obviously the same as 
substituting in P and Q separately and sequentially composing them. 
Theorem 5 
Scoping distributes over unless, aslongas, explicit time limit and the conditional if the ex- 
pression does not reference the scope. 
scope (S1i O1, Al) (unless expr : P) - (unless expr :( scope (Si, O1, Al) : P)) 
F- scope (S1,01, Al) (aslongas expr : P) (aslongas expr :( scope (Si, Ol, Al) : P)) 
F- scope (Si, 01i Al) (expr : P) - (expr :( scope (Si, 01, Al) : P)) 
F- scope (S1,01, Al) : (if expr then P else Q) 
(if expr then scope (Si, 01, Al) :P else scope (Si, 01, Al) Q) 
Proof 5 
The proofs for Theorem 5 are all of a similar nature. The assumption is that the expression 
does not reference the policy scope. The fact that 2x " (x =0AWA f) -wA 3x " (x = 
0A f) given that x is not referenced in w is the foundation of all the proofs. The detail of 
the proofs is omitted. 
Parallel Composition 
The parallel composition of two policies means that both policies are enforced at the same 
time. This immediately leads to concerns about conflicts, that may occur if one policy 
defines a different decision than the other one. 
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Fundamental to Siewe's policy model is that it guarantees that policies are conflict 
free. The notion of a conflict is made explicit in the model by being able to define what 
a conflict means (for example if there is a positive and a negative authorisation for the 
same access) and resolving it using decision rules. Formally the fundamental reason why 
a policy cannot have conflicts in the traditional sense is that policy rules are defined as 
an implication and that no negation of the consequence is permitted. 
This makes it more difficult to capture the intuition behind the parallel composition 
of policies. The following example illustrates: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
policy P: 
( allow (S, money, take) when 0: friend(S) 
decide(S, O, A) when 0: allow(S, O, A)) 
end 
Policy P is a simple closed policy, where every access is denied unless explicitly allowed. 
The policy allows friends to take money. However, there may be another policy Q: 
1 
2 
3 
4 
policy Q: 
( deny (S, money, take) when 0: thief(S) 
decide(S, O, A) when 0: not deny(S, O, A)) 
end 
This is an simple open policy, where every access is by default allowed, unless explicitly 
denied. In this case, the policy denies thieves to take money. 
Assume that the parallel composition of these two policies would be defined using a 
simple conjunction. The obvious conflict in this example is when a friend is also a thief. 
In this case the decision rule of policy P would grant the access and policy Q would silently 
agree to this decision (because the decision rule is a form of implication). Although it 
is possible that the policy administrator has the intention to let friends take money irre- 
spective of whether they are thieves, the point is that the model cannot decide differently. 
Siewe's addresses this issue for simple policies by filtering the rules and using set theo- 
retic operations to remove the decision rules from the policies. However, for temporal 
compositions of policies the problem persists. 
This example shows, that the simple conjunction of two policies does not capture 
the intuition behind parallel composition. SANTA defines a stricter parallel composition, 
that allows the policy administrator to define explicitly the resolution of conflicts. The 
intuition is that both policies are evaluated locally and the decision made by their parallel 
composition is derived 
from their individual decisions. The scope of the component policies 
is important for this as it defines the set of subjects, objects and actions each component 
policy was intended to apply to. 
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The parallel composition of policies is only defined for explicitly scoped policies. Using 
the Theorems 1 to 5, an explicit scope can be introduced for any policy. In the following 
definition Conseq denotes the control variables for the different types of rules (autho+, 
autho-, autho, oblig and integ). 
[scope (Sp, Op, Ap) :P and scope (Sq, Oq, Aq) :Q deconflict D] = 
t1spESp, opEOp, apEAp, sgESq, ogEOq, agEAq " 
3Conseqp(sp, op, ap), Consegq(sq, og, aq) " 
( [scope (Sp, Op, Ap) : P[Consegp(sp, op, ap)lConseq(sp, op, ap)]l n 
[scope (Sq, Og, Aq) : p[Consegg(sq, oq, aq)lConseq(sq, og, ag)]] A 
(`dsESubj "b'oEObj "baEAct" (sESpnSgnoEOpnOgnaEApnA9n 
len =0A Conseqp(s, o, a) A Consegq(s, o, a) H Conseq(s, o, a))) A 
QDJ) 
The parallel composition of the scoped policy P and a scoped policy Q introduces local 
boolean state variables Consegp(sp, op, ap) and Conseqq(sq, oq, aq) to capture the local 
policy decision of policy P and policy q. sp, op, and ap range over P's scope, sq, oq, and 
aq over Q's. The original policy definitions of P and q are rewritten, to update these local 
variables. Since both policies are rewritten, to affect only local variables, their semantics 
can be safely conjoined. The definition states that for all subjects, objects, and actions 
that are in the scope of the parallel composition and that are in the scope of both policies 
a policy decision can be derived if the same decision can be derived from both component 
policies. 
This means that both policies must explicitly agree on a specific policy decision, for 
the decision to be made in their composition. Any decision that is taken unilaterally by 
one policy will not be reflected in the composition. This strict interpretation of parallel 
composition, does not capture the intuition of the parallel composition, either. For ex- 
ample the parallel composition of two policies with completely disjoint scopes leads to a 
policy, that does not grant any access, defines no obligations and imposes no integrity con- 
straints. However, using the conflict resolution policy D the interpretation of the parallel 
composition can be relaxed. 
In the conflict resolution policy D the original scopes of the policies P and Q, as well 
as their local policy decisions can be referenced. In the syntax, all references to subjects, 
objects and actions, as well as to the policy decisions allow, deny, decide, oblige and integrity 
that are prefixed with a dot reference the local scope and decisions of the left-hand side 
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policy of the composition. All those that are suffixed with a dot the local scope and 
decisions of the right-hand side policy. The keywords to reference the decisions of the 
parallel composition and the respective local decisions and the variables they represent in 
the definition of the parallel composition are summarised in Table 7.3. 
SANTA Corresponding Variable 
subjects subjects subjects. Subj Sp Sq 
objects objects objects. Obi OP Oq 
actions actions actions. Act Ap Aq 
allow(x, y, z) . allow(z, y, z) allow. 
(x, y, z) autho+(x, y, z) authop (x, y, z) authoq (x, y, z) 
deny(x, y. z) . deny(z, y, z) 
deny. (z, y, z) autho-(x, y, z) authop(x, y, z) authog (x, y, z) 
decide(z, y, z) . decide(z, y, z) decide. 
(z, y, z) autho(x, y, z) authop(x, y, z) authoq(x, y, z) 
integrity(z, y, z) . 
integrity(z, y, z) integrity. (z, y, z) integ(x, y, z) integp(x, y, z) integq(x, y, z) 
oblige(x, y, z) . oblige(z, y, z) oblige. 
(x, y, z) oblig(x, y, z) obligp(x, y, z) obligq(x, y, z) 
Table 7.3: Referencing local decisions 
The use of the dot as a prefix or suffix is only permitted in the context of simple 
policies that de-conflict the parallel composition. Using the de-confliction policy the strict 
definition of the parallel composition can be relaxed. Examples of this have been provided 
earlier on in Section 7.4.2. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter introduced the syntax and semantics of SANTA policies. Two conceptional 
different types of policies can be expressed: a) environmental policies that constrain the 
access to interfaces of SANTA objects and b) behavioural policies that constrain the 
behaviour of SANTA agents. Both types of policies can be distinguished by the subjects, 
objects and actions they apply to. For an environmental policy the controlled objects are 
SANTA objects and the controlled actions the interfaces that they expose. For behavioural 
policies the objects are 
SANTA agents and the controlled actions the actions that are 
encapsulated within the agents. 
SANTA policies express security requirements, such as authorisation, delegation, in- 
tegrity and obligation, in form of rules. Each rule defines the type of requirement and 
the system entities that are affected by it in form of a consequence. The premise of a 
rule defines a set of behaviours that 
lead to the consequence. The possibility to define a 
behaviour in the premise allows for the expression of complex history dependent require- 
ments, such as the 
Chinese Wall Policy. Examples of the various type of rules as well as 
state and history 
based requirements have been provided in Sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.5. 
Policy rules are combined into simple policies, representing a set of policy rules that 
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apply simultaneously. One of the key advantages of the policy model is that policies can be 
composed to capture the dynamic change of policies based on time and the observation of 
events. This enables the policy administrator to focus during the specification of a policy 
on specific situations and then define the events and conditions that describe the transition 
between them. This is captured by the temporal composition of policies. An example of 
a policy that depends on a system wide threat level has been given in Section 7.4.1. 
The structural composition of policies allows to restrict a policy to a specific scope and 
to combine temporal compositions to apply simultaneously. The structural composition 
is used to combine policies that are defined for different units within an organisational 
hierarchy to obtain the policy that applies to the overall organisation. 
The semantics of policies has been defined in Section 7.3 and 7.5. It was shown, how 
interface parameters can be externalised and be made accessible in the specification of 
policy rules. The use of prophecy variables to reference the values of parameters at a 
specific state in the history has been detailed. The semantics of rules has been gradually 
developed to take into account state and parameter dependencies. 
At the semantic level, policies define the behaviour of policy specific control variables 
over a sequence of states. These control variables are modelled as boolean ITL state 
variables that capture the policy decision in every state. 
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Enforcement 
In this chapter we introduce the mechanisms that are available in 
SANTA for the enforcement of policies. The enforcement mechanisms 
link the the SAfAS with policies. 
199 
CHAPTER 8. ENFORCEMENT 
8.1 Introduction 
Enforcement mechanisms define how policies are enforced in the system. Because a SMAS 
is a highly distributed system we cannot assume the existence of one centralised mechanism 
that is enforcing the policy. Instead we define three different mechanisms that can be 
distributed in the system. These are vigilant agent, vigilant object and security enforcer. 
Distributed Enforcement Mechanisms For a vigilant agent the enforcement is part 
of the agent's behaviour. It is implemented in the enforcement phase of the agent and as 
part of the encapsulated actions. A vigilant agent can enforce behavioural policies for the 
agent. Similarly, for a vigilant object the enforcement is part of the object's behaviour. 
It is implemented as part of the interfaces that the object provides. A vigilant object 
can enforce environmental policies for the object. The security enforcer is similar to the 
vigilant object mechanism, however it controls the access and integrity of a group of 
objects. The enforcement mechanism mediates the access to the interfaces of the objects 
under protection. The security enforcer can enforce environmental policies for a group of 
objects. 
The link between policies and system The semantics of objects and agents defines 
their behaviour as a set of sequences of states. In SANTA this specification is initially 
defined at a higher level of abstraction and then refined to be concrete and implementable. 
This is depicted in Figure 8.1 by the lower two state sequences. At the higher abstraction 
level, the definition of actions and interfaces state only the effect of the computation, 
not how the computation is actually performed or how many states are required. During 
the development the abstract specification is refined into a concrete specification that 
introduces additional states (depicted by the lower state sequence). 
Similarly a policy defines the behaviour of the enforcement variables over a sequence 
of states, viz. the access control decisions, obligations and integrity in each state. The 
policy specification is more abstract than the specification of the agents and objects as it 
is only defined in terms of subjects, objects and actions. The implementation details of 
the actions or interfaces are hidden and not of interest at this level of abstraction. The 
policy specification has an even coarser grained view of the system. This is depicted in 
Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1: Abstraction Levels 
The semantics of the enforcement mechanisms defines the mapping between the states 
over which the policy is defined and those iii the abstract specification of agents and objects 
as defined by the SMAS2. Additionally they relate the control variables in the SNIAS"_ to 
the enforcement variables in enforcement Properties. Time enforcement properties define 
what, the enforcement of it policy ºueans at a high abstraction level, viz. over the . aºuc 
sequences of states over which the policies are defined. 
In this chapter we are concerned with the abstract specification of the enforcenºe it 
nºechanisuts, viz. what does it mean for it policy to be enforced and how do policies 
influence the behaviour of agents and objects. The development of mcclianisms that 
ensure that the overall system does not violate the properties stated by the eufin"ceuºent 
mechanisms is discussed subsequently in Chapter 9. 
In Section 8.2 we introduce the syntax that is used to define enforcement uºechauisuºs, 
and to associate policies with them. In Section 8.4 we show how it policy can be t raus- 
formed into a complete (deterministic) policy. Section 8.5 and 8. (i define the uºefuºiug t 1w 
vigilant mechanisms; Section 8.7 the semantics of the see"iu"ity enforcer. 
8.2 Enforcement Mechanisms in SANTA 
1 
2 
3 
4 
enf = 'enforce', policy, 'withid 
senf = 'securityenforcer', id 
'protect' protect ' id, [' .', id] 
{', ', id ,['. 
', id] }}, 
{ vardecl }, 1 intdecl }, 'end' . 
The keyword enforce defines the link between a policy and an enforcenºent nºec"hawisnº. 
id is the identifier of an object, agent or security enforcer that enforces the policy. I. or 
vigilant agents the policy is associated with an agent identifier; fir vigilant (l)jec"ts witlº 
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an object identifier. Policies that are enforced by a security enforcer are associated with 
the security enforcer's identifier. 
A security enforcer represents a separate entity in the system that guards a set of 
objects. Its definition is similar to the one of an object, but additionally contains a set 
of names that represent the object interface under its protection. This set is introduced 
by the keyword protect followed by a list of names that consist of the object identifier and 
an optional interface identifier separated by a dot. If the interface identifier is omitted it 
expands to all interfaces that are defined by the object. 
Limitations: Conflict resolution has been only addressed in this work for policies. 
However conflicts can also occur between enforcement mechanisms. This is not addressed 
in this work, but can be defined along the same lines as the conflict resolution of poli- 
cies. We assume in the following that any object is protected by exactly one enforcement 
mechanism. 
8.3 Subjects, Objects and Actions 
In Chapter 7 we defined the set variables for subjects Subj, objects Obj and actions Act 
to be free in the policy specification. The enforcement mechanisms combine the semantics 
of policies with the semantics of the system and therefore need to bind these free variables 
to concrete sets that are meaningful w. r. t to the system definition. The binding of the free 
set variables is defined as follows: 
bind = (Subj = A) A (Obj = AU 0) A (Act = (U U x) U (U 
U i)) 
aEAxEXa oEOiEIo 
(8.1) 
The set of all subjects in the policy specification is the set of all SANTA agents in the 
SMAS. The objects in the policy specification can be either agents or objects in the SMAS. 
The actions that can be controlled by policies are either the agent actions (for behavioural 
policies) or they are interfaces (for environmental policies). 
8.4 Complete Policy Specification 
Any security policy that is enforced by any of the mechanisms that are presented in the 
following sections must fully specify the outcome of all policy decisions for the scope that 
is controlled by the enforcement mechanism. Siewe presented in [124] an algorithm that 
transforms a the specification of a policy to a complete policy. The algorithm guarantees 
that the policy specification determines the value of the enforcement variables in every 
state of the interval over which the policy is defined. 
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Siewe introduced the operator strict always followed by to capture that a specific access 
control decision is only made if and only if the premise of the rule holds over some interval 
in the left neighbourhood of the state for which the decision is made. The definition of the 
operator replaces the implication relationship between the premise and the consequence 
of a rule as defined by the operator always followed by with an equivalence: 
f 4-º w -D ((Of) - (fin w)) (8.2) 
The following outlines the algorithm as it was presented in [124]. Siewe represents 
a simple policy as a set of rules: If '--º op(x, y, z)} where x, y, z are constants and 
op E {autho, autho+, autho-}. All rules in the set hold in conjunction. We expand the set 
op to include additionally oblig and integ. The set of rules can be easily produced from 
the semantics of a simple policy that was provided in Section 7.3.4. First the bounded 
universal quantification is expanded into an equivalent conjunction of the form: 
. 
f0 ý-- OP(X07 yo, ZO) n ... n. fl, m, n '-' oP(Xl, ym, zn) 
xi, yj and zk are constants identifying concrete subjects, objects and actions. The set of 
all rules, in the following referred to as p, is produced by splitting the conjunction of the 
individual always-followed-by operators. 
The algorithm takes as input a simple policy p, the set of subjects XC Subj, the set 
of objects YC Obi and the set of actions ZC Obj with respect to which the policy p 
is completed. The result is a policy p' for which all policy decisions are specified. The 
algorithm guarantees that any decision (assignment of the corresponding enforcement 
variable to true) that is made in p is also made in p'. 
Step 1. Construct the set 
pi =PU 
U {false '-º op(x, y, z)} 
xEX, yEY, ZEZ 
The semantics of false i--º op(x, y, z) is true, i. e. the conjunction of all rules in pi is 
equivalent to the conjunction of all rules 
in p. 
Step 2. Regrouping of rules. Siewe provides a Theorem that states the conjunction of 
two rules with the same consequence is equivalent to a single rule with the same conse- 
quence, where the premise 
is the disjunction of the premises of the original rules: 
(fl f--º w) nU2 I" W) = 
V1 V f2) ý--º wý 
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This is used to regroup the rules in the set to a normal form, where every consequence 
occurs exactly once. 
P2 =U{ fzy, = H oP(x, y, z)l 
xEX, yEY, xEZ 
where fZ y, z =f I' v ... vf is the 
disjunction of all the f °p such that fOH op(x, y, z) E 
pi, i = 1,..., n. 
Step 3. Siewe shows that the operator strict-always-followed-by is a refinement of the 
operator always-followed-by, viz. that (f H w) D (f H w). In this step the operator 
always followed by is replaced with the operator strict always followed by. This is denoted 
by the set p' that is the result of the algorithm. 
p' ={f fl, '-' °p(x, Y, z) 1 
Given that all rules in the set p' apply in conjunction, this fully defines the policy 
decisions for all the control variables. The result of the process is the same as assuming 
that the default value for the case that no decision can be derived is false. 
The algorithm Comp(X, Y, Z, p) takes as input the set of subjects X, the set of objects 
Y, the set of actions Z and a simple policy p and produces as output the complete policy 
p'. This can be easily extended to composed policies as described in [124]. The enforce- 
ment mechanisms presented in the following will use the Comp algorithm to ensure the 
completeness of the enforced policy with respect to the subjects, objects and actions in 
their maximal enforceable scope. 
8.5 Vigilant Agent 
A vigilant agent implements enforcement mechanisms directly within the agent's enforce- 
ment phase and as part of the action execution. An agent a is defined to be vigilant by 
associating a policy Pa with the agent: 
I enforce P. with a 
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8.5.1 Enforceable Policies 
A vigilant agent can enforce behavioural policies for the agent itself. Formally this means 
that the scope of policies that can be enforced by the vigilant agent a is 
(Subjai Obja, Acta) = ({a}, {a}, Xa) 
Associating a policy with a vigilant agent implicitly scopes the policy to this maximal 
enforceable scope. This means that the above association of the policy p with the agent a 
is equivalent to: 
1 enforce scope ({a}, {a}, X, ) : P. with a 
Where Xa is the set of actions encapsulated in the agent a. Each vigilant agent can 
enforce exactly one policy. If more that one policy is to be enforced then the policies must 
be explicitly composed using the operators presented in Chapter 7. The type of rules that 
the policy can contain are authorisation, obligation and integrity. Delegation rules are 
not in p's scope, because the agent cannot define the interfaces delegate and revoke. 
The policy may reference the agent variables encapsulated in the agent a by their 
identifier, or the fully qualified name a. id. The policy can also reference the control 
variables donea, r and faileda, r. 
8.5.2 Mapping Policy- and System States 
A policy that is enforced by a vigilant agent is interpreted over an interval that contains 
only those states in which the vigilant agent can start the execution of an action. These 
are the states in the interval defined by SMAS2 for which neadya is true. 
We know that from one of these states to the next the agent executed at most one 
action. Consequently the agent variables have been assigned at most once as the compu- 
tation takes place in local (or auxiliary) variables and the results are only copied back to 
the agent variables if the execution is successful. Events that are defined in terms of agent 
variables cannot be lost in this coarser view. This is depicted in Figure 8.2. 
If the execution of action x by the vigilant agent a in state co did update the agent 
variables, then any event that 
is defined as an expression on these variables is still observ- 
able in the subsequent state where the agent is ready again (In Figure 8.2 this is the state 
o3). The mapping 
from these states to the policy states a and ai ensures that from one 
policy decision to the next no policy related events are 
lost. 
Defining the policy decisions only for the states in which the agent is ready is suffi- 
cient, as the agent can only start the execution of an action in this state. This shows 
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Figure 8.2: State projection for vigilant Agent 
that selecting only the states where the agent is ready is a suitable abstraction for the 
eiif)rceInent of behavioural policies. 
The interval a', containing only the states for which readya is true, is obtained using 
t lie ITL projection operator SaATa. Ta is the formula that holds on the projected interval 
auul S the formula that describes the intervals bridging between the projected states. In 
the case of the vigilant agent enforcer a, the formula Sa bridges between two states in 
which the agent a is ready: 
So, = ((ready,, A skip) ; ((keep ready,, ) A fin readya)) (8.3) 
Equation (8.3) describes an interval that is at least of length one, in which readya is true 
only in the initial and the final state of the interval. 
The formula Ta that must hold over the projected interval is the complete policy Pa 
with respect to the maximal enforceable scope of the vigilant agent a. 
Pa = Corrap(Subja, Obja,, Acta,. Pa) (8.4) 
The complete policy Pa, holds in conjunction with the enforcement properties EPa, autho! 
EPa, ohlZq and EPa, integ that define the enforcement of the respective policy class, viz. 
the effect that a policy decision has on the system. They are defined subsequently in 
subsections 8.5.3,8.5.4, and 8.5.5. 
7a = Pa n EPa, autho n 
EPa, 
oblig n EPa, integ 
(8.5) 
The semantics of a SMAS3 that contains policies Pn that are enforced by the vigilant 
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agents aE SEvigagent is then defined as a conservative extension to tLe SAIAS2 subset: 
SMAS'ýý = SMAS2 A bind n 
A (keep (- readya)) ; (Sa01a)) 
aE. ti'Ln, yy 
(K. (; ) 
SEt, igagcrit defines the set of agents that enforce a policy vigilantly. is a , uh, et 
of the set of all agents A. The prefix interval (keep (- ready)) bridges t he stººrt of t Iºe 
agent and the start of the policy enforcement, viz. the policy enforcement starts ill the 
first state iii which ready,, is true. The link between the SMAS2 aucl the eººfin"ceºººeººt is 
depicted iii Figure 8.3. 
SN4AS 
1, 
/('X('('" d('lIb" II111O del1l), I CH 
1. 
I 
\. 
_ keep ready, T 
Figure 8.3: Vigilant Agent enforcing a lolic. v 
", 
,,, 
The formula (keep(-, ready, l)) 
bridges the time until the agent first enters t he execci- 
tion phase. The states in which the agent enters the execution phrase are hibelled (7A., 
(higlhlighted in red). In these states the control variable rcrlc/y is Iriw. 'I'lse interval be- 
tween the states 0kß and 1kß,, is bridged by the formula S, defining the projected intc'rv, il 
(7' = cry , ...,.. 
T, over which the policy and the enforcement propert ies ; ce specified. 
8.5.3 Enforcing Authorisation 
The effect that the enforcement of authorisation policies by a vigilant ; igcnt has oil f I, (, 
systenº execution is defined by the enforcement property EP,,,,,,, rý, Intin-nrºIIy I h(, en- 
forcement of authorisation means that if an agent a is not permitted to perform an action 
x in a state Qi', then it cannot be the case that the agent a has successfully executed i I, (, 
action x in the next state Qz+i . 
This is expressed in (8.7). 
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EPa, autho A keep (- autho(a, a, x) D O- donea, x) (8.7) 
xEActa 
8.5.4 Enforcing Obligations 
The link between an obligation in the policy model and the SMAS system is defined 
similarly to the enforcement of authorisations. Informally the enforcement of an obligation 
means that if an agent a executed an action x in state of+1, then it is either the case that 
the agent has been obliged to execute this action in the previous state o, or the agent did 
not have any obligations that could have possibly been executed. This is captured by the 
following enforcement property: 
EPa, 
oblig 
- 
(O(donea, x v faileda, x)) D 
nkeep (oblig(a, a, x) v -(3y E Xa " 
xEActa oblig(a, a, y) A autho(a, a, y) A Pa, y nn readyj)) 
jEEa, y 
(8.8) 
The second line in (8.8) formalises the case that the agent did not have any obligations 
that could have possibly been executed. One condition for the ability to execute is that the 
agent is indeed authorised. Secondly the action must be executable, viz. its precondition 
is fulfilled (see Section 5.3.5). Thirdly all entities that are involved in the execution of the 
action (viz. the entities in Ea,, y) must be ready (see Section 6.3.1). 
Other work [126,117,39] takes a much stronger view of obligation, where an obligation 
guarantees that a specific action is executed or a specific state of the environment is brought 
about. However, these notions represent a property of the system that in most cases is 
checked statically against the system specification. This is in principle also possible within 
the presented framework, but not addressed in this work. 
The view of obligation taken here is less strict and has a more operational interpreta- 
tion, viz. an obligation can overrule the decision that was made in the deliberation phase of 
an agent. This is actually enforceable by reassigning the priorities for the agent's actions 
and captures the intuition that is behind the enforcement of behavioural policies. 
8.5.5 Enforcing Integrity 
The enforcement of integrity policies is similar to authorisation policies. Informally the 
enforcement of integrity constraints means that no action can have successfully executed, 
if its integrity constraints have not been met. This is defined as: 
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EPa, integ -A O(- integ(a, a, x) D -' donea, x) (8.9) 
xEActa 
If the integrity check has failed then the action cannot have succeeded. Note that 
here integ(a, a, x) and donea, x are evaluated in the same state, because the results of the 
execution of x are only available at the end of the action execution. They are accessible 
through the auxiliary variables for that action (see Section 7.3.3). 
8.6 Vigilant Object 
A vigilant object implements enforcement mechanisms directly within the object's inter- 
faces. An object o is defined to be vigilant, by associating a policy P,, with the object: 
1 enforce P. with o. 
8.6.1 Enforceable Policies 
A vigilant object can enforce environmental policies that control access to the object's 
interfaces. Policies may reference the internal state of the object. Formally the scope of 
policies that can be enforced by the vigilant object o is: 
(Subj,,, Obj,,, Act,, ) = (A, {o}, I,, ) 
Where A is the set of agents in the systems and Io is the set of interfaces that is provided 
by the vigilant object o. By associating a policy with a vigilant object, the scope of the 
policy is implicitly limited to the maximal enforceable scope, viz. the above association is 
equivalent to writing: 
1 enforce scope (A, 
{o}, Io) : P. with o. 
The type of policy rules that can be enforced by this mechanism are authorisation, 
delegation and integrity policies. Obligation policies are not enforceable, because the 
object is a passive entity that cannot initiate any computation. Policies may reference o's 
object variables. 
8.6.2 Mapping Policy- and System States 
In Chapter 7 we assumed that the enforcement of environmental policies does guarantee 
that the parameter values that are passed during the interface invocation have been as- 
signed to their corresponding auxiliary variable 
before the policy decision is made. This 
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means that we cannot use the states in which the objects are ready for the projection, 
because these are just before the auxiliary variables are set. To define the state in which 
all variables that are required for the interface execution are initialised, we introduce a 
marker variable enf o. 
Introducing en f,, as a marker 
The initialisation of the local variables (respectively the auxiliary variables) is defined by 
initi, x in 
(6.7) on page 137. To be able to identify the state in which the initialisation has 
finished we introduce a boolean marker variable enfo for each object o, that is only true 
in exactly one state after the variables have been initialised. Theorem 6 states that the 
introduction of a new variable that acts as a marker is a refinement (see Chapter 9). 
Theorem 6 
The introduction of a new boolean state variable that acts as a marker is a refinement. The 
marker variable can be used to mark states that are directly before or after a temporal 
assignment and is valid after the initialisation of the object. Provided the statement 
[x«- y1 v is part of the specification of an object in the SAIAS and V Vo, contr then 
replacing the statement with 
[x. - y; m: =true; m: = falsely, 
or with 
[m: =true ; m: = false ; x4-- yJv, 
is a refinement. Where V' denotes the set of augmented object state variables. To fully 
specify the behaviour of the marker variables the specification is strengthened to ensure 
that it is kept stable in all other states. To ensure this, the set of control variables is 
substituted in the object specification with the augmented set VV, oontr = 
Vogt,. U {m} 
after the initialisation phase of the object inito = 'v"- a is refined to inito = v, m"- e, false. 
Proof 6 
The proof for this theorem very similar to the Proof 8 in Chapter 9 and not repeated here. 
Since the marker is a freshly introduced variable, its assignment does not modify any 
variables in V. By adding the marker to the set of variables, we complete the specification 
w. r. t. the marker. 
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Applying the theorem we introduce the marker enf o 
for every object o as a suffix of 
the interface initialisation initi, x : 
[vö,. 
.., vk', po, ..., pI*- vo, ..., vk, eo, ..., el; 
enf o := true; enf o := 
false] V+\{pö,..., pj}u{enfo} 
The set of control variables for the object o is extended by the variable enf o to ensure 
that the variable is kept stable by the rest of the object specification. 
Mapping to the marker 
The enforcement of policies is defined analogously to the vigilant agent case. However, 
the policy is now projected on the states in which enfo is true. 
So = (enfo A skip) ; ((keep enfo) A fin enfo) (8.10) 
S. is the formula that bridges between the selected states. The complete policy Po 
with respect to the maximal enforceable scope of the mechanism is: 
P« = Comp(Subjo, Objo, Acto, Po) (8.11) 
The policy Po that is enforced by the vigilant object o together with the enforcement 
properties for authorisation and integrity is defined as To. 
To = Pö A Eo, autho A Eo, integ (8.12) 
The semantics of a SMAS3 that contains policies Po that are enforced by the vigilant 
objects oE SEvigobject is then defined as a conservative extension to the definition given 
in (8.6): 
SMAS3 = SMAS2 A bind n (8.13) 
A (keep (- readya)) ; (SaoTa)) A 
aESE,,, gagent 
n ((keep (- ready,, )) ; (keep (- enfo)) ; (SoOTo)) 
oESE,,, go6ject 
Here SEvigobject denotes the set of all vigilant objects that are defined in the SMAS. 
The formula keep (-1 readyo) bridges the initialisation phase of the object, and the for- 
mula keep (- enfo) over the subsequent interval until the variables for the first interface 
invocation on object o are initialised. 
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The level of abstraction that is provided by this mapping guarantees, that no policy 
related event, that is specified in terms of object variables, can be lost. Object variables 
are only modified by interfaces. The marker en f,, is true after the initialisation of each 
interface execution. Consequently from one state o in the abstraction to the next state 
rri+l all policy related changes can be observed. The abstraction is also intuitive, as it 
ux+atts that one unit interval in the policy specification bridges the execution of exactly 
one interface at the system level. It also ensures that for every interface execution a policy 
decision is trade. 
SN-IAS 
0(7 ,I 
keep ready, T 
Figure 8.4: Vigilant Object enforcing a policy 
8.6.3 Enforcing Authorisation 
The enforcement of authorisation is analogous to the vigilant agent case. However, the 
object of the authorisation check is now the vigilant object and the action is the vigilant 
object's interface. The control variable that indicates the success of the interface invocation 
do1u' 
),, L,; is used instead of the agent control variable. 
EPa, 
aatho =A keep (- autho(a, o, i) O Oý doneo. a. i) 
(8.14) 
aE. S'uFij 
iEAct 
The enforcement property states that if the agent a is not authorised to invoke the interface 
i of object o in state oz then it cannot be the case that in the next state Qi+i the interface 
has been successfully executed by a. 
212 
8.6. V1(. IL: 1N'1' UI0h: ('I' 
8.6.4 Enforcing Integrity 
The enforcement of integrity is analogous to the vigilant agent cause. It states that if the 
integrity constraints are not met, then the interface invocation cannot he successful. 
EPo, integ A EI(- integ(a, o, i) D- don, (8.15) 
aE. 4vc6j 
iEAet 
For integrity policies the level of abstraction poses a special itp(iate In"obleui if t IIv 
policies reference parameters. This is illustrated in Figure 8.5 below. 
s0/, 
4 
init2 ýý ýý srrrrrrrl V fn, il rnil, ., 
/1111 i 
,,,, 
ý°n. f ready,, enf,, rwid, y,, 
Figure 8.5: Abstraction Level for Environmental hrtegrity Politics 
The object starts the execution of an interface in a state where it is ready (e. g. (7, ), 
It then initialises the local variables for the parameters. This is done in stile tea. The 
marker enfo is used to select this state in the abstraction for the euforcenueut of the polio ý, 
Following this, the interface executes on the local variables and either succeeds or afails. 
The interface invocation ends in the next state where the object is ready The results 
in the local variables remain stable from state (71 to (7 . III, 
The problem is that the invocation of the next interface would potenlially overwrite 
the local results and output parameters in the initialisation (state (7,,, to (T,, ). t1w 
policy semantics assumes that the results are available in the final state oft he int ervicl. 'Iii 
ensure that the results of the computation and the parameter values of t he last execiit ion 
are still available in state o,,, it is necessary to store them separately. 
For all local variables v' that are assigned iii the initialisation iiait,,. r we jut rocluce 
an auxiliary variable vh that reflects the value v' in the last interface execnt iou. 'I'lse 
refinement of the initialisation follows along the same lines as the refinenieut lu int ri liice 
the marker variables. 
anzti. s 
Q2)1'- eIV' 
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Introduction of the new variables; Strengthening of the assignment and augmenting the 
control variables to ensure that the new variables are kept stable. 
C jvl, vh«- e, VII vi. 
We denote here by V* the original set of variables that are controlled by the initialisa- 
tion and by V1* the augmented set that contain the new variables. Using this two level 
approach, the results of the last execution are available in the next enforcement state a,. 
In more detail this means that the results have been computed in the local variables v' in 
state al. They are then kept stable until state oa. Their values are then copied into the 
variables vh in state o, viz. vh in 0 m, has the same value as v in al. References to results 
in the integrity policy map to the variables vh. 
8.7 Security Enforcer 
A security enforcer is a separate entity in the system, that mediates the access to object 
interfaces placed under its protection. A security enforcer is like an object and can define 
additional interfaces and variables. In the following the set 08e, p denotes the set of objects 
that are under the protection of the security enforcer se. Ie, P denotes the set of interfaces 
that are protected by the security enforcer se. These are obtained from the protect clause 
in the specification of the security enforcer. The syntax allows to omit the second identifier 
of names. This means that all interfaces Io of the object o are protected. 
8.7.1 Enforceable Policies 
The security enforcer can enforce environmental policies that control the protected in- 
terfaces. The security enforcer synchronises with all invocations of these interfaces and 
controls the access and integrity in a similar fashion as the vigilant object mechanism. 
The scope of the policies that can be maximally enforced by a security enforcer se is 
(Subjse, Objse, Actse) _ (A {se} U Ose, p, Ise U Ise, p}) 
A is the set of all agents in the SMAS. OBe, p is the set of all objects, that are listed in 
the protect part of se. Ise is the set of interfaces that are provided by se and I3e, p is the 
set of interfaces that are listed in the protect part of se. For example the security enforcer 
definition: 
214 
8.7. SECURITY ENFORCER 
i 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
securityenforcer ee : 
protect (01 , oz. 
il 
, 02. 
i2) 
var delegations = [] 
delegate(in g, in d, in z, in y) { ... 
revoke(in g. in d, in x, in y) { ... 
} 
end 
} 
For this security enforcer, the scope of the enforceable policy is: 
(ýQ, {01i02, Se}, {delegase, revoke, il, i2} U Iol) 
All subjects in the system can be controlled. Controlled objects are the security enforcer 
and the objects of and o2. Controlled interfaces are the interfaces that are defined by 
the enforcer (viz. delegate and revoke) and the interfaces under protection. The policies 
may reference the variables defined in the enforcer, but must not reference any variables 
defined in the objects under its protection. This means that the security enforcer observes 
the objects under its protection at the interface level. However, the policies may reference 
the parameters and control variables corresponding to the interfaces under protection. 
8.7.2 Motivating Example 
The system provides two objects paypal and itune. The object paypal provides the interface 
pay(in amount) that allows agents to make an on-line payment. 
The protection requirement 
for the objects is that whilst everybody can access the interface pay of paypal, only those 
agents that previously paid 5 (GBP) to paypal can access the interface download(out mp3) of 
object itune. This is a common scenario, e. g. a payment or non-disclosure statement must 
be made before the access is granted or a third party needs to give its consent. 
Listing 8.1: Motivating Example for the Security Enforcer 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
object paypal: /s"""s/ 
pay(in amount) { /s ... s/ 
} 
end 
object itune : /s ... s/ 
... s/ 
} dovnload(out mp3) { /* 
end 
policy p: ( 
allow (S, paypal, pay) when true 
allow (S, itune, dovnload) when 
done(S, paypal, pay(x)) and x >= 5 
decide (S. O. A) when 0: allow(S, O, A) 
end 
securityenforcer se : protect 
(paypal, itune) end 
enforce p with as 
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The above policy would not be enforceable using any other mechanism because it does 
relate the execution of object of and 02. To ensure that the enforcer does not loose any 
policy related events, it serialises the access to all objects under its protection. This is 
explained in the next section. 
8.7.3 Semantics of the Security Enforcer 
The security enforcer is a special form of object, that mediates the access to the interfaces 
under its protection. The semantics of the security enforcer is an extension of the object 
semantics that was provided in Chapter 6. 
They key difference is that the security enforcer can either participate in the execution 
of one of its own interfaces or in the execution of one of the interfaces it is protecting. The 
definition of the security enforcer is similar to the one for objects (see (6.13) on page 141). 
(Pse = initse; ((®'se, x) ®(® (8.16) 
XEXae xEXae, p 
Here X8e is the set of all remote actions that invoke one of the security enforcers 
interfaces. XBe, p denotes the set of all remote actions that invoke one of the interfaces 
IBe, p the security enforcer protects. The definitions of initse and O e, x are the same as 
the initialisation and interface invocation of an object (see (6.14), page 141 and (6.15), 
page 142). 
To ensure that the security enforcer synchronises with the execution of the interfaces 
under its protection, the set of participating entities E,,, x (see (6.2), page 135) is redefined 
for the SMAS3 to include the security enforcer. 
The entities that are involved in the execution of the action x by the agent a are 
Ea, 
x = 
{a} if xE Xäoc 
{a, o} U SE, if xE Xd t 
(8.17) 
Where the set SEE is the set of all security enforcers that protect the interface i that the 
remote action x is invoking. 
SE, ={se I se E SEsecenf A2E I3e, p} (8.18) 
This guarantees that all security enforcers synchronise with the execution of a remote 
action that is invoking an interface under their protection. 
The restriction of having only one enforcer for per object means that the set contains 
either none or exactly one security enforcer. However, with a future extension of conflict 
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resolution between enforcers in place the set can be larger. 
8.7.4 Mapping Policy- and System States 
The abstraction for the security enforcer is the same as the abstraction for vigilant objects. 
However, the policy enforced by the security enforcer is interpreted over the states where 
the control variable enf,, of any of the objects oE ObjSe that are under the protection of 
the security enforcer se are true. 
The synchronisation of the security enforcer, objects and invoking agents ensures that 
at most one object oE Obj9e can be accessed at any point in time. We define the S8e that 
bridges between the projected states as: 
S3e -V enfo A skip 
(keep 
A- enfo A 
(fin 
(V enfo) (8.19) 
OE Obj se of 
Obi., of Obj ae 
This selects those states where any of the protected objects or the security enforcer itself 
have set the marker enfo. 
The enforcer enforces the complete policy Pse: 
PSe = Comp(SubjSe, 0 bj3e, Actse, Pse) (8.20) 
The formula T3e that holds over the projected interval is the policy that is enforced in 
conjunction with the enforcement properties. 
Tse = Pse A EPse, autho A EPse, integ (8.21) 
We augment definition (8.13) with the semantics of the security enforcer and the en- 
forcement of policies to the final version of the SMAS3 semantics: 
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SMAS3 = SMAS2 A bind A (8.22) 
A (keep (- readya)) ; (SaOTa)) A aE SEvsgagent 
A ((keep (- ready, )) ; (keep (-' enfo)) ; (S0iTo)) A 
of S&, g0bj, t 
A BeESEe, enf ýOse n 
A (keep (-ready3e)) ; (keep(-( V enfo))) ; (Sse07'se) 
seESEBeee f oEO6jse 
This means that the enforcement of a policy by a security enforcer mechanisms starts 
with the first interface invocation after the security enforcer has been initialised. 
8.7.5 Enforcing Authorisation 
The enforcement property for authorisation is similar to the one defined for the vigilant 
object mechanism. However, it applies to the maximal enforceable scope of the security 
enforcer. 
EPse, autho °A keep (- autho(s, o, a) D O-, done(s, o, a)) 
sESubjee 
oE Obj se 
aEACtae 
8.7.6 Enforcing Integrity 
(8.23) 
The enforcement property for integrity is similar to the one defined for the vigilant object 
mechanism. However, it applies to the maximal enforceable scope of the security enforcer. 
EP8e, integ =A [I(- integ(s, o, a) D -, done(s, o, a)) (8.24) 
8ESu6jse 
oE O6j ee 
ßEACtse 
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8.8 Summary 
In this chapter we have shown what the enforcement of the different types of policies using 
the three enforcement mechanisms vigilant agent, vigilant object and security enforcer 
means and how policies can be associated with enforcement mechanisms in the SANTA 
language. Security Enforcers have been introduced as special objects that mediate the 
access to interfaces under their protection. 
We defined for each enforcement mechanism the abstraction over which the enforce- 
ment of the policy is defined. The intuition is that the vigilant agent makes one policy 
decision before entering its execution phase. For vigilant objects the intuition is that the 
policy decision is made for every invocation. The security enforcer synchronises the access 
to all interfaces under its protection and defines the result of the policy decision for each 
interface invocation. It has been shown that these are suitable abstractions. 
In addition to the abstraction level, the meaning of enforcing the different types of poli- 
cies has been captured in enforcement properties. They define the relation between the 
object and agent control variables and the enforcement variables that reflect policy deci- 
sions. The abstraction and the enforcement properties provide the high-level specification 
of what enforcement means in the SMMAS3. 
In the following chapter we consider the development that leads from the abstract 
specification of agents and objects and enforcement mechanisms to concrete implementable 
code. 
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Refinement 
This chapter provides refinement rules that are used for the stepwise 
refinement of the abstract specification constructs in SANTA into con- 
crete, implementable constructs. The application of the rules is illus- 
trated using the motivating example of Chapter 5 that is extended to 
enforce a simple policy vigilantly. 
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9.1 Introduction 
Refinement is the provably correct transformation of an abstract specification into a con- 
crete (deterministic) program. A good introduction to refinement is given in e. g. [96]; 
Back et. al. address the refinement of sequential and concurrent programs in [13,11]; Re- 
finement of ITL specifications into executable programs has been investigated in [41]. The 
specification-oriented semantics of the SANTA language allows to define transformations, 
so-called refinement rules, that can be applied to a specification to make it more deter- 
ministic. The iterative application of the rules is called stepwise refinement. 
In SANTA some statements define the behaviour of the system at a more abstract level 
than others. The temporal assignment for example defines only the value of the variable 
in the final state of the interval - it does not define any value for intermediate states, nor 
the length of the interval over which the assignment takes place. In contrast a concrete 
assignment defines the length of the interval to be exactly one. Similarly the enforcement 
mechanisms define the effect that policy decisions have on the agents and objects in the 
SMMAS at an abstract level. They must also be refined into concrete enforcement code that 
guarantees the compliance with the enforcement properties at the high-level. 
In SANTA we use the notion of delayed refinement. By this we mean, that part of the 
system can be refined into concrete and implementable constructs, while another part re- 
mains at the abstract level. Delayed refinement allows to focus on one aspect of the system 
at a time. In SANTA delayed refinement is possible because of the compositional seman- 
tics of the underlying logic ITL and the fixed structure of the SMAS, i. e. the separation 
into agents and objects that encapsulate variables. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 9.2 we define the notion of refinement 
that is used in this work and prove some of the less obvious refinement rules that are 
used in the subsequent examples. In Section 9.3 we show how the different phases in 
the execution of the SANTA agent that was described informally in Section 5.2.4 can 
be refined into deterministic ones. This shows how the refinement rules are applied to 
develop a concrete and implementable agent. Subsequently in Section 9.4 we show how 
policies that are enforced vigilantly by an agent are refined into concrete enforcement 
code. The advantage of this approach is that it allows to give guarantees on the time 
that the enforcement mechanisms need to compute the policy decision in a state. The 
potential benefits are similar to those presented in [111,1181, however we have a sound 
mathematical foundation that allows to reason about and proof timing properties. We 
conclude the chapter in Section 9.5 with a short summary. 
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9.2 Refinement Rules 
Refinement in this work means implication. A specification spec, is refined by another 
specification spec2 if spec2 D spec.. 
specs C spec2 = spec2 D specs 
The specification oriented semantics of SANTA makes it possible to prove that one SANTA 
program is a refinement of another. This is used to gradually refine the abstract spec- 
ification of the SANTA program towards a program that contains only implementable 
constructs, viz. the timing of statements is deterministic and enforcement mechanisms 
are implemented to ensure the compliance with policies and enforcement properties. The 
following theorems are not a complete list of all refinement rules, but rather a collection 
of the less obvious refinements used in the examples. 
Theorem 7 (Temporal to Concrete Parallel Assignment) 
The abstract multiple assignment is refined by the concrete multiple assignment. 
Ixl... xn. -- el... enIV C Qxl... xn: = el... enIV 
Proof 7 (Temporal to Concrete Assignment) 
The abstract multiple assignment with respect to to a set of variables V is defined as: 
I 2p,..., 2n "- ep,..., en ] v= 
n (xi`'-ei)^ A 0<i<n uEV\{xp,..., xn} 
the concrete multiple assignment as: 
I xo,..., xn := eo,..., en 
stable (u) 
IV = skip AA ((Oxi) = ei) AA stable (u) 
0<i<n uEV\{xo,..., xn} 
In both cases the last conjunct keeps all variables in V that are not assigned, stable 
throughout the interval. It remains to be shown that x :=e is a refinement of x +- e. 
x +- e= finite A fin (x) =e by definition 
C skip A fin (x) =e because: skip D finite 
skip A (Ox) =e because: skip D ((Ox) - fin (x)) 
x :=e by definition 
The final state in a unit interval is identical to the next state. 
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Theorem 8 (Prefix Introduction for Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
An temporal multiple assignment can be refined into an idle prefix followed by the temporal 
multiple assignment. 
[x-- e]y C [idie; x. - e]y 
provided xEV and that e is an expression on variables in V. 
Proof 8 (Prefix Introduction for Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
Proof that 
[idle; x. - e]v D Ix- e]v 
Assumptions: xEV and (AVEv stable v) D stable e. 
[x- e]y=(x- en A stable v) (9.1) 
vEV\{x} 
Introduction of a unit interval that keeps the expression e stable. Using the assumption all 
variables in V are kept stable. The length of the interval is still finite: (skip; finite) D finite. 
((skip n Astable v) ;x «- e) AA stable v) (9.2) 
vEV vEV\{z} 
Importing the conjunct (/ `VEV\{x} stable v) in the Chop yields: 
((skip n Astable v)) ; ((x 4- c) AA stable v) (9.3) 
vEV vEV\{x} 
The right hand side of the Chop is the definition of the temporal parallel assignment. The 
left hand side of the Chop is the definition of idle. 
_[ idle1 y; [x«- e]V (9.4) 
Using the statement semantics of the sequential composition this can be combined to: 
[idle; x. - ely (9.5) 
Theorem 9 (Extended Prefix for Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
From the iterative application of Theorem 8 follows that: 
[x4. - e]v C 
(([ldle]v)* A finite) ; [x. - c]v 
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Proof 9 (Extended Prefix for Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
The proof is straightforward from the iterative application of Theorem 8. Restricting the 
Chopstar to a finite interval is necessary. 
Theorem 10 (Sequential Decomposition of Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
An temporal multiple assignment can be decomposed sequentially. 
[x1. 
.. xnt- ei ... en]v 
C [var t1. 
.. 
tp-- xi ... xj 
x1 ... xj. - e1 ... ej 
i xj+l ... xn. - ej+1 ... en 
Ay 
where 1<j<n and 1<i<i and ei = ei [ti ... tj/xl ... xj] 
is the expression ei where 
every occurrence of xi .. xj is substituted with the local variable tl ... tj. 
Proof 10 (Sequential Decomposition of Temporal Multiple Assignment) 
The introduction of local variables is a refinement. 
[xl 
... xn«- el ... en]v 
C 3tl ... 
tj " (Ixi ... xn«- el ... en]v) 
The application of Theorem 9 yields: 
C 3tl ... tj " 
(finite n ([idlelv)` ; [xl ... xna- el ... enjv) 
The left hand side of the Chop can be refined by an temporal assignment that maintains 
all variables in V. Additionally the set of variables V is extended by the set of local 
variables, to keep them stable. 
C 3tl ... 
tj". 
. 
(It, 
. 
tj"- Xi ... xjLVu{ti... t; } ; 
[xi 
... Xi ... xn. - el ... ej ... en1VU{tl... t; }) 
The temporal assignment keeps all variables in V stable over the finite interval in which the 
local variables tl ... tj are assigned. In the final state of the assignment the local variables 
have the same value as the corresponding variables xl ... xj. This is used to substitute all 
occurrences of xi ... xj in the expressions ej+l ... en, with the local variables tl ... tj. The 
expression after the substitution is denoted by ei = ei [ti ... tjlxl ... xj], 
j<i<n. 
C 3ti ... ti " 
([tl 
... ti. - xi ... xi]vu{tl... t; }); 
[xi 
... x. i, xj+i ... xn. - el ... ej, ej+i ... en]VU{tl... t; } 
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Splitting the assignment into a prefix and a suffix: 
C 3t1 ... tj - 
([ti 
... tjr- xi . .. xj]vu{t,... t, }); 
[xl 
... xj- ei ... ej ; xj+ý ... xn«- 
ei+l 
. .. en ]vu{tý... y} 
is a refinement, because the values that have been assigned to xi ... xj in the prefix are 
kept stable over the suffix, and the expressions ej'+1 ... e;, 
do not depend on xl ... xj. The 
substitution with the local variables ensured that the expressions e, '+1 ... e;, yield the same 
result as in the expressions ej+l ... e in the initial state. 
C 3tl ... tj " 
([tl 
... tj4-- x] ... xj]vu{t,... tj}); 
[xl 
... xj. - el ... ej ; xj+l ... xn«- ej+, l 
Using the semantics of the sequential composition and the semantics of local -variable 
introduction, this can be rewritten to: 
[var t1... tj+- x1 ... xj : 
{x1 
... xj"- el... ej ; xj+1... xn- ej'+1 ... e;, 
}]v 
Theorem 11 (Remove unreferenced Local Variables) 
A local variable t1 that is never referenced in stat can be removed. 
[var tl, ..., tnf- expri, ..., exprn : stat] C 
[var t2, ... 9 tn«- expr2, ..., exprn : stat] 
If tl is the only local variable, the var construct can be removed. 
9.3 Refinement of the SMAS1 Example 
When refining the example all temporal multiple assignments must be expressed as con- 
crete multiple assignments or sequences of concrete assignments. The specification level 
behaviour of the example is included here again, for the readers convenience. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
6 
7 
8 
9 
agent ag : 
var x=0 
when x< 232 do inc x x+l 
when x<2 33 do dbl x 2*x 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, dbl«- 1,0 
else inc, dbl. - 0,1 } 
end 
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SMAS 
Figure 9.1: Specification level behaviour of the SMAS1 example 
1I) nc 
Figure 9.2: Specification level behaviour of action inc 
9.3.1 Initialisation 
The semantics of the initialisation phase states that the control variable nrady. is false 
throughout the initialisation, and that all other control variables are assigned to their 
default value at the end of the initialisation plinse. Additionally all agent variables me 
assigned their initial value. 
All the agent state variables Vg are known. The specification of the initialisation phtwo 
(see Section 5.3.1, Equation (5.1)) can be expressed as the following SANTA stateujent. 
initag = readyag = falseA 
Idotermag, termag, doneag, inc, doneag, dbl, failCdag, inc, failcdag, dbl+ 1lag, inc, tlag, dbl9 X «- 
nn 
false, false, false, false, false, false, 1,1,0 
It is assumed, that the control variable readya is correctly initinlitie(I to false. This 
statement is clearly satisfying the specification, as it guarantees that the %itriabk trady. g is 
kept stable (viz. false) throughout the duration of the temporal assignment. The temporal 
multiple assignment can then be refined using the refinement rules that have been provided 
in the previous section. First Theorem 10 is applied to split the nssigmnent: 
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initag g; readyag = falsen 
[var tl «- doterm8g: { 
doterm. 
g , -- false; 
term. ag, doneag, inc, doneag, dbl, failedag, 1oc, failedag, dbl, rlag, inc, llag, dbl, X4-- 
false, false, false, false, false, 1,1,0 
] v. 
The local variable ti is never referenced in the following statement. The application 
of Theorem 11 removes this unreferenced variable: 
initag C readyag = falseA 
[dotermag *. - false; 
termag, dOneag, inc, doneag, dbl, fatlcdag, incl, %atledag, dbl+rIag, inci nag, dblv X '- 
false, false, false, false, false, 1,1,0 
]va 
The repeated application of Theorems 10 and 11 yields: 
initag C readyag = falseA 
[dotermag +- false ; termag +- false; 
doneag, inc, doneag, dbl, failedag, inc, failcdag, dbl 'I"- false, false, false, false; 
nag, inc "- 1; 1lag, dbl 4- 1; X +- 0 
ýV., 
Using Theorem 7 the temporal multiple assignment is refined to the concrete (multiple) 
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assignment. 
initag C readyag = falseA 
Qdotermag := false ; termag := false; 
doneag, inc, doneag, dbl, failedag, inc, failedag, dbl false, false, false, false; 
nag, inc "= 
1; nag, dbl "= 
1; x :=0 
v, ý I 
It is assumed, that the boolean control variables indicating the success or failure of the 
previously executed action are implemented as an integer, that represents the four boolean 
variables and allows for their parallel assignment. All assignments are now concrete and 
the length of the initialisation phase is determined. This is depicted in Figure 9.3 
dotermag := false doneag, inc,.... = false,... na9, d6l :=1 
Figure 9.3: Implementation Level behaviour of the initialisation phase 
The states are listed in the table below: 
Agent Variables of 02 Q3 04 a5 Qs C1, -7 
x Variable x ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 
Priority Variables 
IIag,; nc Priority of inc ? ? ? ? 1T 1 1 
nag, dbl Priority of dbl ? ? ? ? ? 1 1 
Control Variables 
readyag ag is ready F F F F F F F 
doneag,, nc ag successfully executed inc 
? ? ? F F F F 
failedag, lnc ag failed executing inc 
? 7 ? F F F F 
doneag, dbl ag successfully executed dbl ? 7 ? F F F F 
failedag, dbl ag failed executing dbl ? ? ? F F F F 
termag Final state of the DEE cycle ? ? F F F F F 
dotermag Indicate termination at the end of DEE ? F F F F F F 
Table 9.1: States in the Initialisation Phase 
The temporal multiple assignment has been refined into a sequence of assignments of 
length 6. The refined initialisation phase contains now only concrete assignments and its 
implementation is straight forward. Other refinements are obviously possible. 
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9.3.2 Deliberation 
The deliberation phase is refined in a similar fashion. The statement is explicitly defined 
in the deliberation section and assigns the priority variables to non-negative values, while 
maintaining all other agent state variables. 
delibag, expticit = [S]v, 9 A 
delibag, esternat 
=I if x%2=0 then inc, dbl«- 1,0 else inc, dbl'- 0,1 
The statement clearly implies delibag, exte, nal, as only priority variables are modified and 
assigned to non-negative values. 
C[ if x%2=0 then inc, dbl. 1,0 else inc, dbl«- 0,1 
]v09 A deli6a9, acernal 
I Vaý 
The application of Theorems 10 and 11 yields then: 
C[ if x%2=0 then (inc: =1; dbl: =O)else {inc: =O; dbl: =1} I Va9 
From the initialisation it is clear that in the first state a7 the value of x is 0. This 
means that in the first iteration of the DEE cycle the true branch of the conditional is 
executed. This leads to the following behaviour: 
Agent Variables as aj, =all ak, = 010 
x Variable x 0 0 0 
Priority Variables 
17.,, E Priority of inc 1 1 1 
fI.,, dw Priority of dbl 1 0 0 
Control Variables 
neadyq ag is ready F F T 
done.,,,. ag successfully executed inc F F F 
failed, 
g,,, c ag 
failed executing inc F F F 
done.,, dbi ag successfully executed dbl F F F 
failedq, 1 ag failed executing dbl F 
F F 
term., Final state of the DEE cycle F F F 
doterrn., Indicate termination at the end of DEE F F F 
Table 9.2: States in the Deliberation and Enforcement Phase 
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9.3.3 Enforcement 
Since no policies are defined to be vigilantly enforced by the agent, the enforcement phase 
does not affect the priority decisions made in the deliberation step. 
enfag = 
(finite 
AA fin (Tn < IIag, x < 1n) AA (keep stable v) ;Q 
XEXa9 vEV 
readyag := true 
The initial state always satisfies / \XEiia9 0< 
nag, x < 1n 
(see deliberation), therefore 
the empty interval is a trivial refinement of the above prefix. (empty D finite and 
empty D keep f). 
C empty ;[ ready,,, := true yVng=Q readyag := true uQ9 I 
The empty prefix can be omitted. No policy is enforced in this phase and the agent can 
immediately enter the execution phase. 
9.3.4 Execution 
In the execution phase the agent chooses one of the enabled actions non-deterministically 
or remains idle. An action is enabled, if the agent is ready, its precondition and its guard 
evaluate to true. The chosen action is then executed on temporary variables and either 
succeeds or fails. 
The choice between success or failure is non-deterministic in the specification and 
refined into a conditional choice that reflects the outcome of an integrity check. As no 
policies are being enforced, the action can only succeed. This means that the statement 
execution for the action inc (see Equation (5.16)): 
8t(1ta9, inc = 
32' " 
is refined to: 
ý1 
E x' 4-- x 
C3x'" 
=3x'"(ý 
doneag, i.,,, c, 
doneag, dbl, failedag, inc7failedag, dbli x' true, false, false, false, 
x 
xl ýx t 
XI «- x 
9ýýI 
9 
x': =x'-}-1 
x'. =x'-F-1 
Pv 9; (succeeday, in, ® failag, inc)) 
oý+ ; succeeda9, inc) 9 
L V+ 
JX'' =X'+1 fl+ i °9 Vag 
p v,, +. > 
L Vag 
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Given the semantics of the sequential composition of statements this can be written as: 
- 32 " 
([2'. 2: 2ý: =2' + 1: 
doneag, ic, doneag, dbi, Jailedag inc, failedag, dbt+ 2: ~ true, falso, falsa, falso, x'IV+ ý ng 
With the definition of local variables (see Equation (5.10)) this can be rewritten to: 
_ [var x'- x: { x': =x' f 1; 
doneay, ic, doneay dGl, faileday inc, failedag, dGl+ x"- trua, ialsa, falsa, false, x'}] yQ9 
The temporal multiple assignment can now be refined using the Theorems 10 and 11. 
Similarily the statement for the action dbl can be refined. The non-deterministic choice 
between the enabled actions can be refined to a conditional choice. In this example this 
is straight-forward. 
SOag = gag, inc A ncadyay n ([readyay: =jalsc[v,, ; statag, inc) 0 
9ag, dGl n neady, 9 A ([rradyQ9: =falae]t; D ; statay, d61) 
® 
idleQy 
Using the statement definition and the definition of the conditional choice we can refine 
the nondeterministic choice as: 
[if (gag, inc and rreadyag) then rcadyag: =f also; statag, inc 
else if (Sag, dtl and readyag) then rcadyag: =tala" ; statag, d61 
else idleag] ys 
In other settings however, care must be taken to ensure that the fairness criterion is 
met. An implementation could for example randomly choose between enabled actions or 
implement more sophisticated scheduling algorithms. Table 9.3 shows the behaviour of 
the agent variables, assuming that the temporal multiple assignments are refined as shown 
in the earlier examples. We assume that the creation and assignment of the local variable 
x' takes one unit interval. 
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Agent Variables 011 0k=12 0,13 014 012=15 
x Variable x 00001 
X1 Local Variable x' 0111 
Priority Variables 
ri. 
g, inc Priority of inc 1 1 1 1 1 
R. 
g. dbl Priority of dbl 0 0 0 0 0 
Control Variables 
ready,, ag is ready F F F FF 
done,,,,., ag successfully executed inc F F F TT 
failed..,,,, ag failed executing inc F F F FF 
done. g, dbl ag successfully executed dbl F F F FF 
failed. 
g, dbl ag failed executing dbl F F F FF 
term., Final state of the DEE cycle F F F FF 
doterm. g Indicate termination at the end of DEE F F F FF 
Table 9.3: States in the Execution Phase 
This example shows that it is possible to refine a SANTA program from its abstract, 
specification oriented semantics into concrete, implementable constructs. At the concrete 
level all choices are deterministic, and an execution trace can be derived from the seman- 
tics. The refinement of the SNMAS2 is very similar to the refinement that was shown in 
this section and is not detailed. 
9.4 Refining a Vigilant Agent 
The previous section has shown how the abstract specification of a SANTA agent can be 
refined to be deterministic and implementable. The example assumed, that no enforcement 
mechanisms are in place and that any action execution does therefore succeed. In this 
section we concern ourselves with the refinement of a vigilant agent, that is enforcing a 
simple policy and show how the action selection and the non-deterministic choice between 
action success and failure is refined to ensure that the vigilant agent correctly enforces 
the policy, viz. satisfies the enforcement properties. This can be easily extended for the 
enforcement of composed policies. 
To keep the example simple, we extend the definition of the SMASI example that was 
refined in the previous section with a policy that is vigilantly enforced by the agent. 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
agent ag : 
var x=0 
when x< 232 do inc :x x+l 
when x< 231 do dbl :x := 2*x 
deliberation :{ 
if x%2=0 then inc, DB "- 1,0 
else inc, dbl. - 0,1 } 
end 
policy p: 
( allow (ag, ag, A) when true 
deny (ag, ag, dbl) when 1: (x < 5), 
decide (ag, ag, A) when 0: ( allow(ag, ag, A) and 
not deny(ag, ag, A)), 
oblige (ag, ag, inc) when [T.. 2,21: sometime (x < 3), 
integrity (ag, ag, A) when 0: x' < 20 
end 
enforce p with ag 
The agent definition remains the same as previously described. The agent would start 
the execution with the action inc and alternate continuously between the execution of 
dbl and inc until the value exceeds the integer limit. However, now the policy p that is 
enforced vigilantly by the agent ag does impose additional constraints. 
The example of the agent has been deliberately kept simple. The complexity of the 
actual computation that is performed by the actions, or the complexity of the decision 
making is irrelevant for the enforcement of policies. The policy is defined at an abstract 
level where the details of the computation are hidden. At this level of abstraction it does 
not make a difference whether the action merely increments an integer or performs another 
complex computation. Similarly the complexity that is involved in the agent deliberation 
is not visible at this level - only the result, viz. the assignment of the priority values is 
observable. 
The policy p shows an example for each type of rule and contains some rules that 
reference the history of the execution. The informal meaning of the rules is as follows: 
Positive Authorisation The agent ag is unconditionally (viz. the premise of the rule is 
true) allowed to execute actions. 
Negative Authorisation The agent ag is denied to perform the action dbl if the value 
of its agent variable x was in the previous state less than 5. 
Decision Rule The agent ag may execute any of its actions provided that it is allowed 
(positive authorisation) and not denied (negative authorisation) to do so. 
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Obligation Rule The agent ag is obliged to execute the action inc if the value of x has 
been less than 3 at some point within the past interval of length 2. The interpretation 
of the past interval is lenient, viz. if there is not enough history available for the 
evaluation of the rule, the longest available past interval is used. 
Integrity Rule Any action execution is considered to be failed if it would assign a value 
to x that is greater than 20. 
These additional constraints on the execution change the actual execution of the agent 
quite dramatically. The result is that the agent will increment the value of x until it reaches 
5 and remain idle for one step. Following this, the agent's execution is not affected by 
the policy and it alternates between doubling and incrementing the value of x. However, 
it will soon exceed the maximal value of 20 that is defined by the integrity rule and as a 
result constantly try to execute the action and fail. This is detailed in the following. 
To enforce authorisation rules and obligation rules we implement the enforcement phase 
of the agent in such a way that the assignment of priority variables guarantees that none 
of the enforcement properties is violated. Table 9.4 shows the execution of the agent at 
the states where the agent is ready. To give a better intuition we provided two values 
for the priority variables. The first value denotes the outcome of the agent's deliberation. 
The second value is the value that is assigned during the enforcement phase of the agent, 
viz. that overrules the initial decision. If only one value is specified, it means that the 
enforcement phase does not modify the decision. 
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State Op oj 0'2' a3' C4 Ojy 06, aý oe og 
x= 0 1 2 3 4 5 5 10 11 11 
n, 1/-1 0/-1 1/-1 0/-1 1/-1 0/ 0/ 1/ 0/ 0/ 
II d6/ 0/ 1/0 0/0 1/0 0/0 1/0 1/ 0/ 1/ 1/ 
donea9, , c F T T T T T F F T F 
faileda9,,, ý F F F F F F F F F 
donea9, d6i F F F F F F F T F F 
faileda9, d61 F F F F F F F F F T 
autho+(ag, ag, inc) T T T T T T T T T T 
autho'(ag, ag, dbl) T T T T T T T T T T 
autho- (ag, ag, inc) F F F F F F F F F F 
autho- (ag, ag, dbl) F T T T T T F F F F 
autho(ag, ag, inc) T T T T T T T T T T 
autho(ag, ag, dbl) T F F F F F T T T T 
oblig(ag, ag, inc) T T T T T F F F F F 
oblig(ag, ag, dbl) F F F F F F F F F F 
integ(ag, ag, inc) F T T T T T T T T F 
integ(ag, ag, dbl) F T T T T T T T T F 
Table 9.4: Vigilantly Enforced Policy 
In state orb the value of x is 0, the agent's deliberation phase decides on the execution of 
action inc. The evaluation of the policy shows that the agent is indeed allowed to execute 
any action. Since x is less than 3, the obligation rule fires (T = 0, viz. for the empty 
interval it is sometimes the case that x is less than 3). The integrity cannot be met in the 
inital state, as any integrity rule demands at least a history of one. This does not violate 
the enforcement property for integrity, because in the initial state it is also not possible 
that an action has been executed. To enforce the obligation, the priority nine is assigned 
to the value -1, guaranteeing the execution of action inc. 
In the next state (a, ) the agent has successfully executed the action inc, since the 
updated state met the integrity constraint (x < 20). The value of x is now 1. Consequently 
the agent decides to execute the action dbl. Evaluating the policy results in the assignment 
of nine to -1 to meet the agent's obligation. Additionally the negative authorisation (x in 
the last state is less than 5) to execute action dbl means that ndbt is assigned to the value 
0, guaranteeing that it is not executed. The agent executes the action inc again. 
This continues until state as, in which the value of x has reached 5. In this state the 
agent is no longer obliged to execute inc, because there is no state in the past interval of 
length 2 where x is less than 3. Still the last value of x is less than 5, leading to a negative 
authorisation to execute action dbl. The agent's deliberation phase decided to execute 
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action dbi, which is overruled by the negative authorisation, and not to execute action inc. 
The agent remains idle, because no action can be chosen for execution. This is reflected 
in the assignment of the control variables done and failed in the next state - they are all 
false. 
The case for cr is similar to the previous one, however, the negative authorisation 
cannot be derived. This means that the agent does not execute the action dbi and thus 
doubled the value of x from 5 to 10. From now on the agent behaves normally, viz. the 
decision made by its deliberation phase is not overruled in the enforcement phase. All 
actions executions are permissible and no obligations can be derived. This continues until 
state o, 81. 
In state v$ the agent decides on doubling the value of x from 11 to 22. The execution 
of the action dbl starts, but the result is rejected by the integrity policy. This means that 
the value of x remains 11 in state v9. The failure to execute is indicated in the control 
variable failedag, dbj. Unfortunately the deliberation of the agent is not very sophisticated 
and does not take into account the possibility for failure. Consequently the same decision 
to execute the action dbi will be made again. This continues indefinitely. 
In the above example the policy decisions have been made by interpreting the seman- 
tics of the policy rules. However the aim of this chapter is to show how we can refine 
the enforcement phase of an agent in such a way, that the assignments to the priority 
variables ensure that the enforcement properties of the vigilant agent hold. This process 
can be automated and effectively compiles a policy specification into the corresponding 
enforcement code, that guarantees the compliance of the system with its security policy. 
This is explained in the following. 
9.4.1 Determining the Required Enforcement History 
To be able to evaluate the rules, the history of the execution is needed. It is not efficient to 
store the history of the whole execution. To keep the history to a minimum, we transform 
the policy rules into a normal form, that allows us to compute the maximal history that 
is needed for each variable that is referenced in the rules. 
Given the rule premise it is possible to determine the history of the referenced variables 
that is needed for the enforcement of the rule. For example the following premises of rules: 
1 
2 
3 
consequence when 0: x=1 
consequence when 2x=1 
consequence when (1 :x= 1) ; (2 :y=5) 
The first rule is a state-dependent rule, that states that x is now equal to 1. In this case 
no history for the variable x is required for the enforcement. The second rule is history 
dependent, and states that the value of x two time units in the past must have been equal 
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to 1 for the rule to fire. In this case the history of x must be kept for at least two previous 
states. 
In the third rule two different variables, x and y, are referenced. The rule states that 
two time units in the past the variable y had the value 5 and in the state before x had 
the value 1. In this case the history for the variable y must be kept for at least the last 2 
states and for the variable x for the last 3 states. To obtain the maximal time for which 
the history of a variable must be kept, we transform the rules into a normal form. 
9.4.2 Rule Transformation 
To compute the maximal history that must be kept for a rule to ensure that the rule can be 
enforced it is beneficial to transform the rule into disjunctive normal form. In the following 
we will use mathematical notation (e. g. A) in preference of the ASCII representation (e. g. 
and) of the SANTA language, because of its compactness. The following rules can be 
applied: 
fln(f2vf3)(flnf2)v(f1nf3) 
fl; 
+(f2vf3) = 
(fi'+f2)v (f1; f3) 
sometime f= true; f 
[t1,..., tn): f =(tt : f)v... v(tn : f) 
t: (fivf2)=(t: fi)v(t: f2) 
exists x<n: f =(x=0n f)v... v(x= 
forall x<nf e(x=0n f)n... n(x= 
if w then f else g= (w n f) v ('Iw n g) 
(9.6) 
(9.7) 
(9.8) 
(9.9) 
(9.10) 
nn f) (9.11) 
71 A f) (9.12) 
(9.13) 
We assume for (9.8) that the overall premise of the rule is finite. This is a reasonable 
assumption for the enforcement of rules, because policy decisions in infinite time are not 
of any practical interest. The syntax of rules allows only bounded quantification, viz. 
quantifications can be expanded into a finite conjunction or disjunction. For the static 
timing analysis we only consider the explicit and implicit time information in the premise. 
We do not consider the satisfiability of state-formnulae and assume that any state-formula 
(except false) is satisfiable. For example the following premise 
([1 
,3 , 7j : x=0) and ((2: (sometime y=2)) ; ((0 , 1) : z=0)) 
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can be transformed to a disjunctive normal form by applying the above rules: 
([1,3,7] : x=0)A((2: (O(y=2))); ([0,1]: z=0)) 
Substitution of Of with true; f (9.8) and expansion of the times (9.9): 
((1: x=0)v(3: x=0)v(7: x=0))n((2: (true; y=2)); ((0: z=0)v(1: z=0)) 
Applying (9.7) on the second conjunct: 
((1: x=0)v(3: x=0)v(7: x=0))n 
(((2 : (true; y= 2)) ; (0 :z= 0)) v ((2 : (true; y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0))) 
Applying (9.6): 
((1 :x= 0) n ((2 : (true ;y= 2)) ; (O :z= 0))) v 
((3 :x= 0) n ((2 : (true ;y= 2)) ; (O :z= 0))) v 
((7 :x= 0) n «2: (true ;y= 2)) ; (0 :z= 0))) v 
((1 :x= 0) A ((2 : (true ;y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0))) v 
((3: x=0)n((2: (true; y=2)); (1: z=0)))v 
((7 :x= 0) n ((2 : (true ;y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0))) 
9.4.3 Determining the Chopping Points 
To determine the length of the premise the following relations are used: 
0< Length(f) <T (9.14) 
The maximum length of any interval defined by the premise of the rule is the enforcement 
time T. 
Length(t : f) =t= Length(f) 
Length(f; g) = Length(f) + Length(g) 
Length(f n g) = Length(f) = Length(g) 
(9.15) 
(9.16) 
(9.17) 
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We can use the relations between the lengths Length(f) to determine the overall length of 
a premise or to show that a premise cannot be satisfied. For the above example we can 
establish that: 
" The first disjunct is not satisfiable because Length(1 :x= 0) =1 and Length((2 : 
(true ;y= 2)) ; (0 :z= 0)))) = 2. For the conjunction of both, the times must be 
equal (see (9.17)). The length of an interval cannot be 1 and 2 at the same time. 
Similarly the second, third, 4th and Gth disjunct are not satisfiable. 
9 The 5th disjunct is satisfiable. The timings that can be established are: 
Length(3 :x= 0) =3 
Length((2 : (true; y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0)) =3 
Length(2 : (true ;y= 2)) =2= (Length(true) + Length(y = 0)) 
Length(1 :z= 0) =I= Length(z = 0) 
In this case the timing Length(true) and Lcngth(y = 0) cannot be established. However, 
we know that their sum is equal to 2. Together with (9.14) this leads to a finite number 
of combinations: 
Length(true) =0 and Length(y = 0) =2 
Length(true) =1 and Lengthy = 0) =1 
Length(true) =2 and Lengthy = 0) =0 
If the chopping point is not determined by either the left-hand side or the right-hand 
side, then it can be at any state in the interval. Since the overall length of the interval 
is always less than T this case can be addressed by making the finite number of possible 
combinations explicit: 
(2 : (true ;y= 2)) 
is transformed by explicitly specifying the possible chop points to: 
(2 : (((0 : true) ; (2 :y= 2)) v ((1 : true) ; (1 :y= 2)) v ((2 : true) ; (0 :y= 2)))) 
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The new premise is again brought into disjunctive normal form: 
(3: x=0)A((2: (((O: true); (2: y=2))v 
((l : true) ; (1 :y= 2)) v 
((2: true) ; (0: y=2)))); (1: z=0)) 
Applying (9.10) and (9.7) 
(3: x=0)n((2: ((0: true) ; (2: y=2)); (1: z=0))v 
(2 : ((1 : true) ; (1 :y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0)) v 
(2 : ((2: true) ; (0: y=2)); (1: z=0))) 
Applying (9.6) 
((3: x=0)n(2: ((0: true) ; (2: y=2)); (1: z=0)))v 
((3 :x= 0) n (2 : ((1 : true) ; (1 :y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0))) v 
((3 :x= 0) n (2 : ((2 : true) ; (0 :y= 2)) ; (1 :z= 0))) 
This ensures, that all chopping points in the premise are deterministic. Since the 
premise describes a past behaviour from the view-point of the state in which the decision 
is made, we take this state as the fix-point when discussing history variables. We label 
the final state of the interval with o3 and the state in which the enforcement started with 
al. The meaning of ai is then the state that is i in the past of the state for which the 
policy decision is made. 
It is now easy to compute the state of each chopping point, by starting at the rightmost 
element of the sequence, working towards the leftmost element adding each time the length 
of the sequence element. For the example we annotated the chopping points with the state 
below: 
((3 :x= 0) n (2 : ((0 : true) ; a3 (2 :y= 2)) ; Qi (1 :z= 0))) v 
«3: x= 0) A (2: ((1 : true) ; °z (1 :y= 2)) ; °1 (1 :z= 0))) v 
((3 :x= 0) n (2 : ((2 : true) ; o'i (0 :y= 2)) ; °i (1 :z= 0))) 
With this information at hand it is straight forward to determine the maximum history 
that must be kept for each variable to be able to evaluate the premise of the rule: It is 
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the earliest chopping point left to the state formula in which the variable occurs. For the 
example the maximal history for x is 3; the maximal history for y is 3; and the maximal 
history of z is 1. 
9.4.4 Transformation of the Vigilant Agent Example 
The transformation of the rules is not detailed here, because it follows the same lines as 
the previously discussed premise. Only the obligation rule is of interest, as it references 
the enforcement time T. 
oblige (ag, ag, inc) when [T.. 2,2]: sometime (x<3) 
In the premise of this rule, we expand the sometime to: 
[T.. 2,2] : true ; (x, 3) 
T is the current enforcement time, viz. the abstract time since the enforcement of the 
rule started in the state where the consequence of the rule is determined. In this case 
the explicit timing of the rule states that any interval of length T to at most 2 in which 
sometimes x is less than 3. Knowing that T in the first state of the enforcement is 0 we 
can expand this to: 
(T=OA[0.. 2]: (true; (x<3)))v 
(T=1A[1.. 2]: (true; (x<3)))v 
(T=2A[2.. 2]: (true; (x<3)))v 
(2 : (true; (x < 3))) 
When expanding the times of the first disjunct, viz. (0.. 2] : to: 
(T =0A (0 : (true; (x < 3)) v1: (true; (x < 3)) v2: (true ; (x < 3)))) 
it is clear that the disjunct 1:... and 2:... cannot be satisfied, because every length 
must be less than or equal to T (see (9.14)). Since T is equal to 0, they cannot be satisfied. 
Consequently the premise can be reduced to: 
(T=0n0: (true; (x <3))) v 
(T =1A1: (true; (x < 3))) v 
(2 : (true ; (x < 3))) v 
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The disjunct (T =2A... is implies the last disjunct (2 : (true... and can therefore be 
removed. Again the chopping point of the sequence is not yet deterministic and must be 
made explicit as discussed previously. 
(T=0n0: (x<3))v 
(T=1n1: (x<3))v 
(T =1n (1 : true) ; (0: (x < 3))) v 
(2: (x < 3)) v 
((1 : true) ; (1 : (x < 3))) v 
((2 : true) ; (0 : (x < 3))) 
The result of the transformation is that the history of the agent variable x must be kept 
for 2 past states. This is needed for the enforcement of the obligation rule. 
9.4.5 Refining the Enforcement Time 
The enforcement phase as described in Section 5.3.4 guarantees that all agent variables are 
maintained and that the phase takes only finite time to execute. The abstract specification 
of the enforcement time T is implemented in the enforcement phase. In the semantics of 
policies the enforcement time is modelled as a static variable that has the same value as 
Clock in the final state of the interval. The specification of a simple policy states that 
Clock is incremented by one from each policy state to the next. We established earlier in 
Chapter 8, that the enforcement phase is executed once between each state in the policy 
enforced by a vigilant agent. We can therefore model Clock as an enforcement auxiliary 
variable that is initialised to -1 and incremented in the beginning of the enforcement phase. 
Figure 9.4 depicts the relation between the implementation level and the abstraction level 
of the policy. 
Formally we initialise the variable Clock in the initialisation phase to the value -1 and 
refine the enforcement phase enfa to: 
enf a9 
C 
enf a9 = [Clock := Clock + 1jva9 ; enf a9 
To maintain the variable Clock during the rest of the agent execution we add it to the set 
of enforcement auxiliary variables VQg, enj. The proof that this is a refinement is along the 
same lines as for the finite prefix introduction for a temporal assignment (see Theorem 9 
on page 224). 
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Clock =0A Clock gets Clock +1 
finit enf 
Clock «- -1 Clock Clock +1 ,i d)l ('lock Clock - Clock +1 stable Clock 
Figure 9.4: Enforcement Time 
9.4.6 Maintaining the History 
To maintain the history of the variables, we introduce for each variable that is used in the 
premise of a rule a list that holds its history. We denote this list in the following by H,,, 
where v is the identifier of the variable. As a convention we keep in the first element the 
current value of the variable (viz. H[0] = v). 
The refinement of the enforcement phase to maintain the history of the variables is 
similar to the refinement for the enforcement time. For each variable that is used in the 
policy, we introduce an enforcement auxiliary variable that holds its history. The history 
is maintained by shifting the values in the list once in each execution of the enforcement 
phase. The associated assignments are all finite and can therefore be introduced in the 
same way as the enforcement time. 
If the maximal required history of a variable is a constant. the list is of a fixed size. If 
the maximal required history is a variable, then the size of the list grows linearly and is at 
most of size T. For the vigilant agent example we established that the maximal required 
history of the agent variable x is 2. We can therefore refine the agents enforcement phase 
to: 
enfay C 
enfä9=[T: =T+l] 
QHx[2], H,. [1]. Hz [0] - Hz[1]. Hs[0]. x]iag; 
enf ng 
Consequently the list HH. [i] denotes the value that x had i time units in the past, provided 
that i<T. To keep the values of the history variables stable we add them to the set of 
enforcement auxiliary variables 
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9.4.7 Refining Obligation Rules 
If a vigilant agent has an obligation we must ensure that the enforcement property 
EPag, oblig holds (see Section 8.5.4). The enforcement property states that the agent can 
only successfully execute an action, if it is either obliged to do so or if it cannot possibly 
execute another action that it is obliged to execute. 
This is ensured by assigning the value -1 to the priority variable corresponding to the 
obliged action. The negative value ensures, that the action has a higher priority than 
any that has been assigned in the deliberation phase of the agent. The functional guards 
of the agent's actions (see (5.13), page 118) ensure that - provided the precondition of 
the obliged action holds - no other action but an obliged action can be enabled. If the 
vigilant agent has more than one obligation, the agent will choose to comply with one of 
them. 
To reassign the priority of the obliged actions, we refine the enforcement phase: 
enf n9 
enf a9 
r- 
=[Clock := Clock + 
1]Iva9; 
[xx [2], Hx [1], xx [o] +-- Hx [1], Hx [o], xD va9; 
[if oblig(ag, ag, inC) then Ilag, inc _ -1]ýira9 i 
enf ag 
Here the condition for the obligation is expressed by oblig (ag, ag, inc) and is determined 
by the premise of the rule. The premise is already in normal form and can be transformed 
into an expression on the history variables using the following rules: 
(tl : 
, 
fl) ; (t2 : 12) = ((tl : 1l) ; (t2 : true)) A ((tl : true) ; (t2 : 12)) 
(9.18) 
This is possible because the chopping point is deterministic. For the second line we 
can omit the length of the prefix for the second conjunct, because the overall length is 
determined by the first conjunct. For the special case of a state-formula: 
(tl : wl) ; (t2 : true) _ ((tl + t2) : wl) (9.19) 
This is because a state-formula holds over an interval, if it holds in the initial state of 
that interval. These two equations allow us to transform all sequences in the premise of a 
rule into conjunctions where each conjunct is of the form: 
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(ti : true) ; (t2 : w) 
This means that there is a suffix of length t2 for which w holds in the initial state. In 
the rule syntax a state formula is limited to be a boolean expression, viz. the evaluation 
of the expression in the state a is the same as the evaluation of the expression on the 
values of the variables in state or* . These values are stored in the history: 
(tl : true) ; (t2 : w) =0: (T > (tl + t2) A w[Ily{ [t2YVi]) 
where vi are the free variables in w. The additional constraint that T is greater than 
or equal to tl + t2 captures the length requirement. In the state-formula w all variables 
are substituted with the history variable for the time t2. This state formula evaluated in 
the last state of the interval is true if the same expression evaluated in state a* was true. 
For the obligation rule we apply the above transformation as follows: 
(T=0n0: (T>OnH[O]<3))v(T=1n0: (T>1nHý, [1]<3))v 
(T=1n0: (T>1nHx[0]<3))v(0: (T>2nH, ý[2]<3))v 
(0 : (T >2n Hx[1] < 3)) v(0 : (T >2nH., [0] < 3)) 
It is important to note that the variable T references a local static variable that has 
the same value as the variable Clock in the final state of the interval. Consequently the 
above premise is equivalent to: 
(Clock =0AHx[O]<3)v(Clock 1AHx[1] <3)v 
(Clock =1A Hx [0] <3)v(Clock >2AHx[2] <3)v 
(Clock >2 AHx[1] < 3) v (Clock >2AHx[0] < 3) 
interpreted in the same state in which the consequence of the rule is determined. The 
above is the condition that is equivalents with oblig(ag, ag, inc). The enforcement phase 
is then: 
'Provided that the policy is complete as discussed in Section 8.4. 
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enf Q9 =[ClocJl" := Clock + 1]t;,; 
[Hs[2], I1Z[1], Ifz[0] "- If: [1], Hs [0], x]va9; 
[if (Clock =0n II_, [0) < 3) v(Clock =1n Hx[1] < 3) v 
(Clock =lnIfs[O]<3)v(Clock >2nHx[2] <3)v 
(Clock > 2A Ilr[l) < 3) v (Clock >2A Hx[0] < 3) then IIas, fnc 
enf a9 
This enforces the obligation for the agent ag to execute the action inc as stated 
in the 
vigilant agent example. 
9.4.8 Reizung Atitliorisations 
Authorisations are refined after obligations. The intuition is that a denial is stronger than 
an obligation. By refining authorisation rules after the obligation, the assignment made 
by the obligation can be overruled. This captures the specification of the enforcement 
property for obligations (see (8.8) on page 208). The mechanism is similar to the one 
for 
obligations. 
enfag C 
enf ag =[Clock := Clock + 11v d9; 
[H=[2], 11s[1), H=[0] - Hx[1], H, [0], x]va,; 
[ if (Clock =0n H= [0] < 3) v(Clock =1n Hx [1] < 3) v 
(Clock =1nlHx[0]<3)v(Clock >2nHx[2]<3)v 
(Clock >2nHs[1]<3)v(Clock >2nHx[0]<3)then 
[ifýautho(ag, ag, inc) then Hag, inc OIVQ9; 
[ifýautho(ag, ag, dbl) then IIag, d6l = O]Va9; 
enf ag 
Ilag, inc :- -1JIVagi 
We know that the conflict resolution rule in the policy gives precedence to denials. 
Since the rule is state-dependent we can also write: 
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enf a9 =[Clock := 
Clock + 1]v,,,; 
[Hx[2], Hx[1], H=[0]'- H=[1], H=[o], x]ýa9; 
[iF(Clock =0nHx[0] <3)v(Clock =1 nHx[1] <3)v 
(Clock =1nHx[0]<3)v(Clock >2nHx[2] <3)v 
(Clock >2nHx[1]<3)v(Clock >2nHx[0] <3)then nng, inc ý_ -1]VQ9; 
Qif-, (autho+(ag, ag, inc) A -, autho-(ag, ag, inc)) then nag, inc := 01 V. 9; 
if-, (autho+(ag, ag, dbl) A -, autho-(ag, ag, dbl)) then IIag, dbl := 01 VQ9; 
enf ag 
Since autho+(ag, ag, inc) is always true and autho-(ag, ag, inc) is always false we can 
remove the if construct ((if false then f else empty) - empty and (empty ; f) - f). We 
also know that autho+(ag, ag, dbl) is always true. Consequently: 
enf a9 =[Clock := 
Clock + 1]y. 9; 
[Hx[2), H., [11, Hx[0] «- Hx[1], Hx[o], x]Va9; 
[if(Clock =OnHx[0)<3)v(Clock =1nHx[1]<3)v 
(Clock =1n Hx [0] < 3) v(Clock >2n Hx [2] < 3) v 
(Clock >2A Hx[1] < 3) v (Clock > 
112 
A IIx[0] < 3) then nag, inc 
if aatho- (ag, ag, dbl)) then nag, dbl := 0y Vay; 
enf ag 
We convert the premise of the negative authorisation rule analogously to the obligation 
rule. autho-(ag, ag, dbl) is then replace by the expression on history variables: 
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enf Q9 =[Clock := Clock+ 1]t; 
[11[2], H1[1], 11[0] +- H1[1], Hz[o], xlVa9; 
[if(ClocJL"=OA H1[0]<3)v(Clock =1nH1[1]<3)v 
(Clock =1n IH1 [0] < 3) v( Clock >2n Hx [2] < 3) v 
(Clock >2A H1[1] < 3) v (Clock >2 nI H-[0] < 3) then IIag, inc :_ -llVa9; 
[if Clock >1A 11[1] <5 then IIag, d6l := O1ýVa9; 
enf a9 
9.4.9 Refining Integrity Rules 
The enforcement of integrity rules cannot be implemented in the enforcement phase of 
the agent, because it requires the results of the computation. This is available after the 
execution of the action statement on the local variables (see Section 5.3.5). The semantics 
of a local action defines that the action does either succeed or fail (see Equation (5.16)) 
where both the success and the failure are defined as a temporal multiple assignment. The 
definitions are included again here for the readers convenience 
stata, z=3r/ 
/ 
a,..., vj " \l 
succeeda, = =[ 
Ii VQ,... vj "- Vp)... Ivj IV+ ; IS. '] va ; (succeeda,,, ® faila, -)) 
donea, x, donea, x, vo, ... , vj «- true, false, vo,... , vý 
fnilo,: =[ faileda, x, failed,,, _- true, 
false 
V+ I 
To enforce the integrity rule for an agent's action we refine the nondeterministic choice 
(succeed,,,, ® fail,,,, ) by a deterministic choice: 
stata, r C 
statQ, = =3vo, ... , vil 
II VOi... vj 4-- v0i.... vj 
V+ I 
lv, + ; QsAV, +; 
if integ(a, a, x) then succeeds, x else fails x) 
The primed variables in the policy rule reference the local variables, that store the 
temporary result of the execution. So for example for the enforcement of the integrity rule 
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of the vigilant agent example the semantics of the action inc would be: 
([ Statag, inc =3x' - 
I I-- x DV9; LLx: =x +1w9f 
if x1 < 20 then succeedag, inc else failag, inc) 
If the premise of the rule does reference the history of the execution, we transform the 
premise into an expression on history variables as shown for the obligation and authori- 
sation. 
9.4.10 Automation 
The process of establishing the maximal time for which the history of variables must 
be kept to make a decision, as well as the transformation into the normal form can be 
automated. The aim of the automation is to derive the enforcement code for a simple 
policy automatically. This means that the policy is compiled into the correct enforcement 
code, rather than interpreted at runtime. This has the benefit that guarantees can be 
given on the time that is needed to make the policy decision. 
The formal grounding of the tool allows for the optimisation of the rules and some 
basic satisfiability checks. Figure 9.5 shows an example of the prototype of the tool. 
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I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
ii 
12 
13 
14 
is 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Available actions: 
? print menu prints the menu descriptions of all available 
actions 
times toggle times Toggles the use of time intervals [ON][OFF] 
r enter rule prompts to enter a rule 
p dump tree Prints the parse tree on the screen. 
1 sub sometime substitutes sometimes f with true ;f 
el Expand ANDOR (f or g) and h -> (f and h) or (f and g) 
e2 Expand CHOPOR (f or g) ;h -> (f ; h) or (g ; h) 
t Annotate times computes the timings in the rule 
d Disj. Normal transforms f into disjunctive normal form. 
f format tree formats the current parse tree 
1 label nodes Relabels the nodes in the tree. 
q quit program quits the program 
(choose option ? for help) >r 
Reading a rule from standard input (terminate with and press enter) 
[101: z=0 and ([11: y=0 ; [0.. 8]: z=0). 
(choose option ? for help) >t 
This rule is not satisfiable 
Figure 9.5: Example of Automated Rule Analysis 
The current version of the tool, does not support all transformation rules that are 
needed to obtain the disjunctive normal form. 
For example the explicit timings are not 
transformed into a disjunction. The tool by default computes the 
length of individual sub- 
intervals on an minimum/ maximum basis. The example in Figure 9.5 
defines a premise 
of length 10, where x=0 in the initial state and a sequence where y=0 in the prefix of 
length 1 and z=0 in the suffix of any length between 0 to 8. The analysis of the minimal 
and maximal length shows that the sequence must be between length 1 and length 9. In 
conjunction with an interval of length 10 this is not satisfiable. 
With explicit timings provided the tool can also compute possible combinations of 
timings that result from sequences. This allows to optimise the premise to omit cases that 
are known to be not satisfiable. Figure 9.6 provides a more complex example: 
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I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Reading a rule from standard input (terminate with .' and press enter) 
[5,7,11,13,17,23]: ([1,2,0,51: x=0 ; [2,5,131: y=0). 
(choose option ? for help) >t 
This rule is not satisfiable on intervals shorter than 5 
This rule is not satisfiable on intervals longer than 13 
This rule is only satisfiable on intervals of length t in [5,7,13] 
(choose option ? for help) >p+ 
0: Start [min= 5; max= 13; times= [5,7,13]] 
0.0: TimedNode [min= 5; max= 13; times= [5,7,13]] 
0.0.0: ListNode 
0.0.0.0: IntConstNode =5 
0.0.0.1: IntConstNode =7 
0.0.0.2: IntConstNode = 11 
0.0.0.3: IntConstNode = 13 
0.0.0.4: IntConstNode = 17 
0.0.0.5: IntConstNode = 23 
0.0.1: ChopNode [min= 5; max= 13; times= [5 , 
7,13]] 
0.0.1.0: TimedNode [min= 0; max= 5; times= [0,2,5]] 
0.0.1.0.0: ListNode 
0.0.1.0.0.0: IntConstNode =1 
0.0.1.0.0.1: IntConstNode =2 
0.0.1.0.0.2: IntConstNode =0 
0.0.1.0.0.3: IntConstNode =5 
0.0.1.0.1: EQNode [min= 0; max= 5; times= [0,2,5]] 
0.0.1.0.1.0: Id name= x; vat=0 
0.0.1.0.1.1: IntConstNode =0 
0.0.1.1: TimedNode [min= 2; max= 13; times= [2,5,13]] 
0.0.1.1.0: ListNode 
0.0.1.1.0.0: IntConstNode =2 
0.0.1.1.0.1: IntConstNode =5 
0.0.1.1.0.2: IntConstNode = 13 
0.0.1.1.1: EQNode [min= 2; max= 13; times= [2,5,13]] 
0.0.1.1.1.0: Id name= y; val=0 
0.0.1.1.1.1: IntConstNode =0 
Figure 9.6: Example of Automated Rule Analysis 
In this example the tool discovers that only intervals of length 5,7 or 13 can possibly 
satisfy the premise. More interestingly is that it also concludes that the prefix of the 
sequence cannot be of length 1 as there is no combination with any potential length of the 
suffix that could result in any of the explicitly defined overall length. This can be seen in 
252 
9.4. REFINING A VIGILANT AGENT 
the annotated parse-tree (line 20) where the list of potential times does not contain 1. 
Beside its application for the automatic generation of enforcement code, the tool can 
also be integrated in the policy specification process to provide an early feedback on the 
satisfiability of rules. 
9.4.11 Enforcing Composed Policies 
Policies can be composed along the temporal and structural axis. The enforcement along 
the structural axis is solved similarly as shown for the enforcement of hybrid access control 
policies (positive and negative authorisation combined by a decision rule). Whilst the 
enforcement may require additional variables, it does not increase the complexity of the 
approach. 
For the composition along the temporal axis, the transition between two simple policies 
is dependent on time or the occurrence of events. When refining a complex policy into 
enforcement code the event is checked in every execution of the enforcement phase. If the 
event occurs, the enforcement timer is reset and the policy changes to the next policy in 
the sequence. For example: 
policy p: /* */ end 
policy q: /* */ end 
policy pq : (unless x >= 10: p) ;q end 
In this case the event for the change is x> 10. In the enforcement phase the change 
from policy p to policy q takes place when the event is observed. To capture the currently 
enforced policy we introduce an auxiliary variable seq that denotes the currently enforced 
policy. Initially p is enforced, viz. seq is initialised to p. The enforcement phase is then 
refined into a check on the event: 
enf3 =[Clock := Clock + 1]V,; 
[ if (seq =pAX> 10) then seq, Clock +- q, 0¢ Va; 
[if (seq = p) then refinement of p else 
if (seq = q) then refinement of qlv, 
The sequential composition of policies is implemented as a finite state machine where seq 
denotes the current state (viz. the currently enforced policy). With every execution of 
the enforcement phase it is checked whether a transition is made, or if the enforcement 
remains in its current state. By refinement of p we mean the update of the history variables 
required for the enforcement of p and the conditional assignments of the priority variables 
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that reflect the policy decisions as it was discussed in the previous subsections. 
This is an example of compositional refinement, where first the temporal policy com- 
position is refined and then the simple policies that are components of the composition. 
The refinement of the composition is essentially an automata and has similarities with 
security automata [122], however a state does not denote the acceptable system states, 
but the current state of the enforced policy. 
9.5 Summary 
In this chapter we have introduced refinement as implication. A refined specification 
implies its original specification. We presented some refinement rules for which this relation 
is not obvious and proved the rules to be correct. In Section 9.3 the rules have been applied 
to refine the SMAS1 example to a concrete and implementable program. The refinement 
of an SMAS2 was not detailed in this chapter, as it follows the same lines as the SMAS1 
example. 
We then focussed on the refinement of a vigilant agent. The vigilant agent enforce- 
ment mechanism defines the effect that a policy has on the agent's execution in form of 
enforcement properties. We have shown how a policy can be brought into a disjunctive 
normal form and how the maximal history for all variables referenced in the policy can be 
obtained. We further detailed, how the policy can be transformed into an expression on 
history variables. 
Refining every policy rule into concrete enforcement code manually would be a signif- 
icant overhead to the development process. Some of the refinement rules can be extended 
to be used at the syntactic level. This would reduce the overhead. Ultimately we envi- 
sion the automation of the policy refinement so that policies can easily be enforced by a 
dedicated software component in the system. Although we did not explicitly study the 
scalability of the approach we believe it will scale well with the size of policies and the 
execution time. The approach broadly separated the maintenance of history variables and 
the evaluation of simple boolean conditions to determine the policy decision. The former 
optimises the amount of administration and the memory usage that is associated with the 
enforcement of history-based access control, the latter can be optimised using standard 
techniques, e. g. found in logic programming or compiler theory for the optimisation of 
boolean expressions. 
The history variables have been introduced as part of the agent's state variables and 
the enforcement phase has been refined to maintain the history. We have shown how 
obligation and authorisation rules are implemented as conditional assignments that depend 
on the expression of history variables. The enforcement of integrity rules differs in its 
254 
9.5. SUMMARY 
implementation from obligation and authorisation in that it refines the non-deterministic 
choice between an action failure or success with a conditional choice. The choice depends 
on the expression on history variables that was derived from the rule premise. 
We then outlined how policies that are composed along the structural and temporal 
axis are enforced. Notably the composition along the temporal axis provides a performance 
benefit over more traditional approaches, because the set of rules that applies at a time is 
smaller, i. e. less rules must be checked. The process of transforming the policy rules into 
the corresponding enforcement code can be automated. We presented an initial prototype 
of the envisioned tool-support. The benefit of the automation is that the enforcement code 
can be pre-compiled and optimised before the policy is deployed. This will increase the 
performance of the enforcement and also allows to reason about the time that is needed 
to make policy decisions. The underlying semantics of the enforcement code can be used 
to prove that a policy decision can made under hard real-time constraints. 
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Chapter 10 
Analysis 
The objective of this chapter is to present tool-support for the analysis of 
policies. The tool is aimed to allow for the early and frequent validation 
of policies early in the development life-cycle. The aim is to test whether 
a policy captures the original intent of the policy designer. 
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10.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we introduce the Security Policy Analysis Tool (SPAT) that allows for the 
early and frequent validation of policies during the development-life cycle. The analysis 
made with SPAT is based on a simulation of policies using the Tempura language [66,99]. 
Tempura is an executable subset of ITL - this ensures that the semantics of the policies 
can be accurately captured. SPAT simulates a specific scenario of a system run by defining 
the observable events and the sequence and timing of their occurrences. Given this fixed 
scenario the policy is simulated and all policy decisions during the run are recorded for 
analysis. 
The record of all policy decisions is kept by a Java [63,93] program that provides a more 
convenient and extensible platform for the analysis of the results. SPAT itself is designed 
to support the development of a policy specification and its continuous validation within 
the same interface. This allows for a fast feedback to the policy designer and supports an 
iterative development approach for policies. 
SPAT currently is still under development and is only available as a prototype. Due 
to resource limitations a full implementation that is up to industrial standards was not 
feasible. This means that the different modules in the SPAT architecture are not linked 
and the (straight-forward) translation between policy and the corresponding Tempura 
program must be performed manually. 
The structure of the Chapter is as follows. In Section 10.2 we present the architecture 
of the SPAT tool together with an overview of the available features. In Section 10.3 we 
provide a case study that was published in [75]. We then show in Section 10.4 how SPAT 
can provide a graphical user interface for the composition of policies and in Section 10.5 
the support for the analysis of Policy decisions. We conclude the chapter with a short 
summary in Section 10.6. 
10.2 SPAT Architecture 
SPAT is conceived to support the specification of a test scenario and a policy specification 
that is to be analysed for the scenario. Given this specification SPAT will simulate the 
scenario and visualise the effect of the policy. The policy decisions can be explained to 
the user in terms of policy rules that influenced the decision. An overview of the SPAT 
architecture is provided in Figure 10.1. 
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User 
Scenario Policy Views 
Module Module 
Explanation Analysis 
Component Module 
Tempura 
Simulation File Java-Tempura Bridge 
SPAT System Boundary 
Tempura 
Figure 10.1: SPAT Architecture 
SPAT consists of several modules that are responsible for different tasks in the policy 
specification process. SPAT is intended to be used in the development process of policy 
specification or for later policy revision. Typically when a policy is being developed there 
is already a high-level description of the system structure available. For example subjects, 
objects and actions are identified, however their concrete implementation is still unknown. 
Similarly for the later revision of a policy. A policy revision will occur typically during the 
development process or even after the system has been deployed. In this case the structure 
of the system is already in place and the policy designer has a concrete scenario at Band 
for which the original policy has proven to be insufficient. 
Scenario Module The SPAT user first defines the basic structure of the system in form 
of a scenario. The scenario description contains the subjects, objects and actions in the 
system as well as events that are relevant to the policy. The scenario call be at a high 
level of abstraction by defining only the events and their timings or more concrete in fornº 
of a concrete SANTA program. The scenario is then compiled as part of the 'livupnrrº. 
Simulation File. 
Currently the Scenario Module allows only for the specification using a predecessor of 
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the SANTA-language which is based on an action-system approach [124,12]. Preliminary 
work has shown that SANTA specifications can be encoded as Tempura programs in a 
similar way. For the following case study the scenario is sufficiently simple and has been 
specified directly as a Tempura input file. 
Policy Module Given a scenario, the user can define the policy that should be applied. 
The Policy Module is linked with the scenario to ensure that only events and state infor- 
mation that is defined in the scenario can be referred to in the policy specification. The 
composition of policies is aided by a specialised editor that presents the composition as 
structural diagrams. The editor is discussed along with the case study in Section 10.4 in 
detail. The policy specification is then compiled as part of the Tempura Simulation File. 
Tempura The Tempura language represents an executable subset of ITL. The Tempura 
interpreter executes the simulation file and outputs the results (e. g. events or policy de- 
cisions) to the Java-Tempura Bridge. The execution of the Tempura Simulation File is 
based on a sound reduction of the Tempura program to determine the next state in the 
execution; for details see [66,99]. 
Java-Tempura Bridge The Java-Tempura Bridge is the communication interface be- 
tween the Analysis Module written in Java and the Tempura Interpreter (implemented 
in C). It provides functions to access Java objects from the Tempura Simulation File, 
enabling event-recognition and visualisation. 
Analysis Module The Analysis Module records the events and policy decisions during 
the simulation. It provides a basic interface for standard and proprietary plug-ins. The 
standard plug-ins in SPAT visualise the policy decisions in form of an access control matrix 
or an access control graph. Typically they present Views to the user that provide visual 
feedback on the policy decisions. The different views are discussed in more detail together 
with the analysis of the case study in Section 10.5. Proprietary plug-ins can be used to 
visualise scenario dependent information. SPAT does not provide direct support for the 
visualisation of the scenario, as this is a highly domain-dependent issue. 
Explanation Component The Explanation Component is actually a plug-in, however 
due to its importance in the analysis process it is depicted as a dedicated component in the 
architecture. The explanation component interacts with the other plug-ins to provide the 
user with a feedback for a selected policy decision. The explanation contains descriptions 
of the rules that have influenced the decision. This allows the user to query those policy 
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decisions that did not match his initial intent and quickly find the rules that require 
modification. 
In the following we will present some of the modules in the context of a small case 
study. 
10.3 Case Study 
We present a small simplified scenario, that shows the use of our dynamic policy model 
for resource control. We will use this scenario in the subsequent sections, to illustrate the 
functionality of our analysis toolkit. The scenario is taken from the military domain and 
can be seen as a simplification of a typical bandwidth allocation problem in an adverse 
environment. 
10.3.1 Scenario 
A platoon is navigating an area, where long range communication is limited due to en- 
vironmental conditions. The platoon consists of several small units and a command unit 
that carries a long distance transmitter. The communication within the platoon is enabled 
using short distance radio links. The quality of service of the long distance transmission 
is highly dependent on the environment the platoon is navigating. Dependent on the 
command units position there may be significant drops in the communication bandwidth 
or even areas where communication is not possible at all. The command unit is used to 
analyse and control the mission. It is constantly relaying mission related information back 
to the base and provides a relay service to the other members of the platoon. The access 
to the relay service is controlled by a policy with the following requirements. 
1. All members of the platoon are allowed to relay information. 
2. If the bandwidth is dropping below 50% then units that have not been involved in 
combat action within the last 2 time-units are denied to relay information. 
3. If the bandwidth drops below 20% only the command unit can relay tactical and 
strategic information. 
4. If the command unit is under attack, the units that are not in its direct proximity 
are denied to relay messages, regardless of the available bandwidth. 
The scenario is graphically represented in Figure 10.2. 
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specification for which the policy is to be analysed. 
Whilst the first requirement uses only static information, such as the membership, 
the second requirement includes a temporal aspect. It takes into account the event of an 
attack on a unit over the last two time steps. This can be formalised, as in Eq. 10.2. 
command(O, platoon) A member(S, platoon) A 
2: (O(-, combat(S))) n 
(true ;0: (bandwidth(O) < 50)) 
'--p autho-(S, O, relay) (10.2) 
If the bandwidth available to the command-unit 0 is now less than 50 (percent) and 
the requesting unit S has over the last two time units never been engaged in combat 
activity, then the unit is denied to relay messages. The formalisation of requirement 3 
follows the same lines as requirement 2, without the temporal aspect. 
command(O, platoon) A member(S, platoon) A 
0: (bandwidth(O) < 20) 
h-l autho-(S, 0, relay) (10.3) 
Requirement 4 finally defines that if the command unit is under attack then units 
that are not in its proximity are denied to relay information, regardless of the bandwidth 
requirements stated in requirements 2 and 3. 
command(O, platoon) A member(S, platoon) A near(S, 0) h- autho-(S, 0, relay) 
(10.4) 
The rule in Eq. 10.4 expresses the requirement partially. Additionally the requirement 
states that it overrides the requirements 2 and 3 and does only apply if the command unit 
is under attack. This can be seen as a dynamic change in the security policy, dependent 
on the event that the command unit is engaged in combat. We distinguish between two 
situations: 
a) The command unit is not engaged in combat. 
b) The command unit is engaged in combat. 
In the first situation the simple policy that is applied consists of the rules (10.1), (10.2), 
(10.3) together with a decision rule that gives precedence to denials. The definition of the 
policy for the case that the command unit is not under attack is: 
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P= 
member(S, platoon) A 
H autho+(S, 0, relay) A 
command(0, platoon) 
command (O, platoon) n 
member(S, platoon) A 
i-º autho-(S, 0, relay) A 
2: (O(i combat(S))) A 
(true ;0: (bandwidth(O) < 50)) 
command(O, platoon) A 
member(S, platoon) AH autho-(S, 0, relay) A 
(0: 
(bandwidth(0) < 20) 
autho+(S, O, A) n -i autho-(S, O, A) i--+ autho(S, O, A) 
(10.5) 
In the second situation, the policy definition does not contain the rules related to the 
bandwidth, but the rule that expresses the denial for units that are not in the proximity 
of the command unit. 
Q 
member(S, platoon) A 
command(O, platoon) 
command(O, platoon) A 
member(S, platoon) A 
- near(S, 0) 
autho+(S, O, A) A- autho-(S, O, A) 
H 
H 
I-º 
autho+(S, 0, relay) A) 
autho-(S, 0, relay) 
autho(S, 0, A) l 
(10.6) 
The change between the two situations is now expressed using policy composition: 
R= ((combat(Cmd))P; [combat(Cmd)]Q)* (10.7) 
The composition denotes that unless the command unit Cmd is under attack the policy 
P applies. On the event of an attack the policy changes to policy Q and applies as long as 
the command unit is involved in combat. The policy iterates between those two situations. 
The advantage of this approach is that access requirements that are dependent on time 
and events, can be expressed at a higher abstraction level, without the need to explicitly 
encode the conditions in the premise of the rule. This leads to rules and policies that are 
easier to comprehend. Using policy composition, the policy designer can decide on the 
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time and event relations between different policies. SPAT provides a separate uuxlrnle for 
the specification of composed policies and rules. Figure 10.3 shows the prototype for the 
above policy specification. 
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The Policy Specification Module represents the policy composition as it structau"al 
block diagram. On the left the structure is represented as it tree; the right represent st Iie 
corresponding block diagram. A simple policy is it list of rules to which rifles call be added 
or deleted. The consequence of the rules can be changed by clicking on the colour-ale'/ 
label. 
The specification module does also allow for the hiding; of policies, t licit are c"urreut ly 
not of interest. In the screenshot, the policy Q for the case that the command unit 
is under attack is hidden. It can be expanded again, by clicking on the c"orre'sponcliug 
expand button. Policies can be developed top-down and it bottom-up. The yellow fraune 
shown in Figure 10.3 is used for a bottom-up approach to replace the framed policy wit Ii 
a composition construct. The specification modaalc can also Zoom ill and mit of policy 
compositions, by selecting in the tree-structure the appropriate policy component. 
10.5 Policy Validation 
Under policy validation we understand the process of analysing; policy decisions in t In' 
context of a specific scenario. The validation is supported l pliig-inºs that visiialise the 
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scenario and the policy decisions. Support for explanations how decisions have been made 
is also provided in form of a dedicated Explanation component. 
10.5.1 Scenario Visualisation 
a 
ý 
3 
F4 
D 
Q 
C 
cma iii D 
t=0 
t=1 
SPAT can interact with plug-ins for the visualisa- 
tion of a scenario. This allows the policy designer 
to comprehend the scenario to which the policy is 
applied better. For the case-study we developed 
a small plug-in that shows the positioning and 
combat status of each unit in a grid that is rep- 
resenting the terrain. The quality of service that 
is available at a specific grid position is coded in 
shades of grey: 
QoS > 75% > QoS > 50% > QoS > 20% > QoS 
a 
ima 
A 
0 
0 
-') The command unit (Cmd) starts off, surrounded 
by its subordinate units (A, B, C and D), in the 
north-easterly corner of the grid and traverses di- 
agonally down to the south-westerly corner. The 
event that a unit is under attack is visualised by 
t_ :; the red frame surrounding the unit. For example 
i 
iI- 
9 
I 
A 
CmE' 
L-D 
A 
ma 
D 
A 
: iý 0 
C 
C 
C 
t=t 
r=., 
at time =1 the unit A is under attack. 
Initially the command unit traverses an area 
where there is sufficient bandwidth to allow all 
units to relay messages back to the base, how- 
ever at time =2 the command unit itself be- 
conies involved in combat, triggering a change 
in policy that allows only nearby units to relay 
messages. We consider in this scenario units that 
are in a within a distance (= 0x + Ay) of two 
squares from the command unit to be near-by. 
At time =5 the command unit enters an area 
where the quality of service degrades to less than 
50 %. This means that the rule that denies units 
that have not been under attack within the last 
2 time steps to relay messages applies. Conse- 
quently, only the units B and D should be able to 
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relay mes 
Importantly at time =6 the unit B is still 
able to relay messages. as it has been under at- 
tack in the previous time step. At time =7 the 
command unit enters an area where the QoS de- 
graded so much that the 20% rule triggers. The % 
__ 
same applies at time = 8. 
Subsequently at time =9 the QoS improves 
and only the 50% rule applies, allowing the units 
A and C to relay messages, as they have been 
under attack in the last two time steps. The 
command unit then moves gradually in a terrain 1 
where sufficient bandwidth is available to allow 
all subordinate units to relay messages. 
Given the scenario we can now validate the 
II 
t=H 
9 
9 
simulated policy decisions against the expected j 
_... ....... ý_! ý ones. 'the validation is not automated, as the ex- 
act definition of the expected test-results would 
already represent an exact specification. The tool 
is intended to provide early feedback in the spec- 
ification process itself and relies therefore on the 
interaction with the policy designer and his ob- 
servations. 
10.5.2 Policy Decisions 
The policy decisions can be analysed using two 
different views. The first view is a tabular view 
that lists all access control related decisions that 
have been made during the simulation run. Al- 
ternatively only positive authorisations or neg- 
ative authorisations can be displayed. The view 
currently supports the sorting by column and the 
filtering of the displayed information using regu- 
lar expressions. 
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State Subject 
0A 
0D 
0C 
0B 
1B 
IA 
ID 
1C 
2C 
2D 
2B 
2A 
3A 
3C 
3D 
3B 
4B 
4C 
4D 
4A 
5C 
5B 
5A 
5D 
6B 
6C 
6A 
6D 
7B 
7C 
7A 
70 
8C 
8D 
8A 
8B 
9B 
9D 
9A 
9C 
10 B 
10 D 
10 A 
10 C 
11 C 
11 B 
11 A 
11 D 
object CrncJLRTr 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransrnit 
CrndLRTransrnit 
CrndLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmR 
CmdLRTfansmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CrndLRTrdnsrnA 
CmdLRTransrnit 
QndLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTransrnit 
CrndLRTransmA 
CmdLRTransmit 
CrndLRTransmd 
CmdLRTransmA 
CrndLRTransmit 
CmdLRTfanSmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CrndLRTransmd 
GmiLRTfdnsmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CnIdLRTrdnsmd 
CmdLRTransrnd 
CmdLRTransmit 
CrndLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTransmd 
CrndLRTransmit 
CrndLRTfdnsrnd 
CrndLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTrdnsmR 
CrndLRTransrnit 
CrndLRTrdnsmd 
CmdLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTrdnsmd 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CrndLRTransmd 
CmdLRTransmR 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTfdnsmR 
CmdLRTransrnit 
CmdLRTransmit 
CmdLRTransmit 
a, Ctlorl Der i 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay deny 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay deny 
relay allow 
relay deny 
relay allow 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay deny 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
relay allow 
Figure 10.4 displays the access control deci- 
sions for the scenario. The view is sorted by 
states (abstract time) and filtered to only show 
t he decisions made for the subjects A, B, C and 
D for the action relay on the long range trans- 
mitter of the command unit. For easier compre- 
I tension denials are colour-coded in red and al- 
Ic)wances in green. 
The policy decisions can then be compared 
it Ii the scenario to increase the policy designers 
confidence in the specification. For example it is 
immediately clear that during the time that the 
command unit was situated in a very low QoS 
urea all subordinate units were denied to relay 
i uessages. 
10.5.3 Graphical Representation 
For many users a graphical representation of ac- 
"ess control policies is more appealing. This is for 
example the underlying assumption for LaSCO 
[(i8] policy specification framework. We believe 
t liat a representation as an access control graph 
is beneficial, especially for the analysis of per- 
rnissible information flow [124]. SPAT provides 
;i view of the filtered access control matrix as a 
directed graph, where the edges of the graph are 
libelled with the action navies and states (color- 
coded: red for denial and green for allowance). 
Subjects are represented as red triangles, ob- 
jects as yellow triangles. The directed edges in 
t lie graph represent the act ions that subjects can 
Figure 1(1.4: Tabular View of the SPAT (or cannot) perform on the objects. The label at 
Analysis Module 
tions (see Section 3.3.2) 
the edges describes the access control decisions. 
For the analysis of permissible information flow, 
all actions are categorised into read and write ac- 
The check whether there is a permissible information from one 
entity to another can be performed by analysing the connectivity in the graph. 
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relay[O 1.4.5 10.1 11 relay[2.3.6-9] 
relay[0-2.4.5 10 11j relay[3.6-9] 
CmdLRTransmit 
relay(0-4.9-11j, relay(5-81J 
;;:, ) -i 911j, relay[5-8] 
Figure 10.5: Graphical View 
Direct Permissible Information Flow There is a direct permissible information flow 
from node ni to node 712 at time t if there is an edge from ni to 11.2, representing a write 
action that is authorised at a time t,,, <t or if there is an edge from '112 to n-i, representing 
a read action that is authorised at a time t,. < t. 
Indirect Permissible Information Flow There is a indirect permissible information 
flow from node nj to node n2 at time t if there is a node n, ' for which there is a direct 
information flow from node nj to node n' at time tt and a indirect information flow from 
node n' to n2 at time t2 and tl < t2 < t. 
If we assume that the concrete implementation is known, we can take some possibility 
for covered channels that are part of the action execution into account. The actions can 
then be classified as write, read or query. A query action is a special form of read that is 
side-effect free, viz. the read does not affect the state of the object. The analysis is then 
along the same lines as explained above, however the definition of the direct iufornºat. ioiº 
flow changes to: 
Extended Direct Permissible Information Flow There is a direct periiiissil)ic in- 
formation flow from node ni to node '112 at time t if there is an edge front '11, to '11,2, 
representing a write or a non-query read action that is authorised at a time t,,, <t or if 
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there is an edge from n2 to rig, representing a read action that is authorised at a time 
t, < t. 
The above outline for analysis represents permissible information flow, i. e. flow that can 
occur under the enforcement of the policy. This does not mean that the flow does actually 
exist in the execution of the program, as this is further constrained by the interactions of 
the entities involved. 
10.5.4 Explanation Component 
The important link between the specification and analysis module is the explanation com- 
ponent. Given that the policy designer tested a new policy (or a modification in an 
existing policy) and observes that the resulting decisions do not match his original intent, 
the policy must he corrected. However in large policies this may be a very difficult and 
error-prone task. The explanation component provides help, as it allows to query which 
rules did influence a specific policy decision. A screenshot of the component is provided 
in Figure 10.6. 
ýx ý- 
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Rules that deny subject B to perform relay on object CmdbRTrancmit in state 2: 
Type F Name Comment 
Members that are not near to the command 
authoN ruleOnlyNearCanRelay unit have negative authorisation to relay 
messages via the platoons command unit. 
authoP 
FrWe2a 
positive authorisation is propagated to group 
members. 
Figure 10.6: Explanation Component 
I Link 
edit 
edit 
H 
The explanation component shown in Figure 10.6 was obtained by clicking on a the 
corresponding row in the tabular view shown in Figure 10.4. It is also available for the 
graph view on selection of an edge in the graph. The Explanation Component only displays 
the rules that lead to a decision in this context. 
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10.6 Summary 
In this chapter we outlined the architecture of the SPAT tool-support for the analysis 
of policies. SPAT is currently available as a prototype implementation that shows the 
feasibility of the techniques involved. 
The main components are the Policy Module and the Analysis Module. The Policy 
Module allows to develop policies in form of a structure diagram that reflects the com- 
position of policies for different situations. The interface leaves the policy designer the 
freedom to choose between a bottom-up, top-down or hybrid approach to the specification 
of policies. 
The Analysis Module's focus is on the visualisation of policy decisions for the concrete 
scenario. The filtering ability and the graphical representation allow a user to concentrate 
on key aspects of the policy specification. Especially important to decrease the time in the 
specification - analysis cycle is the Explanation Component. This specialised component 
provides feedback on how a policy decision was made and which rules did influence the 
decision. This is especially useful if a policy decision does not capture the original intent 
of the policy designer. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we summarise our findings, highlight the contributions 
and critically review our approach to policy specification and enforce- 
ment. Additionally we outline future work to extend our contributions 
and address some of the criticism. 
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11.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we summarise our work on the integration of functional, security and 
temporal requirements for the specification of secure Multi-Agent Systems. Section 11.2 
reviews the main concepts that have been presented in this thesis in form of a short 
summary. We then highlight our contributions and compare them with previous and 
related work in Section 11.3. Although our contributions advance the research in policy- 
related areas of computing, our approach is not a silver-bullet that solves all problems. 
Consequently there is also criticism to our approach, which we compiled in Section 11.4. 
We conclude this chapter and the thesis in Section 11.5 with ideas that can improve the 
presented work in the future. 
11.2 Summary 
In this thesis we have shown how security requirements, that are expressed as dynami- 
cally changing policies, are enforced in an agent-based distributed system. The system's 
functional- and security requirements are defined together in form of a SANTA speci- 
fication. The advantage is that security requirements are seamlessly integrated in the 
development process. 
SANTA specifications define the system in terms of agents that are active entities 
acting on behalf of a user; objects that represent shared resources in the system; policies 
that describe protection requirements for both agents and objects; and enforcement mech- 
anisms that provide the link between policies, agents and objects. An overview of these 
components and their interaction has been provided in Chapter 3. 
The development process that is used to transform SANTA specifications into concrete, 
deterministic SANTA programs is based on the notion of refinement. The stepwise ap- 
plication of sound refinement rules makes the specification gradually more deterministic 
to a degree at which the specification becomes an executable program. Formal refine- 
ment is possible because SANTA has a sound specification-oriented semantics in Interval 
Temporal Logic (see Chapter 4). 
Agents have been formally defined in Chapter 5 as entities that encapsulate variables 
and actions. The execution model of a single agent is staged in phases. After an ini- 
tialisation phase the agent enters the Deliberation-Enforcement-Execution (DEE) cycle. 
The deliberation phase abstracts the decision making process of the agent. In this phase 
the agent prioritises its actions for execution. We do not impose a special mechanism 
for the decision-making and leave the developer the freedom to choose the appropriate 
agent-architecture. 
Once the actions are prioritised the agent enters the enforcement phase. This phase 
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enforces a behavioural policy, viz. a policy that defines constraints on the agent's execution. 
We refer to an agent that enforces such a policy as a vigilant agent. The effect of the 
enforcement phase is that the original action prioritisation of the agent is modified to 
ensure the compliance with the behavioural policy. The policy can potentially overrule 
any decision the agent has made. This is especially advantageous if the agent's deliberation 
is complex and uses third party modules or AI learning techniques that are difficult to 
test and verify before the agent is deployed. 
In the execution phase the agent executes either a local action, that is an action that 
performs only local computation, or a remote action that invokes an interface of a shared 
object. If an agent is terminated, it leaves the DEE cycle and enters the termination 
phase. 
Objects represent resources in the shared environment of agents. Agents can access 
objects through interfaces to modify the variables that are encapsulated within the object. 
We formally defined objects in Chapter 6. The access can be restricted in environmental 
policies, that are either vigilantly enforced by an object, or centrally by a security enforcer 
for a collection of objects. 
To protect the access to object interfaces and to constrain the autonomy of agents we 
formally define policies in Chapter 7. Policies are composed of rules that capture history- 
dependent authorisation, delegation, obligation and integrity requirements. Policies can 
be composed along a temporal axis. In this case the component policies capture the 
requirements that apply in a specific situation. The composition operators then define 
when the transition between the situations takes place. Policies can also be composed 
along a structural axis, viz. the component policies define the requirements for a specific 
scope (e. g. a department) and the composition operator defines how conflicts between the 
components are resolved. 
Policies are defined at a different abstraction level than the system itself. While the 
system defines the transition from one state to another at the level of concrete assignments 
to variables, the policy is defined in terms of executed actions or invoked interfaces. This is 
a much coarser grained view. The concrete mapping between policy abstraction and system 
implementation is defined by the enforcement mechanisms using temporal projection. We 
detailed the two vigilant mechanisms, where the enforcement is part of the agent or object 
itself, and the centralised security enforcer mechanism in Chapter 8. 
In Chapter 9 we have shown how specification constructs such as the temporal assign- 
ment can be refined into concrete implementable code. Important for the success of a 
policy language is its enforceability, that is the development of enforcement mechanisms 
that can ensure that the requirements expressed as a policy are not violated by the sys- 
tem. In Chapter 9 we have therefore also shown how policies can be transformed into 
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a deterministic normal form and how agents can be refined to implement corresponding 
enforcement code. 
Finally we provided tool-support for the analysis of policies, where we focussed on the 
validation of high-level policies. The use of the tool for a specific case-study has been de- 
tailed in Chapter 10 and [75]. The prototype of SPAT allows for the specification of a policy 
that is tested under a given scenario. The resulting policy decisions are visualised and the 
policy designer can compare the results to see whether they meet the informal require- 
ments. The approach is similar to early prototyping in traditional software-development 
processes and geared especially towards policies. Most important is the feedback that is 
readily available to the policy-designer on which rules did influence the observed policy 
decision. 
11.3 Contributions 
The main contribution of this work is the integration of functional and security and tem- 
poral requirements in a uniform and formal framework to allow for the analysis of the 
effects that policy decisions have on the system behaviour. Secondary contributions are 
extensions to the policy model proposed in [124]; the abstraction of policies using temporal 
projection; and the refinement of policies into concrete enforcement code. We detail the 
contributions in the following. 
11.3.1 Integration of Functional and Security Requirements 
The motivation of this work is the realisation that security requirements must be addressed 
early in the system development life-cycle and cannot be bolt-on as an afterthought. This 
has been widely accepted in the community and lead to the integration of security in 
for example UML [79]. However, we believe that for applications in which security is a 
critical factor, viz. the violation of security requirements may lead to loss of life, a more 
rigorous approach must be taken. Applications where security is critical are often found in 
governmental information systems that process sensitive data of a large number of citizens, 
or in the military domain where confidentiality is critical to the success of a mission. 
The aim of this work was to integrate functional, security and temporal requirements 
for the development of distributed systems in a uniform and formal framework. We chose 
Multi-Agent Systems as a representative of distributed systems, because the autonomy 
and encapsulation of the different system components appeared to be a good candidate 
to model applications in the before mentioned domains [19]. We have provided in this 
work a rich computational model for a Multi-Agent System in which a) the autonomy 
of agents can be limited and b) the access to shared resources is controlled by policies. 
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The model does not constrain the agent-architecture that is used for the implementation 
of the individual agents in the MAS. 
The policy model is based on dynamically changing policies that have been introduced 
in [124] and previous work [74]. It provides a flexible and compositional approach to the 
specification of history-dependent policies that can dynamically change over time or on 
the occurrence of events. The model has a formal semantics given in Interval Temporal 
Logic. ITL is a suitable foundation for the model as reasoning over temporal aspects of a 
specification is natural. It also provides a compositional proof-system [101] that improves 
the scalability of the approach. 
The SANTA language integrates the specification of functional requirements in form of 
a MAS, security requirements in form of policies and links them through (de-) centralised 
enforcement mechanisms. The semantics of all these components is given in ITL allowing 
for the uniform analysis of security properties and their interaction with the functional 
part of the system. This is a contribution in itself, as most other work either dedicates itself 
to the specification of agent-systems (e. g. [58]) or policies (e. g. [72,20]). Often the link 
between the two is not clearly defined and the enforcement mechanisms are programmed 
in an ad-hoc manner. In the framework presented here the relation between the system 
and policies is made explicit by the abstract definition of enforcement mechanisms (see 
Chapter 8) and their refinement (see Chapter 9). 
We believe that the SANTA framework helps to close the gap that exists between 
the specification of security policies [114] and their enforcement in concrete mechanisms 
by providing a development approach that allows to derive these mechanisms from their 
high-level specifications. 
11.3.2 Extensions to the original Policy Language 
The original model [124] has been extended to allow for the specification of obligations 
and integrity constraints as well scoping and parallel composition of policies. 
Obligations Obligations are an important aspect of management policies, as they define 
what a subject must do as opposed to access control which defines what a subject can do. 
An obligation is for example that an agent must enter a transaction-log to a central data- 
base or that a user must revoke a delegated right after a certain time. Similar requirements 
can also be found in for example the BMA policy framework [6]. This type of requirements 
could not be expressed in the original policy language presented in [124]. Especially as 
the enforcement of obligations is highly dependent on the system itself. 
Other policy languages (e. g. [108,120]) take the view that obligations are directly 
associated with the execution of an action. We take here a more liberal view in that 
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we define an obligation to be dependent on any observable condition or event. We also 
take the view that pre-obligations, e. g. the clinician must obtain the consent of the patient 
before passing information on to others, are actually authorisations in disguise. The above 
example could be rephrased to The clinician cannot pass information on to others if he 
did not obtain the patient's consent before. In for example XACML an obligation is 
actually an obligation of the enforcement mechanism, viz. the enforcement mechanism 
must perform a certain action, rather than being associated with a subject. Although this 
is not fundamentally different it provides more flexibility in the specification. 
Integrity Integrity rules define constraints on the observable effect of an action execution 
and allow to discard results that do not meet these constraints. Integrity policies for a 
single action/interface invocation are well known and are nowadays supported by many 
programming languages (e. g. Java [63]) in form of assertions [65]. The benefit of our 
approach is that these assertions can also take the history of the execution into account. 
We provided an example for the integrity of the computation of Fibonacci-Numbers in 
Chapter 7. The history of the execution is at the policy specification level not explicitly 
defined, but is captured in the semantics of policy rules. The advantage is that the 
additional variables that would only be used to check the integrity of the execution are 
not implemented as part of the program itself. This honours one of the key-principles 
in software testing stating: do not include functionality required only for testing in the 
original code. The benefit of this approach has also be noted in [43], but seems not to 
have been a major concern in the development of policy languages. 
By defining integrity policies, one specifies the expected behaviour of a component at 
a high level of abstraction. with respect to the testing community this specification is 
desired to be precise, viz. the actual behaviour must not deviate. Testing is concerned 
with the finding of software faults before deployment. With policies we a concerned with 
the validation of properties in the deployed and running system. One of the applications, 
especially for open systems, is the establishment of trust-relationships between previously 
unknown entities. In this case the integrity policy defines a set of acceptable behaviours, 
that when matched by the actually observed behaviour lead to the establishment of trust. 
Key to this use is that the violation of an agent's integrity policy on an object's interface 
execution does not affect the object. For example when booking two seats in Albert Hall, 
my agent can reasonably expect that the available seats for the second booking do not 
contain the seat that was reserved for me in the first booking. If this is violated my trust 
in the booking system will decrease (even if I received an adequate confirmation for the 
first booking). 
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Scoping and Parallel Composition The advantage of defining policies that can change 
over time and events in a compositional fashion is that it allows for a modular approach to 
policy specification. Policy composition has previously been addressed in many languages 
e. g. [72,138,46,108,18,14], however they do not address composition along the temporal 
axis. We feel that this form of composition is important, as it allows the policy designer 
to not only partition the task of policy specification in departments, but also according 
to situations. This is especially suitable for policies in work-flow based systems that are 
naturally divided into stages. Other authors [28,17] did also recognise the need for tem- 
poral dependencies of authorisations and allow for the expression of periodic constraints 
e. g. "between 10: 00 and 14: 00 o'clock every Tuesday". Our approach is more flexible in 
that sequences and order relation can be specified without explicitly defining time. 
The difficulty of introducing scope and parallel composition is the dynamics of the 
model. One of the key advantages of the model presented in [124] is that policies are con- 
flict free, viz. the outcome of a policy decision is always defined. However, by introducing 
parallel composition new conflicts can be easily introduced, especially when the component 
policies do change dynamically. We have shown in Section 7.5.2 that the policy composi- 
tion using a simple conjunction does not adequately capture the intuition. We proposed 
a composition that hides the effect of the component policies and allows additionally the 
specification of an explicit conflict resolution. This approach differs greatly from the tra- 
ditional set-based approaches for policy composition as it captures the dynamics of the 
component policies. 
11.3.3 Policy as an Abstraction 
In [124] policies have been defined at the same level of abstraction as the system. This 
lead to difficulties in matching the semantics of a change in policy on a specific event. For 
example by executing an action that assigns x: =0; x: =1; x 22 and a policy that changes 
on x=1 and again on x=2 , it is not clear how these events can a) be observed and b) 
be implemented. With the proposed abstraction of policies we clearly define the observable 
states and events that can affect the policy (see Chapter 8). 
Additionally the implementation of more complex enforcement mechanisms, that for 
example take the history of the execution into account, could not be implemented because 
their implementation would affect the semantics of the policy itself. By defining policies 
at a higher level of abstraction and showing how the enforcement maps between these 
abstraction levels we are now able to implement more sophisticated enforcement mech- 
anisms. An additional benefit is that it allows for delayed refinement, viz. policies and 
actions/interfaces can be refined independently. This was detailed in Chapter 8 and 9. 
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11.3.4 Enforcement 
Key to the success of a policy language is its enforceability. Although [124] addresses the 
implementation of policies in Secure Action Systems (SAS), only a small subset of policy 
rules could be enforced. The premise of the rules was restricted to ITL state-formulae, viz. 
formulae that do not contain any temporal dependencies. This is an obvious drawback, as 
the power of the policy rules stemmed from the fact that history-dependencies could be 
expressed naturally as ITL formulae. We extended the class of rules that is enforceable 
to a negation-free subset of ITL with bounded quantification and have shown how the 
corresponding enforcement code can be formally derived (Chapter 9). 
The dynamic change of policies was implemented in [124] by composition of SAS, 
using similar operators as for policy composition. It was then shown how the SAS can be 
brought into a normal form that enforces the changing policy. In this work we chose a 
different approach and use compositional refinement to implement the policy change. 
We also relaxed the assumption of a single, centralised enforcement mechanism and 
allow for the distribution of policies to different enforcement mechanisms. Although this 
restricts the dependencies of policies to the part of the system that is observable by the 
enforcement mechanism, we feel that it is closer to actual system implementations. 
Enforcing Dynamically Changing Policies The enforcement of dynamically chang- 
ing policies has an advantage over the enforcement of other policy languages in which 
different situations are expressed as additional constraints on the policy rules to guarantee 
that the rule does only apply in the right context. For languages, in which policies do not 
change dynamically, the set of rules that must be evaluated by the enforcement mecha- 
nisms at any point in time remains constant. The specification of dynamically changing 
policies carries additional information on the transition between phases. This enables the 
enforcement mechanism to recognise the transition and to evaluate only those rules that 
apply in the current situation. Depending on the number of situations that can be distin- 
guished this can lead to substantial savings in the time that is needed for the enforcement 
of a policy. 
For example XACML [108] provides checks for the applicability of a policy. This is 
also aimed at the reduction of the computational effort that is needed to determine policy 
decisions. Still, the applicability of a policy is checked with every access request. 
Deriving the Required History Unlike other models, e. g. [72], the enforcement of 
our policy model does define how policy related events and states are maintained in form 
of histories. We have shown how the process can be optimised to maintain only the 
information that is needed to make policy decisions. This eliminates the need for meta- 
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policies that define the purging of a history data-base as proposed in [61]. The possibility 
to optimise the history in this sense has been recognised in [118], however it is not based on 
a sound mathematical foundation. The benefits of this approach have also been highlighted 
in [43] where they are applied to history dependent integrity checks for data-base systems 
that are defined as past time temporal logic formulae. 
Generation of Enforcement Code The refinement of policies into concrete enforce- 
ment code can be automated. We presented a prototype of such a compilation mechanism 
in Chapter 9. This allows for the generation of optimal enforcement code for a specific 
policy during run-time; viz. if a policy is changed, the new and updated enforcement code 
can be created. The advantage of this approach in comparison to a logic-programming 
based approach to policy evaluation is that a detailed timing-analysis can be performed 
on the enforcement code. Given a concrete execution platform real-time guarantees on 
the policy decision making can be provided. 
Temporal Requirements More recently with the development of Usage Control Mod- 
els (UCON) [145] the benefit of temporal logic for the specification of policies has been 
adopted. However, their approach seems to mainly focus on the maintenance of system 
controlled attributes rather than the specification of history dependencies of policies us- 
ing temporal logic. Also their approach does not address the composition of policies, 
concurrency of usage requests and the enforcement of policies. 
Related work in the WVeb-Service/Agent community to adjust the autonomy of agents, 
e. g. [134], use a description-logic based policy language. It is not clear how one can 
reason within these frameworks about temporal dependencies of policies without explicitly 
encoding time. In [136] AND-OR trees are used to model constraints on an agent's goal- 
adaption - again this does not seem to be suitable for the specification and analysis of 
temporal requirements. 
11.4 Critical Remarks 
In this section we compiled some of the criticism that we encountered when presenting 
our work to the community in form of papers and presentations. 
Another Policy Language - why? A commonly made critique is that there are al- 
ready many policy languages out there, why not take one and extend it. One paper review 
for example suggested to use ITL to formalise XACML, as it has similar concepts of con- 
flict resolution between policies (as does e. g. [72]). In response to this critique we agree 
with Becker et. al. who state in [20]: 
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Languages such as XACML, XrML, or SPKI/SDSI ... are specified 
by a com- 
bination of lengthy descriptions and algorithms that are ambiguous and, in 
some cases, inconsistent. Post-hoc attempts to formalise these languages are 
difficult and reveal their semantic ambiguities and complexities ... 
The aim of this work is to provide a uniform framework that integrates functional, 
security and temporal requirements. In the achievement of this aim the overhead of 
formalising many of the complex and sophisticated concepts found in industrial policy 
languages is not justifiable - especially if the result is that the formalised language is 
ambiguous or not consistent and additional effort would have to be spent in the rectification 
of these problems. 
We clearly see the benefit of using an expressive formal model to capture the seman- 
tics of a widely adopted language with exactly the purpose of improving the language. 
However, this was not in the scope of this thesis. Additionally we feel that the concept of 
dynamically changing policies is important for policies in domains that are characterised 
with a high degree of uncertainty and that need to cope with highly dynamic situations. 
These concepts have not been integrated in other policy languages. 
Policies should be interpreted! A commonly taken view is that policies are data 
that represents an input to an algorithm (e. g. the Policy Decision Point (PDP), see Sec- 
tion 2.3.3) that decides then on the access control decision. We take a different view in 
that the policy is for us an integral part of the PDP. In terms of flexibility, viz. changing 
the policy during the system execution, we would argue that it is as difficult to redirect 
PDP-requests to a different (new) PDP as it is to change the policy of a single PDP. 
Especially in interpreted languages, such as Java, the difference is merely conceptual. 
The advantage is that during the compilation certain optimisations can be performed 
-a policy interpreter on the contrary would be implemented in a way that allows the 
enforcement of all possible policies. The benefits are for example discussed in [111,181 
that dynamically induce the enforcement code in existing programs. 
Why can Obligations only be vigilantly enforced? We take the view that an agent 
(subject) is obliged to take an action. Given the autonomy of an agent, viz. it is in control 
of its actions, the decision to execute an action must be made as part of the agent's 
behaviour. Only a vigilant agent can alter the decisions made in the agent's deliberation 
phase, due to autonomy and encapsulation. 
However, as we mentioned before other work e. g. [108] takes a different approach and 
sees obligation as obligation of the enforcement mechanism. If we would consider a security 
enforcer as being an active entity of the system, then of course this type of obligation could 
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also be enforced. This is analogous to the real world: it is difficult to force somebody to 
take a specific action. Typically it is only enforceable by imposing a form of punishment 
for not compliance. The process of punishing, however, is then undertaken by a different 
(active) entity, i. e. the enforcer. We consider to extend the notion of a security enforcer 
in future work (see Section 11.5). 
The language is complex and real systems are difficult to express? Actually, 
the language itself is comparatively simple in its semantics, especially when compared 
with object-oriented systems or policy frameworks that make use of classes, inheritance 
and instantiations. This critique applies more to the syntax of the language, that is 
admittedly not overly appealing to system engineers. 
Two points must be emphasised in response to this critique. Firstly, languages to 
specify the system (e. g. Java) and the system to specify the policy (e. g. Java's Policy Files) 
are typically seen as two distinct languages. Obviously each of them seen individually is 
less complex. The disadvantage is however, that relations between the two languages are 
not clear. Secondly, with respect to to the policy language the security requirements that 
can be expressed in a single rule are complex and their enforcement is non-trivial. 
For the example that was used in Section 9.4 to show the refinement of a vigilant agent 
the resulting behaviour of the system was indeed complex, albeit the system description 
and the policy specification alone where short and concise. Contrary to the claim that it 
is undesirable to have such complex behaviour emerging from the enforcement of policies 
we argue that the integration of security and functionality within the same framework 
highlights the complexity that failures induced by enforcement mechanisms create in a 
system. We think it is important to highlight the effect that policy enforcement has on 
the system execution and argue that these complexities are already present in today's 
systems. By keeping the discussion of policies, system and enforcement separate they are 
not addressed by most of today's research on policies. 
The structure of the system is too static We agree that by assuming a finite and 
static set of subjects, objects and actions in the system we lack the flexibility of today's 
systems to dynamically create new entities. We would like to address this issue in future 
work by catering for classes and instantiations of classes with respect to agents, objects, 
policies and enforcement mechanisms. 
Formally, however, we can assume that due to finite resources in a software system the 
number of agents and objects will be finite. Therefore we can assume that the instantiation 
of an entity can be modelled by "activating" an existent, but unused entity. In this case 
defining policies in terms of types (for objects), groups and roles (for subjects) or MLS 
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approaches helps to control the dynamic instances, as they abstract the policy specification 
from the concrete identities. 
Formal Methods typically do not scale well Formal development methodologies 
have always been suspicious from the main-stream software development point of view. 
This is mainly due to the difficulty in their application, e. g. especially trained personnel is 
required, and the lacking capability to apply them to large-scale projects. In this work we 
aim to address software applications that are security-critical, i. e. that require a high level 
of assurance that security requirements are not violated. This demands a more rigorous 
and formal approach. 
We feel that the approach that was presented in this work is in terms of scalability 
workable even for larger software projects. Firstly, the design of agents is modular, viz. to 
be able to implement the security mechanisms it is not necessary to refine the deliberation 
phase, or the statements that are executed in an action. Secondly, the policy model is 
specially suitable to express large and complex requirements due to its compositionality. 
When defining a policy one can focus on a particular aspect of the policies e. g. a single 
department for structural composition or a single situation for temporal composition. We 
feel that this greatly increases the ability of policy developers to comprehend and maintain 
large policies. 
From a verification point of view the underlying logic has also the advantage of being 
compositional. This means that properties of the whole system can be inferred from 
properties of its components. This further supports the scalability of the approach. 
11.5 Future Work 
In this section we address some of the concerns that have been raised previously and 
highlight areas of research which we feel are worth pursuing in the future. 
Active Security Enforcer 
The security enforcer that has been introduced in Chapter 8 is based on the semantics 
of an object. It represents a passive entity that mediates the access to the protected 
objects. The passiveness of the enforcer represents a drawback when obligations should 
be associated with an enforcement mechanisms. One way of addressing this is by defining 
the security enforcer as an active entity. 
In this case the security enforcer would extend the semantics of agents and objects. The 
ability to execute actions would enable the enforcer to comply with obligations. Interfaces 
allow for the provision of administrative functions, such as role-assignment, delegation, 
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etc. to other agents in the system. Another benefit would be that networks of security 
enforcers can exchange information on events, reputation or similar. 
Models for Event-Distribution In natural extension to the active security enforcer it 
is conceivable to create models for event-distribution. This would allow the enforcement 
of policies that depend on events which are not directly observable by the enforcement 
mechanisms. These models would have to guarantee that events are distributed timely, 
viz. an access control decision is not made based on incomplete information (or if it is can 
be revoked whilst the access is ongoing - similarly as conceived in UCON). 
I 
SPAT towards an industrial strength tool 
The prototypes for analysis and automatic enforcement code generation require attention. 
For SPAT it seems to be increasingly important to appropriately link between the spec- 
ification and analysis modules. Additionally consistency checks, like the once that are 
made during the enforcement code generation provide valuable information to the policy 
designer, viz. if a policy is not satisfiable it is likely that the designer was mistaken in his 
conception of the rule. We are also investigating how a propositional subset of the policy 
rules could be model-checked using for example PITL2MONA [62]. 
Language extensions 
The SANTA language provides in its current state relatively low-level concepts for the 
specification of agents and objects. We are interested of extending the language to pro- 
vide well-known concepts like classes and inheritance as well as high-level communication 
constructs for inter-agent communication. The latter is based on using objects as channels 
or message-boxes, depending on the target platform. 
The concept of classes, instantiation and inheritance can then be used to develop 
a library of policies and enforcement mechanisms. For example it would be desirable 
if enforcement mechanisms that support RBAC (i. e. that provide interfaces for role- 
assignment/activation) can be predefined and included in new system developments. 
Provide an alternative formalisation for e. g. UCON or XACML 
To address the concern of why we would want to create another policy-language we aim 
to show how UCON or XACAML policies could be expressed using our framework. This 
could potentially detect ambiguities in these languages and thus help to improve them. 
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1%ust: How to deal with the Unknown 
Finally we wauit to exploit the developed concepts to model trust relationships between 
entities based ou their past (observable) behaviour and the risk that is associated with all 
interaction. We aim to extend the framework in such a way, that entities can establish 
trust through experience and are able to share this information with other entities. This 
does obviously require a richer model for the decision-making of agents than it is currently 
present in SAN'T'A. This line of investigation will he sponsored by the DIF-DTC consortiuiii 
as Project 7. (i "'T'rust Management in Collaborative Systems". An outline of the proposed 
Trust Management Framework is depicted in Figure 11.1. 
Bob 
Risk Engine 
Trust Engine 
Trust Policy 
Security Mechanisms: 
control interaction based on 
trust and risk assessments. 
Alice 
Risk Engine 
Trust Engine 
I rust Noucy 
info 
meta-info 
Eve 
Figure 11.1: Outline of the Trust Management Framework 
In this framework a trust-policy defines how an entity establishes trust and how it par- 
ticipates in the t rust -establishment process of other entities through trust-propagation. 
The framework links between the subjective notion of trust and the actual security niech- 
anisuis t hat, have been the focus of this work. Central to the approach is also the assessment 
of risk, that is the risk involved in engaging in an interaction with another entity or the 
risk iiivolvedl with basing decisions on information that was provided by other entities. 
Interactions & Trust propagation 
Assesses the trust/uncertainty and 
decides on a risk/benefit basis the 
outcome of future interactions. 
Enforces the trust policies, and assesses 
trust/ uncertainty on behaviour and 
information. 
Defines how trust propagates and how 
trust/ uncertainty values change dependent 
on observed behaviour 
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A 
access control The function of access-control is to control which principals [subjects] 
have access to which resources [objects] in the system - which files they 
can read, which programs they can execute, how they share data with other 
principals, and so on. [8]. 
action In the contect of Policies: An action is performed by a subject on an object. An 
example are the -rwx actions that are protected in a UNIX file system. actions 
can denote the mode of access to the object or represent a more complex access, 
e. g. method invocations. 
Actor An Actor is a self contained, interactive and continuously executing object. 
Agent Communication Language (ACL) Agents in open environments generally com- 
municate using an Agent Communication Language. This language usually 
provides performatives to distinguish the type of the message and beside a 
message-content, other mandatory parameters that are needed for message 
passing. 
Agent Orientated Programming (AOP) Programming paradigm in that the basic struc- 
ture of definiton is an agent. Agents, unlike objects in Object Oriented Pro- 
gramming do not only encapsulate methods and attributes, but also the control 
of these. This allows to specify a system that is build out of highly modu- 
lar and independent software entities (agents) that exibit control over their 
actions and state. 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) Artificial Intelligence is a branch of computer science that 
deals with intelligent behavior, learning, and adaptation in machines. Re- 
search in Al is concerned with producing machines to automate tasks requir- 
ing intelligent behaviour. [Source: Wikipedia, page Artificial Intelligence as 
of 23rd October 2006]. 
Artificial Intelligence Planning (AIP) Subfield of Artificial Intelligence that concerns it- 
self with knowing what to do. It is usually associated with the Stanford Re- 
search Institute Problem Solver planning system. 
authentication Authentication is the process of attempting to verify the digital identity 
of the sender of a communication such as a request to log in. The sender 
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being authenticated may be a person using a computer, a computer itself or 
a computer program. 
authorisation Authorisation determines whether access to system resource is allowed or 
denied, based on a subject's identity or credentials. 
Authorisation Specification Language (ASL) A policy model/ language that was de- 
veloped by Jajodia et. al. [72]. 
B 
Belief, Desire, Intention (BDI) Arguably, the most successful agent architectures are 
founded on the BDI model, in which agents continually monitor their envi- 
ronments and act to change them, based on three mental attitudes of belief, 
desire, and intention, representing informational, motivational and decision- 
making capabilities. Architectures based on the BDI model represent beliefs, 
desires and intentions as data structures, which determine the operation of an 
agent[90]. 
D 
delegation Delegation policies define the conditions under which a subject can delegate 
a specific access right (i. e. the right to perform an action on an object) to 
another subject. 
Deliberation-Enforcement-Execution (DEE) The main phases in the execution model 
of a single SANTA agent. 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) In Discretionary Access Control, the system's se- 
curity policy is under the discretion of individuals, e. g. the owner of a resource. 
A typical example is the file permission in a UNIX file system. 
Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) Subfield of Artificial Intelligence that can be 
further divided in to main camps Distributed Problem Solving and Multi 
Agent System. 
Distributed Problem Solving (DPS) Subfield of Distributed Artificial Intelligence that, 
according to Jennings et. al. considers how a particular problem can be solved 
by a number of modules, which cooperate in dividing and sharing knowledge 
about the problem and its evolving solution. 
E 
Enterprise Privacy Authorisation Language (EPAL) EPAL is a formal language for writ- 
ing enterprise privacy policies to govern data handling practices in IT systems 
according to fine-grained positive and negative authorization rights. It con- 
centrates on the core privacy authorization while abstracting data models and 
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user-authentication from all deployment details such as data model or user- 
authentication. [taken from http: //www. w3. org/Submission/EPAL/. Formal 
in this context does not mean mathematical. 
eXtended Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language, or XACML, was approved and became an OASIS standard in 
February 2003. XACML defines a general policy language used to protect 
resources as well as an access decision language. [taken from 
http: //dev2dev. bea. com/pub/a/2004/02/xacml. html]. 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) The Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a 
W3C-recommended general-purpose markup language for creating special- 
purpose markup languages, capable of describing many different kinds of data. 
[\Vikipedia page Extensible Markup Language]. 
I 
integrity Integrity policies define constraints on the execution of an action on an object 
by a specific subject. 
Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) ITL is a linear, interval-based, first-order temporal logic. 
It allows to express the behaviour of a system over a sequence of states. The 
ITL homepage [40] provides a complete introduction. 
See also Tempura. 
M 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) In Mandatory Access Control the system's security 
policy is under the control of a dedicated administrator. Typically used for 
military or governmental security policies, where subjects are associated with 
a clearance label and objects with a security label. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) The Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology is based in Boston, USA. See http: //web. mit. edu. 
Multi Agent System (MAS) Originally a research area of Distributed Artificial Intelli- 
gence. According to Jennings et. al. [77] the term MAS is now used "to refer 
to a system, that is composed of multiple (semi-) autonomous components". 
N 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) The National Institute of Stan- 
dards and Technology (NIST, formerly known as The National Bureau of Stan- 
dards) is a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Com- 
merce's Technology Administration. The institute's mission is to promote U. S. 
innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, 
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standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and im- 
prove quality of life. [Source: Wikipedia, page National Institute of Standards 
and Technologies as of 23rd October 2006]. 
Non-Discretionary Access Control (NDAC) Combines MAC and DAC by leaving some 
discretion to the user, however centrally managing aspects like the delegation 
of rights. 
0 
object In the context of Policies: An object is the target of an action execution by a 
subject. 
Object Oriented Programming (OOP) Programming paradigm, in that the basic struc- 
ture of definition is an object, that represents an instantiation of a class. Ob- 
jects encapsulate attributes and methods. 
See also Agent Orientated Programming. 
obligation Obligation policies define the conditions or events (sometimes also called trig- 
gers) under which a subject has to perform a specific action on an object. 
Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act (OODA) The OODA Loop is a concept originated by 
military strategist Col. John Boyd of the United States Air Force. Its main 
outline consists of four overlapping and interacting processes: Observe, Orient, 
Decide and Act. [Wikipedia page OODA Loop]. 
Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards, a 
global consortium that develops data representation standards for use in com- 
puter software. [Source: Wikipedia, OASIS (organization) as of 23rd October 
2006]. 
P 
Policy Decision Point (PDP) A logical entity that makes policy decisions for itself or 
for other network elements that request such decisions. [Source RFC3198, 
Network Working Group, The Internet Society (2001)]. 
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) A logical entity that enforces policy decisions. [Source 
RFC3198, Network Working Group, The Internet Society (2001)]. 
Public-Private Key (PPK) Public key cryptography is a form of cryptography which 
generally allows users to communicate securely without having prior access 
to a shared secret key. This is done by using a pair of cryptographic keys, 
designated as public key and private key. [Source: Wikipedia, page Public- 
key cryptography as of 23rd October 2006]. 
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R 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) In Role-Based Access Control the granting of ac- 
cess rights is abstracted from the concrete user to roles, in that the user can 
act. This is beneficial, since role-hierarchies reflect the organisations structure 
and are therefore less likely to change. This is especially true for companies 
with a high staff turnover. The advantage is that the security policy does not 
need to change, only the assignment of user to roles. This reduces security 
administration cost. 
S 
SANTA Wide-Spectrum Language (SANTA-WSL) Linguistic support for the specifi- 
cation of Secure Multi Agent System within the SANTA framework. Wide- 
spectrum means that the language accomodates both, specification constructs 
and concrete implementation. 
Secure Multi Agent System (SMAS) A SMAS consists of reactive agents, objects, se- 
curity policies and enforcement mechanisms. 
security policy Policies are rules governing the choices in the behaviour of a system. 
They allow the separation of rules that govern choices in the behaviour of the 
system, from the system's functionality. [16]. 
Security Policy Analysis Tool (SPAT) SPAT is a tool-kit for the early prototyping and 
analysis of dynamically changing security policies. SPAT uses Tempura to 
simulate environment and policy behaviour. 
Stanford Research Institute Problem Solver (STRIPS) STRIPS is a planning system 
consisting of three components: 
1. symbolic model of the agent's environment, typically in a subset of first- 
order predicate logic. 
2. symbolic specification of the agents actions. 
3. planning algorithm that uses 1., 2. and a representation of the agents goal 
state to create a plan, which specifies how the agent can act to achieve 
the goal. 
subject In the context of Policies: A subject is an entity that participates in the 
execution of the system. It can be for example a user, an agent/process 
executing on behalf of a user, groups, roles etc. 
T 
Team-based Access Control (TMAC) Team-based Access Control is an approach to 
apply Role-Based Access Control in collaborative environments. A team is an 
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abstraction that encapsulates a collection of users in specific roles with the 
objective of accomplishing a task. [128]. 
Temporal Role-based Access Control (TRBAC) An extension to RBAC that includes 
support for the definition of time and periodicity constraints. See [28]. 
Tempura Executable subset of Interval Temporal Logic, see [99]. 
U 
Usage Control (UCON) Usage Control (UCON) encompasses traditional access control, 
trust management, and digital rights management and goes beyond them in 
its definition and scope. It has been developed by Sandhu, Park and Zhang 
e. g. [112]. 
w 
World Wide Web (WWW) The World Wide Web ("WWW" or simply the "Web") is 
a global, read-write information space. Text documents, images, multimedia 
and many other items of information, referred to as resources, are identified by 
short, unique, global identifiers called Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) so 
that each can be found, accessed and cross referenced in the simplest possible 
way. [Wikipedia page World Wide Web]. 
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